scholarly journals En deçà de la tautologie symbolique du cogito Variations sur Descartes et Augustin à travers Levinas et Marion

2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-116
Author(s):  
István Fazakas

In this paper, I explore the thesis according to which ipseity cannot be conceived of without acknowledging a radical absence and alterity in its very core that makes it possible. To develop this thesis, I draw on Levinas’ reading of Descartes and Marion’s reading of Augustine. After a brief introductory part on what we could call, with Marc Richir’s term, the symbolic tautology of ipseity, I show how such a tautology is deconstructed by Levinas’ interpretation of the idea of the infinite in Descartes’ Third Meditation. I then proceed to contrast the results of this reading with Marion’s take on the problem of the memoria in Augustin’s Confessions. Both readings point towards a radical and immemorial dimension of absence that – by impeding the self from fully possessing itself – makes paradoxically ipseity possible in the first place. In the conclusion, I pose the question of whether – in order to account for this absence that reveals a transcendence in the most inner intimate of the self – one has to abandon phenomenology for ethics or some kind of new theology or if a strictly phenomenological description of this dimension of the experience of ipseity is possible.

2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-43
Author(s):  
Sonia Sikka

AbstractThrough a reading of Nietzsche's texts, primarily of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, this article develops a phenomenological description of the variety of intoxication exemplified in conditions of drunkenness, or in states of emotional excess. It treats Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a literary expression of such intoxication, arguing against attempts to find a coherent narrative structure and clear authorial voice behind this text's apparent disorder. Having isolated the intoxicated characteristics of Thus Spoke Zarathustra - its hyperbolic rhetoric and emotions, its lack of balance, its injustice, its shifting and conflicting moods, and its self-contradictions - I then offer an interpretation of the work, and by extension of intoxication itself, in terms of Nietzsche's model of the self as a dynamic multiplicity of forces. At the same time, I argue for a multiple and dynamic conception of personality in general.


Author(s):  
Jorge Martínez Lucena

ABSTRACTLast years, phenomenology has demonstrated its own value in the field of medicine with useful distinctions as the one among illness and disease. It has also contributed to psychiatry. Some inter-disciplinary works about mental illnesses can be found. The phenomenological description of the melancholic depression patient has three main features: a) the transformation of his own body experience; b) a continuous feeling of guilt; and c) a time experience which is desynchronized from the otherness. This paper aims to synthetize this phenomenological research about depression, which has been considered one of the plagues of our time. Moreover, it tries to explain how these changes in the patient’s experience can imply certain modifications of his own self-experience.RESUMENEn los últimos años la fenomenología ha demostrado su valía en el campo de la medicina con útiles distinciones como la hecha entre conceptos como illness y disease. También ha hecho interesantes aportaciones en el campo de la psiquiatría donde se pueden encontrar trabajos interdisciplinarios sobre la diversas enfermedades mentales. La descripción fenomenológica de la experiencia del enfermo de depresión melancólica constaría de tres elementos fundamentales: a) la transformación de la experiencia del propio cuerpo; b) el continuo sentimiento de culpa; y c) una experiencia del tiempo desincronizada con respecto a la alteridad. Esta comunicación intenta aportar una síntesis de dicha investigación fenomenológica hecha sobre la depresión, que ha sido considerada la plaga de nuestro tiempo. Además, intenta explicar en qué sentido tales elementos de la descripción fenomenológica de la experiencia del paciente de melancolía pueden implicar ciertas modificaciones de la experiencia que éste hace de su propio self.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Göran Sonesson

AbstractThe claim of cognitive semiotics to offer something new to semiotics rests on the ambition to bring together the research traditions of semiotics and cognitive science. Our focus has been on using the empirical approach of cognitive science in investigating semiotic issues. At the same time, however, phenomenological description plays a major part in preparing the studies and integrating their results, which is what is offered here. Eco has claimed that the mirror is not a sign, but once the notion of sign is specified, the mirror image is seen to be a perfect instance of it. It is no accident that the Gallup test, which is supposed to demonstrate the emergence of the self, starts having a positive result concurrently with the picture understanding. In contrast, mental images are not images and thus not signs. They are presentifications, i.e., a means for making something present, in the sense characterized by Husserl, and by such followers as Marbach and Thompson. We however argue that Husserl’s model of picture consciousness is incomplete, and that Thompson’s study of mental images lacks clarity because of the absence of any real comparison to pictures.


Phainomenon ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-153
Author(s):  
Pierre-Jean Renaudie

Abstract Do we appear to ourselves in a specific way that requires a phenomenological description? Do we need a phenomenology of self-knowledge? Another way to raise this question about the legitimacy of a phenomenological approach to the Self is to ask whether a philosophical analysis of the linguistic use of the personal pronouns is able to provide a satisfactory account of self-knowledge. Does the linguistic turn make phenomenology superfluous? Discussing the respective merits of the linguistic and phenomenological approaches to the concept of the Self through a crossed analysis of Sartre, Ricoeur, and Descombes, this paper stresses the complementarity between a phenomenological approach that focuses on the way we appear to ourselves and a linguistic analysis of the first-person pronoun. It claims that this relation of complementarity makes both approaches necessary to put forward the paradoxes of self-knowledge.


Author(s):  
Sander H. Lee

In this essay I examine the relationship between Sartre's phenomenological description of the "self" as expressed in his early work (especially Being and Nothingness) and elements to be found in some approaches to Buddhism. The vast enormity of this task will be obvious to anyone who is aware of the numerous schools and traditions through which the religion of Buddhism has manifested itself. In order to be brief, I have decided to select specific aspects of what is commonly called the Theravadin tradition as being representative of Buddhist philosophy. By choosing to look primarily at the Theravadin tradition, I am by necessity ignoring a vast number of other Buddhist approaches. However, in my view, the Theravadin sect presents a consistent Buddhist philosophy which is representative of many of the major trends within Buddhism.


PMLA ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
William V. Spanos

Shifting our critical perspective on Sweeney to encounter it temporally rather than spatially (New Critically), we discover an existential content embodied in an Anti-Aristotelian form remarkably similar to the drama of the absurd. Its thematic pattern is that which finds its paradigm in the myth of the Furies and its most articulate phenomenological description in Heidegger: the paradoxical flight from death and, ultimately, Nothingness (the Erinyes) that ends in the saving recognition that death is a benign agent (the Eumenides). The flight, characterized in existential philosophy as the self-deceptive “domestication” of death, is epitomized in the wastelanders effort to transform Sweeney's tale of murder into a well-made detective story. But this impulse is thwarted by Sweeney's refusal to draw a distancing conclusion. This becomes Eliot's formal strategy. Like the Anti-Aristotelian absurdists, he “decomposes” the “time-shape” of his microcosm to prevent the audience from objectifying the dreadful contingency of the world of his play. Eliot's Anti-Aristotelianism, however, is ultimately different from that of the “humanistic” absurdists. Whereas the latter project an absolutely discontinuous “time-shape” grounded in a vision of a radically discontinuous universe, Eliot, who sees the macrocosm as a Nothingness that may be the obverse of Somethingness, projects a discontinuous (circular) “time-shape” that contains the possibility of linear direction.


PhaenEx ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-85
Author(s):  
Biagio Gerard Tassone

This paper critically examines the philosophical foundations of Colin Wilson’s New Existentialism. I will show how Wilson’s writings promoted a phenomenological strategy for understanding states of ecstatic affirmation within so-called ‘peak experiences’. Wilson subsequently attempted to use the life affirming insights bestowed by peak states to establish an ontological ground for values to serve as a foundation for his New Existentialism. Because of its psychological focus however, I argue that Wilson’s New Existentialism contains an ambivalent framework for establishing ontological categories, which leads his thought into theoretical difficulties. More precisely, Wilson’s strategy runs into problems in coherently integrating its explicitly psychological interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality within a broader, and philosophically coherent, phenomenological framework. Wilson’s psychological reading of Husserl’s transcendental reduction, for example, manifests tensions in how it reconciles the empirical basis of acts of transcendence with an essentialist conception of the self as a transcendental ego. The above tensions, I argue, ultimately render the New Existentialism susceptible to criticism from a Husserlian-transcendental perspective. After outlining a Husserlian critique of Wilson’s position, I end the paper by suggesting how some of the central insights of the New Existentialism might help to bridge the gap that persists between pure phenomenological description and metaphysics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucio Tonello ◽  
Luca Giacobbi ◽  
Alberto Pettenon ◽  
Alessandro Scuotto ◽  
Massimo Cocchi ◽  
...  

AbstractAutism spectrum disorder (ASD) subjects can present temporary behaviors of acute agitation and aggressiveness, named problem behaviors. They have been shown to be consistent with the self-organized criticality (SOC), a model wherein occasionally occurring “catastrophic events” are necessary in order to maintain a self-organized “critical equilibrium.” The SOC can represent the psychopathology network structures and additionally suggests that they can be considered as self-organized systems.


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