Strategic Balance between India and Pakistan with respect to “Balance of Power Theory”

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. 236-249
Author(s):  
Jaweriya Nasim ◽  
Khushboo Fatima ◽  
Sajida Noureen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Asia ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Single Event ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Power Theory ◽  
Strategic Balance

India and Pakistan have strained relations since their independence because of serious conflicts like the Kashmir issue and major wars of 1965 and 1971. There is a continuous struggle for dominance among both the states through nuclear weapons and alliances with other nuclear weapons states, which have been addressed in this paper. India had made South Asia nuclear; to which Pakistan develop its nuclear program. Moreover, India and the United States growing relationship have further created an imbalance in the region. In return, Pakistan started strengthening its ties with China to counterbalance the Indian threat. This has been discussed in the paper that both states have actually created balance against one another in the context of the balance of power theory. But it is not going to be long lasting as there is a negative peace among them, and a single event can trigger a major conflict and depict dominance of one over the other.

scholarly journals Managing Leadership in the Indo-Pacific: The United States’ South Asia Strategy Revisited

2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 463-480
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Yang
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Asia ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Leadership Role ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
United States South ◽  
Strategic Objective

The United States’ South Asia strategy has been based on the calculation of its overall national security priorities. In practice, when U.S. priorities are at odds with those of other regional powers, Washington tends to adopt a “no-expectations” psychological approach toward its regional partners to avoid disappointment, a technical “de-hyphenation strategy” to improve policy efficiency, and practical cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of its South Asia strategy. However, Washington often has to come to terms with the realities on the ground with regard to its leadership role in South Asia. For the time being, Washington has articulated its strategic objective in South Asia, that is, a regional balance of power in favor of the United States vis-a-vis its perceived competitor, China. Therefore, it has conducted conditional cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan on land, and committed support for India on security issues in the Indian Ocean, so as to hedge against China’s growing presence in South Asia. The enhancement of U.S.-India defense and security cooperation has fueled China’s suspicion of India’s intention to join the U.S.-led coalition against it. By the logic of balance of power, the United States will continue to regard India as a strategic counterweight to China, which is likely to increase the possibility of strategic tensions and conflicts between China and India that may finally entangle the United States.

The Iranian Nuclear Program (1974–2015)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Iranian Revolution ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
Credible Threat

This chapter analyzes US efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons from the 1970s until the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Iran initially began exploring nuclear weapons when it was an American client in the 1970s, prior to the development of a US sanctions policy. Once the United States strengthened its nonproliferation policy, a credible threat of sanctions helped convince Iran to scale back its nuclear plans. After the Iranian Revolution led to a complete break in relations with the United States, Iran again began seeking nuclear weapons, undeterred by the threat of sanctions due to its low dependence on the United States. After two decades of unilateral US pressure failed to alter Iran’s plans, stringent multilateral sanctions led Iran to agree to strict limits on its nuclear program.

The Pakistani Nuclear Program (1972–1987)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Soviet Invasion

This chapter examines US nonproliferation efforts vis-à-vis Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. Although Pakistan started its nuclear weapons program prior to the development of a US sanctions policy, and thus underestimated the odds of facing sanctions, it nevertheless went on to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States was unable to halt the Pakistani program for two reasons. First, when it initially threatened and imposed sanctions on Pakistan in the late 1970s, Pakistan was not highly dependent on the United States and therefore had little to lose. Second, once Pakistan became dependent on the United States in the 1980s due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increased need for aid, the United States undermined the credibility of its nonproliferation policy by waiving sanctions and only credibly threatening to cut off aid in response to a nuclear test.

Trial Balloons

2020 ◽  
pp. 84-105
Author(s):  
Simon Miles
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Force ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
East And West ◽  
General Secretary

This chapter is devoted to Konstantin Chernenko' efforts to shift superpower relations back to a détente-like footing during his time as a General Secretary of the Soviet Union. It examines attempts on the part of various Western leaders to carve out a role for themselves as the superpowers' chosen intermediary. It also investigates the balance of power between East and West, including how and why leaders in Washington and Moscow perceived and responded to each other as they did. The chapter analyzes the nuclear freeze movement, which has remained a political force to be reckoned with as the movement called for both superpowers to halt the construction and deployment of nuclear weapons. It talks about the freeze activists in the United States who shepherded the passage of nonbinding resolutions that support their cause in four state legislatures, the House, and the Senate.

Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China's Military Help Secure North Korea's Nuclear Weapons?

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Korean Peninsula ◽  
Gain Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Security Training

Is China likely to intervene if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, and if so, does Beijing have the willingness and capabilities to deal safely with North Korea's nuclear program? Securing and destroying Pyongyang's nuclear weapons would be the United States’ top priority in a Korean contingency, but scholars and policymakers have not adequately accounted for the Chinese military's role in this mission. China's concerns about nuclear security and refugee flows, its expanding military capabilities to intervene, and its geopolitical competition with the United States all suggest that China is likely to intervene militarily and extensively on the Korean Peninsula if conflict erupted. In this scenario, Chinese forces would seek to gain control of North Korea's nuclear facilities and matériel. For the most part, China has the capabilities to secure, identify, and characterize North Korean nuclear facilities, though it exhibits weaknesses in weapons dismantlement and nonproliferation practices. On aggregate, however, Chinese troops on the peninsula would be beneficial for U.S. interests and regional security. Nevertheless, to mitigate the risks, the United States should work with China to coordinate their movements in potential areas of operation, share intelligence, and conduct combined nuclear security training.

Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Or Rabinowitz ◽  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Africa ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
West Germany ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nuclear Materials ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
History Of ◽  
Nuclear Tests

How has the United States behaved historically toward friendly states with nuclear weapons ambitions? Recent scholarship has demonstrated the great lengths to which the United States went to prevent Taiwan, South Korea, and West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet seemingly on the other side of the ledger are cases such as Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan, where the United States failed to prevent proliferation, and where many have argued that the United States made exceptions to its nonproliferation objectives given conflicting geopolitical goals. A reexamination of the history of U.S. nonproliferation policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan, based on declassified documents and interviews, finds that these cases are not as exceptional as is commonly understood. In each case, the United States sought to prevent these states from acquiring nuclear weapons, despite geopolitical constraints. Moreover, once U.S. policymakers realized that prior efforts had failed, they continued to pursue nonproliferation objectives, brokering deals to prevent nuclear tests, public declaration of capabilities, weaponization, or transfer of nuclear materials to other states.

North Korea

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick McEachern
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Korea ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pop Music ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Foreign Service ◽  
The North ◽  
American President

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

scholarly journals BALANCING IN UNIPOLARITY

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 494-515
Author(s):  
Augusto César Dall'Agnol
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Power Theory ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Soft Balancing ◽  
Cold War Era ◽  
Do So

This article aims to analyze, through a critical bias, the implications of unipolarity to balancing behavior. In order to do so, it discusses the dynamics of balance of power theory, assumed to be inoperative in the post-Cold War period by the main academic debates over unipolarity: i) unipolar stability; ii) balance of threats; iii) soft balancing; iv) liberal institutionalism. What is argued is that, including the unipolar illusion view, tied to the balance of power theory, these approaches overestimated the effects of the unipolarity to the balancing behavior of other states. In this sense, it is assumed here that the issues related to the unipolar moment are directly connected to the hegemonic interregnum discussions. By concluding that the dynamics of balance of power, especially those of hard balancing, are still observed in the post-Cold War era, the two main ponderations of the literature become inverted: i) that balancing became inoperative and; ii) that the only available strategies to other states would be soft balancing and bandwagoning. In sum, this conclusion has directly implication to the available strategies both to the United States and its main peer competitors.         Recebido em: Agosto/2018. Aprovado: Setembro/2018.

The Middle East

2021 ◽  
pp. 96-132
Author(s):  
Michael Mandelbaum
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Military Forces

The undeniable threat that Iran poses to the other countries of the Middle East has its roots in the fundamentalist Islamist ideology that the ruling clerics there espouse. The clerics aspire to evict the long-engrained military forces, aid, and other influences of the United States from the region and to thus become the dominant power. In pursuit of these ambitious goals, Iran has trained and sponsored various proxy forces and terrorists in other nearby countries and has sought to acquire nuclear weapons for the state. Ultimately, these efforts have served to undermine the prospects of building peace in the region.

The United States and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1975–1990

2019 ◽  
pp. 112-159
Author(s):  
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
South Asia ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Assistance

Chapter 4 examines the proliferation dispute between the United States and Pakistan. As with the Middle East, averting containment failure in South Asia was the overriding aim of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. Slowing or halting the clandestine Pakistani nuclear weapons program was always a subordinate goal. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the turning point. Chapter 4 examines the oscillations in US nonproliferation policies toward Pakistan, from the Ford administration’s offer of advanced fighters for nuclear restraint in 1975–1976, to the Carter administration’s imposition of sanctions in early1979, to the Reagan administration’s provision of a $1.4 billion foreign military assistance package and efforts to circumvent nonproliferation legislation in exchange for Pakistani dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s pledge not to cross four nuclear “red lines” from 1981 to 1988, to the George H. W. Bush administration’s resumption of sanctions after the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1990.

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