The Education Iron Triangle

The Forum ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin R. West ◽  
Michael Henderson ◽  
Paul E. Peterson

Do teachers and the public disagree on education reform? We use data from a nationally representative survey conducted in 2011 to identify the extent of the differences between the opinion of teachers and the general public on a wide range of education policies. The overall cleavage between teachers and the general public is wider than the cleavages between other relevant groups, including that between Democrats and Republicans. At least with respect to patterns of opinion on education reform, school politics is largely a conflict between producers within the system and consumers outside it – a classic iron triangle theme.

Abstract While previous work has shown the Storm Prediction Center (SPC) convective outlooks accurately capture meteorological outcomes, evidence suggests stakeholders and the public may misinterpret the categorical words currently used in the product. This work attempts to address this problem by investigating public reactions to alternative information formats that include numeric information: (1) numeric risk levels (i.e., “Level 2 of 5”) and (2) numeric probabilities (i.e., “a 5% chance”). In addition, it explores how different combinations of the categorical labels with numeric information may impact public reactions to the product. Survey data comes from the 2020 Severe Weather and Society Survey, a nationally representative survey of US adults. Participants were shown varying combinations of the information formats of interest, and then rated their concern about the weather and the likelihood of changing plans in response to the given information. Results indicate that providing numeric information (in the form of levels or probabilities) increases the likelihood of participants correctly interpreting the convective outlook information relative to categorical labels alone. Including the categorical labels increases misinterpretation, regardless of whether numeric information was included alongside the labels. Finally, findings indicate participants’ numeracy (or their ability to understand and work with numbers) had an impact on correct interpretation of the order of the outlook labels. Although there are many challenges to correctly interpreting the SPC convective outlook, using only numeric labels instead of the current categorical labels may be a relatively straightforward change that could improve public interpretation of the product.


Author(s):  
Jon Kingzette

Abstract Scholars, the media, and ordinary people alike express alarm at the apparent loathing between Democrats and Republicans in the mass public. However, the evidence of such loathing typically comes from survey items that measure attitudes toward the Democratic and Republican Parties, rather than attitudes toward ordinary partisans. Using a nationally representative survey, I find that Democrats and Republicans have substantially more positive feelings toward ordinary people belonging to the opposing party than they do toward politicians in the opposing party and the opposing party itself. These results indicate that research relying on measures of feelings toward the opposing “Party” vastly overstates levels of partisan animosity in the American public and demonstrate the need to distinguish between attitudes toward party elites and ordinary partisans in future research.


2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2021-107741
Author(s):  
Harald Schmidt ◽  
Sonia Jawaid Shaikh ◽  
Emiily Sadecki ◽  
Sarah Gollust

Implementing equity principles in resource allocation is challenging. In one approach, some US states implemented race-based prioritisation of COVID-19 vaccines in response to vast racial inequities in COVID-19 outcomes, while others used place-based allocation. In a nationally representative survey of n=2067 US residents, fielded in mid-April 2021 (before the entire US population became eligible for vaccines), we explored the public acceptability of race-based prioritisation compared with place-based prioritisation, by offering vaccines to harder hit zip codes before residents of other zip codes. We found that in general, a majority of respondents supported the place-based approach, and a substantial proportion supported the race-based plan. Support was higher among Democrats compared with Republicans. All US residents became eligible for vaccines on 19 April 2021 but as of this writing, equitable uptake of vaccines remains urgent not only for first doses for adults but also for boosters and for children. Our findings also provide a benchmark for future pandemic planning that racial and social justice in vaccine allocation are salient considerations for the public. The findings may furthermore be of interest to policy makers designing vaccine allocation frameworks in countries with comparable health disparities across social, ethnic and racial groups, and more broadly, for those exploring ways of promoting equity in resource allocation outside of a pandemic setting.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Landry ◽  
Jonathan Schooler ◽  
Robb Willer ◽  
Paul Seli

Dehumanization, the belief that other people are less than fully human, dampens empathy, increases animosity, and catalyzes conflict between groups. Research has revealed that a troubling number of American partisans blatantly dehumanize members of the other party. Nonetheless, this research has also found that partisans substantially overestimate the extent to which members of the rival party dehumanize them. Here, we predict that partisans’ perceptions of being dehumanized by rival partisans (or meta-dehumanization) leads them to respond with reciprocal dehumanization. By implication, partisans’ own dehumanization of rival partisans could be reduced by correcting their exaggerated meta-dehumanization. We test this hypothesis in a pre-registered, nationally-representative survey experiment of Democrats and Republicans (N = 2,127). We find that a brief, informational intervention correcting partisans’ exaggerated perceptions of how much rival partisans dehumanize them reduced levels of partisan dehumanization by 45%, and this effect persisted in a follow-up survey conducted approximately one week later. We also investigated the effects of our intervention on additional outcomes, finding that it reduced desire for social distance from, and negative affect toward, rival partisans, and that these effects also persisted a week later. Together, these results suggest that correcting inaccurate perceptions of the extent of partisan dehumanization can be a tool for durably mitigating partisan enmity.


Author(s):  
Emily D. Lenhardt ◽  
Rachel N. Cross ◽  
Makenzie J. Krocak ◽  
Joseph T. Ripberger ◽  
Sean R. Ernst ◽  
...  

One of the challenges when communicating forecast information to the public is properly contextualizing uncertainty. No forecast is ever certain, as no meteorological phenomenon is guaranteed to occur. As such, the uncertainty in forecast information should be communicated in a way that makes sense to end users. Previous studies of the communication of probabilistic information suggest that, although the general public are more apt to communicate uncertainty with words of estimative probability (WEPs), they prefer to receive uncertainty information numerically. Other work has suggested that a combination of numbers and WEPs is the best method for communicating probability, but fewer research studies have assessed the communication and interpretation of probabilistic meteorological information. In this study, we code 8900 tweets from the National Weather Service Weather Forecast Offices (WFOs) and analyze them to find how forecasters communicate probabilistic forecast information to the public via Twitter. This analysis reveals that WFO messaging is dominated by WEPs, with few numerical descriptions of probability. These WEPs are generally vague, unqualified notions of probability that may impede the public’s ability to interpret the information that forecasters are trying to communicate. Based on this analysis, two publicly fielded surveys also are analyzed in order to understand how participants tend to interpret the most common qualified and unqualified WEPs that WFOs used on Twitter. Though participants generally interpret qualified WEPs more consistently than unqualified WEPs, both categories featured a wide range of interpretations that suggest both types of WEPs are vaguely defined for the general public.


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (7) ◽  
pp. 1070-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Rankin ◽  
Murat Ergin

Recent cultural consumption research has drawn attention to the emergence of the high status ‘cultural omnivore,’ that is, individuals who consume a wide range of cultural products, including the expected ‘high culture,’ but more ‘popular’ forms as well. Initially reported in studies conducted in the developed West, this study broadens the basis of comparison by investigating the case of Turkey – a non-western, predominantly Muslim, developing country with a long history of state-led westernization. Using data from a nationally representative survey of adults, the study examines 34 cultural tastes in three domains – music, food, and literature – and participation in five different cultural activities for evidence of an omnivorous pattern. The items used include indicators of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ culture, as well as ‘local’ and ‘global/western’ culture. The results of a latent class analysis clearly identify an omnivorous group. A distinctive feature of the Turkish cultural field is that groups are largely defined by their orientation towards local versus global forms, with omnivores consuming both, in contrast to groups that restrict their diet to ‘local’ forms. Further analysis shows that, similar to studies in other contexts, Turkish omnivorousness is associated with higher social position, especially education and income. Omnivores also tend to be younger and more secular in their views towards the role of religion in the public sphere. The article concludes that, in addition to the high/popular distinction, the local/global is a critical symbolic boundary shaping cultural identities in Turkey.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 237802312110498
Author(s):  
Christopher P. Scheitle ◽  
Katie E. Corcoran

Efforts to address the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have encountered skepticism among the public, but COVID-19 is not the only medical or scientific issue that receives such skepticism. How does COVID-19 skepticism relate to other forms of science skepticism? Using new data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults, this study reveals that skepticism toward COVID-19 is similar to patterns of skepticism toward vaccines in general and, more interestingly, skepticism toward climate change. Patterns of skepticism toward evolution and genetically modified foods are more distinct from COVID-19 skepticism. Notably, even after accounting for other forms of science skepticism, political conservatism is significantly associated with greater skepticism toward COVID-19. Finally, contrary to some media narratives, the analysis reveals few racial or ethnic differences in skepticism toward COVID-19, and the differences that do exist indicate less skepticism among Black and Asian individuals relative to White individuals.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316801985804
Author(s):  
Eddie Hearn

Does an internationally unpopular president reduce support for US foreign policy? This article examines how President Trump’s endorsement influences foreign policy preferences abroad. A nationally-representative survey experiment is conducted on Japanese attitudes concerning the government’s response to the recent North Korean missile launches. It is found that leadership credibility has a significant impact on the public. Japanese citizens are less likely to support an aggressive response to North Korea when it is endorsed by President Trump. The effect of leadership credibility, however, may not be entirely distinct from general anti-American sentiments. These results indicate that, even in high politics related to national security, Trump’s lack of credibility abroad hinders allies’ ability to cooperate with the USA by eroding domestic support, but it is difficult to separate the Trump effect from broader attitudes toward the USA.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document