Chapter 5 Transition Paths and the Quality of Democracy

2016 ◽  
pp. 173-216
Author(s):  
Terence Teo

This chapter examines whether the nature of the transition—distributive conflict or elite-led—has any effect on the quality of democracy. More specifically, it asks whether transition paths reflect equifinality, the existence of multiple routes to the same outcome, or whether democratization through one path rather than another has a more enduring effect. Focusing on cases of reversion to authoritarian regimes, the chapter argues that mass mobilization may also constitute a check on government by raising the costs to both autocratic incumbents and their democratic successors of abusing executive power, violating human rights and civil liberties, and committing electoral fraud. Paired comparisons between similarly situated distributive conflict and elite-led transitions provide additional evidence on how mass mobilization can increase the quality of transitional elections, reduce the capacity of hard-liners to resort to repression, and impede the scope of institutional “lock-ins” that give exiting elites veto power.


Liquidity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-152
Author(s):  
Mukhaer Pakkanna

Political democracy should be equivalent to the economic development of the quality of democracy, economic democracy if not upright, even the owner of the ruling power and money, which is parallel to force global corporatocracy. Consequently, the economic oligarchy preservation reinforces control of production and distribution from upstream to downstream and power monopoly of the market. The implication, increasingly sharp economic disparities, exclusive owner of the money and power become fertile, and the end could jeopardize the harmony of the national economy. The loss of national economic identity that makes people feel lost the “pilot of the state”. What happens then is the autopilot state. Viewing unclear direction of the economy, the national economy should clarify the true figure.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yukihiko Hamada ◽  
Khushbu Agrawal

Money is a necessary component of any democracy: it enables political participation, campaigning and representation. However, if it is not effectively regulated, it can undermine the integrity of political processes and institutions, and jeopardize the quality of democracy. Therefore, regulations related to the funding of political parties and election campaigns, commonly known as political finance, are a critical way to promote integrity, transparency and accountability in any democracy. Political finance regulations must adapt and adjust to political, economic and societal changes. This report contributes to the discussion of the future of political finance by exploring the following trends, opportunities and challenges related to money in politics that need to be taken into consideration when improving political finance systems: • mainstreaming political finance regulations into an overall anti-corruption framework; • supporting the implementation of existing political finance regulations and monitoring their performance; • harnessing digital technologies to ensure transparency and accountability in political finance; and • designing targeted political finance measures to encourage the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Davide Vittori

Abstract Scholars have long debated whether populism harms or improves the quality of democracy. This article contributes to this debate by focusing on the impact of populist parties in government. In particular, it inquires: (1) whether populists in government are more likely than non-populists to negatively affect the quality of democracies; (2) whether the role of populists in government matters; and (3) which type of populism is expected to negatively affect the quality of liberal-democratic regimes. The results find strong evidence that the role of populists in government affects several qualities of democracy. While robust, the findings related to (2) are less clear-cut than those pertaining to (1). Finally, regardless of their role in government, different types of populism have different impacts on the qualities of democracy. The results show that exclusionary populist parties in government tend to have more of a negative impact than other forms of populism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172110261
Author(s):  
Richard Nadeau ◽  
Jean-François Daoust ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville

Citizens who voted for a party that won the election are more satisfied with democracy than those who did not. This winner–loser gap has recently been found to vary with the quality of electoral democracy: the higher the quality of democracy, the smaller the gap. However, we do not know what drives this relationship. Is it driven by losers, winners, or both? And Why? Linking our work to the literature on motivated reasoning and macro salience and benefiting from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project—covering 163 elections in 51 countries between 1996 and 2018, our results show that the narrower winner–loser gap in well-established electoral democracies is not only a result of losers being more satisfied with democracy, but also of winners being less satisfied with their victory. Our findings carry important implications since a narrow winner–loser gap appears as a key feature of healthy democratic systems.


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