scholarly journals Chapter 1 Nuclear Opportunism How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics

2021 ◽  
pp. 9-35
Author(s):  
Jo-Ansie Van Wyk ◽  
Linda Kinghorn ◽  
Hollie Hepburn ◽  
Clarence Payne ◽  
Chris Sham

Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter summarizes key findings in the proponents of the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” which contend that nuclear weapons are transformative because they greatly reduce the need for countries to engage in intense security competition. It emphasizes that although nuclear weapons are the greatest tools of deterrence ever created, they do not automatically confer national security benefits on their owners, much less guarantee enduring safety from foreign threats. The chapter looks into the unfortunate reality of international politics in the shadow of nuclear weapons, in which countries must still pay close attention to the balance of power, search for ways to change the balance when they find themselves at a disadvantage and contemplate and plan for war in order to protect vital national interests. It explains how fears that tragically drove international politics for centuries still exist and how those fears are justified. The nuclear age remains an age of power politics.


Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody

Chapter 1 examines how British policy-makers viewed the arrival of tactical nuclear weapons, employing as a vehicle in the 1950s debate on the relative merits of the opposing strategic theories of ‘graduated deterrence’ and ‘massive retaliation’. It shows how the British government rejected any suggestion to draw distinctions in peacetime between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons because of a strong belief that such an announcement would undermine the overall deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Gripped by a ‘deterrence habit of mind’, civilian leaders viewed tactical nuclear weapons not as meaningful military tools, but as weapons of escalation whose use would trigger a strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers. The rejection of any kind of graduated deterrence through the use of tactical nuclear weapons set a precedent in how British policy-makers conceived the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, which would have important consequences in the following debates about NATO strategy.


Author(s):  
James Cameron

Chapter 1 describes how John F. Kennedy rose to power by articulating his own new nuclear strategy, which would use the latest advances in social and organizational sciences, combined with US superiority in nuclear weapons, to defend the United States’ national security interests. The foremost exponent of this strategy of “rational superiority” was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The chapter then explains how this scheme was dealt a series of blows by Kennedy’s experiences during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, which disabused him of the idea that nuclear superiority could be used to coerce the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration used the rhetoric of rational superiority to advance the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was planning to employ it as part of the president’s reelection campaign in 1964. Kennedy had not reconciled this gap between his public rhetoric and personal doubts at the time of his death.


Author(s):  
Alexandra Guisinger

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the book and its two interwoven puzzles: what are the predictors of Americans’ trade preferences in today’s post-industrial economy, and why do so few politicians attempt to take advantage of these preferences? After providing historical context for American trade policy, the chapter outlines an answer: that the changing American economy has untethered traditional sources of trade sentiment, resulting in diverse, countervailing, and difficult to mobilize sources of trade sentiment. As a result, in most political districts, discussion of trade has fallen by the wayside; and trade policy is increasingly being formulated and conducted outside of standard systems of voter-driven accountability. The chapter places this new argument in the context of existing literature on the domestic and international politics of trade policy and provides a chapter by chapter summary of the book.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 805-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Epstein

AbstractIn this article I theorise the concept of misrecognition that we aim to bring to the study of international politics with this Special Issue. I draw upon three sources to do so: recognition theory, Hegel, and Jacques Lacan. I show that, while the seeds of an interest in misrecognition were laid in that interdisciplinary Hegelian scholarship known as recognition theory, it remains underdeveloped. To develop it into a concept I chart a path through recognition theory back to Hegel’s original dialectic of the master and servant in thePhenomenology of Spirit. What the dialectic captures, I argue, are the actual dynamics of misrecognition in social life, not an idealised form of recognition. This foundational, constitutive misrecognition is what Lacan also theorises by way of his concept of ‘fantasy’. Both Hegel and Lacan foreground a misrecognised, desiring subject that challenges the ways in which agency has been understood in international politics. Lastly, I show the purchase of a Hegelian-Lacanian analysis for IR by considering the relations between sovereignty and nuclear weapons under the lens of fantasy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Bell

What happens to the foreign policies of states when they acquire nuclear weapons? Despite its importance, this question has not been answered satisfactorily. Nuclear weapons can facilitate six conceptually distinct foreign policy behaviors: aggression, expansion, independence, bolstering, steadfastness, and compromise. This typology of foreign policy behaviors enables scholars to move beyond simple claims of “nuclear emboldenment,” and allows for more nuanced examination of the ways in which nuclear weapons affect the foreign policies of current and future nuclear states. The typology also sheds light on Great Britain's response to nuclear acquisition. Britain used nuclear weapons to engage in greater levels of steadfastness in responding to challenges, bolstering junior allies, and demonstrating independence from the United States, but it did not engage in greater levels of aggression, expansion, or compromise. The typology and the British case demonstrate the value of distinguishing among different effects of nuclear weapons acquisition, have implications for scholars' and policymakers' understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics, and suggest avenues for future research.


2005 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-528
Author(s):  
Zaklina Novicic

The author describes the contemporary situation in the theory and practice of international politics in the field of nuclear weapons. The first part of the paper deals with past results in the process of proliferation and the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, as well as the contemporary nuclear policies of great powers. The second part presents different theoretical approaches to the problem of nuclear weapons - realism, liberalism and the so-called critical or alternative approaches. The author expects that the process of nuclear proliferation will be continued - it will be gradual, controlled and directed by great powers and the USA, in particular.


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