scholarly journals Aristotle on Perceptual Interests

Apeiron ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-256
Author(s):  
Pia Campeggiani

AbstractTraditional interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of perception mainly focus on uncovering the underlying mechanisms that are at stake when perceivers are affected by sensible qualities. Investigating the nature of sense perception is one of Aristotle’s main worries and one that he explicitly relates to the question of its causes (e. g. Sens. 436a16–17, 436b9) and its ends (e. g. de An. 434a30 ff.). Therefore I suggest that, in order to fully explain Aristotle’s view of perceptual phenomena, the possibilities, the constraints, and the goals defined by the embodied and situated engagement of perceivers with the external world must be taken into account. Accordingly, in this paper, I provide an affective reading of Aristotle’s theory of perception. I shall ask what, in addition to functioning sense organs and appropriate response mechanisms, the perceiver contributes to perceptual content. Specifically, I propose to shed light on the significance of perceptual experience for the perceiver and I aim to show that, according to Aristotle, one’s biological and personal qualities are perceptually relevant, meaning that they underpin perception, rather than coming into play after perception has occurred and its objects have been discerned. The paper is divided into two parts, respectively dealing with sensory affections and more complex affective phenomena. As regards the domain of primal sense perception, I will focus on smell as a representative example: since Aristotle identifies it as the least developed of human sensory faculties, it will serve as a revealing illustration of how sense perception is informed and qualified by what, drawing on contemporary philosophical terminology, I will call ‘perceptual interests’, viz. the affective sense of what is at stake in the living being’s interaction with the environment. I will then proceed to consider the way more complex affective phenomena underpin perception by examining the case of emotions and that of virtues of character. By showing how perception is affectively inflected and how emotion is rooted in perception’s bodily nature, I aim to sketch out the general lines along which I believe that the Aristotelian theory of perception should be approached.

Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter offers a response to Quassim Cassam’s ‘Seeing and Knowing’, which challenges some of the conditions Cassam thinks the author has imposed on a satisfactory explanation of our knowledge of the external world. According to Cassam, the conditions he specifies can be fulfilled in ways that explain how the knowledge is possible. What is at stake in this argument between Cassam and the author is the conception of what is perceived to be so that is needed to account for the kind of perceptual knowledge we all know we have. That is what must be in question in any promising move away from the overly restrictive conception of perceptual experience that gives rise to the hopelessness of the traditional epistemological problem. The author suggests that we should explore the conditions of successful ‘propositional’ perception of the way things are and emphasizes the promise of such a strategy.


Author(s):  
Susanna Schellenberg

Chapter 5 takes a step back and traces the way in which excessive demands on the notion of perceptual content invite an austere relationalist account of perception. It argues that any account that acknowledges the role of discriminatory, selective capacities in perception must acknowledge that perceptual states have representational content. The chapter shows that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with representationalism. Most objections to the thesis that perceptual experience has representational content apply only to austere representationalist accounts, that is, accounts on which perceptual relations to the environment play no explanatory role. By arguing that perceptual relations and perceptual content are mutually dependent the chapter shows how Fregean particularism can avoid the pitfalls of both austere representationalism and austere relationalism. With relationalists, Fregean particularism argues that perception is constitutively relational, but with representationalists it argues that it is constitutively representational.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Umar Faruque

This study traces the notion of the internal senses in three ancient authors, namely Nemesius, Plotinus and Galen. It begins with Nemesius, and then by going backward ends with Galen. The textual evidence investigated in this study shows clearly that Galen, after acknowledging the Platonic tripartite soul, locates the various dunameis of the soul in the brain. The “localization” theory of Galen plays a crucial role in paving the way for the foundation of the internal senses, which both Plotinus and Nemesius adapted. Just as with the external senses one can locate various sense-organs in different parts of the body, viz., touch, smell, sight etc., so too with the internal senses, thanks to Galen, one is able to locate them in various organs of the body. Thus philosophers are able to explain the role of all these different (internal) senses in their account of sense-perception.


Author(s):  
Walter Ott

Among the most important changes Malebranche makes to the Search is the wholesale rejection of natural judgments. Although he retains the terminology of judgment, he now makes it clear that God is causing us to experience objects in the way that we do. These judgments can be attributed to the mind only in the most attenuated of senses. Moreover, a natural judgment is said to be a ‘compound sensation,’ because it arises from two impressions in the sense organs. The chapter shows this account to be problematic. Roughly, a compound sensation lacks the connection to an idea it would need in order to explain our perceptual experience.


Moreana ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (Number 181- (3-4) ◽  
pp. 9-68
Author(s):  
Jean Du Verger

The philosophical and political aspects of Utopia have often shadowed the geographical and cartographical dimension of More’s work. Thus, I will try to shed light on this aspect of the book in order to lay emphasis on the links fostered between knowledge and space during the Renaissance. I shall try to show how More’s opusculum aureum, which is fraught with cartographical references, reifies what Germain Marc’hadour terms a “fictional archipelago” (“The Catalan World Atlas” (c. 1375) by Abraham Cresques ; Zuane Pizzigano’s portolano chart (1423); Martin Benhaim’s globe (1492); Martin Waldseemüller’s Cosmographiae Introductio (1507); Claudius Ptolemy’s Geographia (1513) ; Benedetto Bordone’s Isolario (1528) ; Diogo Ribeiro’s world map (1529) ; the Grand Insulaire et Pilotage (c.1586) by André Thevet). I will, therefore, uncover the narrative strategies used by Thomas More in a text which lies on a complex network of geographical and cartographical references. Finally, I will examine the way in which the frontispiece of the editio princeps of 1516, as well as the frontispiece of the third edition published by Froben at Basle in 1518, clearly highlight the geographical and cartographical aspect of More’s narrative.


Author(s):  
Walter Ott

Despite its difference in aspiration, the Meditations preserves the basic structure of perceptual experience outlined in Descartes’s earliest works. The chapter explores Descartes’s notion of an idea and uses a developmental reading to clear up the mystery surrounding material falsity. In the third Meditation, our protagonist does not yet know enough about extension in order to be able to tell whether her idea of cold is an idea of a real feature of bodies or merely the idea of a sensation. By the time she reaches the end of her reflections, she has learned that sensible qualities are at most sensations. As in his earliest stages, Descartes believes that the real work of perceiving the geometrical qualities of bodies is done by the brain image, which he persists in calling an ‘idea,’ at least when it is the object of mental awareness.


2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-520
Author(s):  
Nicola Pozza

AbstractNumerous studies have dealt with the process of globalization and its various cultural products. Three such cultural products illustrate this process: Vikas Swarup’s novel Q and A (2005), the TV quiz show Kaun banega crorepati? (Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?), and Danny Boyle’s film Slumdog Millionaire (2008). The novel, the TV show and the film have so far been studied separately. Juxtaposing and comparing Q and A, Kaun banega crorepati, and Slumdog Millionaire provides an effective means to shed light on the dialogic and interactive nature of the process of globalization. It is argued through this case study that an analysis of their place of production, language and content, helps clarify the derivative concepts of “glocalization” and “grobalization” with regard to the way(s) contemporary cultural products respond to globalization.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-242
Author(s):  
PETER D. LARSEN

AbstractThis paper addresses the question of whether, according to Plato, there are forms of sensible qualities; it is also addressed to the wider question of whether there are forms of physical and material things more generally. In particular, it considers the tension raised by the following theses: (1) a Platonic form is the essence of some thing; (2) for Plato those essences that are forms are imperceptible and are knowable through reasoning alone; (3) knowing the essence of a particular color (e.g., red) requires presentation with the relevant perceptible quality and hence requires sense perception; and (4) if a sense perceptible quality has an essence, then that essence is a form. The solution I defend to this puzzle basically consists of accepting theses (1) through (3) but denying thesis (4). Sensible qualities, according to Plato, do have essences, but specifying their essences does not require that one postulate a separate form.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-112
Author(s):  
Kishore Sugali ◽  
Chris Sprunger ◽  
Venkata N Inukollu

The history of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning dates back to 1950’s. In recent years, there has been an increase in popularity for applications that implement AI and ML technology. As with traditional development, software testing is a critical component of an efficient AI/ML application. However, the approach to development methodology used in AI/ML varies significantly from traditional development. Owing to these variations, numerous software testing challenges occur. This paper aims to recognize and to explain some of the biggest challenges that software testers face in dealing with AI/ML applications. For future research, this study has key implications. Each of the challenges outlined in this paper is ideal for further investigation and has great potential to shed light on the way to more productive software testing strategies and methodologies that can be applied to AI/ML applications.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joakim Esbjörnsson ◽  
Fredrik Månsson ◽  
Hans Norrgren ◽  
Sarah L. Rowland-Jones

In this study, we show that the pathogenic HIV-1 CXCR4-tropism is more common in HIV-1 single (79%) than in HIV-1 and HIV-2 dual-infected individuals (35%), suggesting that contemporaneous HIV-2 infection can affect HIV-1 co-receptor tropism in late-stage disease. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for this natural alteration by HIV-2 could pave the way towards a deeper understanding of the AIDS pathogenesis.


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