The Logic of Deterrence

1987 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare
Keyword(s):  
Structural Characteristics ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Credible Threat ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Relationship Of

AbstractThis article describes the important structural characteristics of a recently developed game-theoretic model of deterrence, summarizes the major deductions drown from it, and discusses its implications for both the theory of deterrence and the current strategic relationship of the superpowers. The model shows that a credible threat and a power advantage are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for stable deterrence. It also suggests that, even under ideal conditions, deterrence is an intricate and fundamentally fragile relationship that rests, ultimately, upon the preferences and perceptions of key decision-makers rather than upon the nature and composition of each side’s strategic arsenal.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Model of Choosing a Valuable Good via a Short List Heuristic

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 199 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Ramsey
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Search Procedure ◽  
Short List ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
High Level

The Internet gives access to a huge amount of data at the click of a mouse. This is very helpful when consumers are making decisions about which product to buy. However, the final decision to purchase is still generally made by humans who have limited memory and perception. The short list heuristic is often used when there are many offers on the market. Searchers first find information about offers via the Internet and on this basis choose a relatively small number of offers to view in real life. Although such rules are often used in practice, little research has been carried out on determining, for example, what the size of the short list should be depending on the parameters of the problem or modelling how the short list heuristic can be implemented when there are multiple decision makers. This article presents a game theoretic model of such a search procedure with two players. These two players can be interpreted, for example, as a couple searching for a flat or a second-hand car. The model indicates that under such a search procedure the roles of searchers should only be divided when the preferences of the players are coherent or there is a high level of goodwill between them. In other cases, dividing the roles leads to a high level of conflict.

scholarly journals Conflict without an Apparent Cause

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Mathews ◽  
Bagchi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Long Period ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
The World ◽  
True State ◽  
Processing Information ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Over Time

A game-theoretic model of repeated interaction between two potential adversaries is analyzed to illustrate how conflict could possibly arise from rational decision-makers endogenously processing information, without any exogenous changes to the fundamentals of the environment. This occurs as a result of a convergence of beliefs about the true state of the world by the two players. During each period, each adversary must decide to either stage an attack or not. Conflict ensues if either player chooses to initiate an attack. Choosing to not stage an attack in a given period reveals information to the player’s rival. Thus, over time, beliefs about the true state of the world converge. Depending upon the true state of the world, we can ultimately have either of the two adversaries initiating an attack (either with or without regret) after an arbitrarily long period of tranquility. When this happens, it is as if conflict has suddenly arisen without any apparent cause or impetus. Alternatively (again, depending upon the true state of the world), we could possibly have beliefs converge to a point where neither adversary wants to initiate conflict.

Understanding Investor Behavior in the Recent Global Land Rush

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfredo R. M. Rosete
Keyword(s):  
Land Rights ◽  
Investor Behavior ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Sharp Rise ◽  
Land Acquisitions ◽  
Global Land ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Credible Threat ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Abstract A sharp rise in land acquisitions in developing countries during the last decade has drawn the attention of scholars and think tanks. Recent empirical literature finds that investors acquiring land tend to target countries that have little regard for local land rights. This is a puzzle. By locating in such countries, investors may be foregoing other advantages that generate more revenue. In this paper, I provide an explanation of investor behavior using a game-theoretic model where investors can use expropriation as a credible threat vis a vis smallholders. I show that the credible threat of expropriation lowers the investor’s cost of locating to a country by reducing the necessary remuneration to smallholders for access to land, resulting in adverse incorporation. Further, I demonstrate that investors will locate in countries with weak land governance whenever they anticipate similar levels of revenue or investor protection.

scholarly journals Price Increasing Timing of Competitive Perishable Products

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-37
Author(s):  
Wensi Zhang ◽  
Jinlin Li ◽  
Lun Ran
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Optimal Time ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Perishable Products ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Optimal Time Point

AbstractDynamic pricing has been proven to be an effective tool to increase revenue in many industries. We discuss the optimal time point to increase price of perishable products under duopoly competition in revenue management. We propose a game-theoretic model to describe the price increasing timing problem of competitive perishable products in the same market. By solving this problem, we show the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium point and Cournot equilibrium point when choosing the optimal price switching time. To illustrate our results, we also present a numerical example. Our results are applicable for decision makers to determine the optimal time to stop discounting.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

scholarly journals Formalization and study of the game-theoretic model of the optimal distribution of workers in enterprises

2019 ◽  
Vol 1399 ◽  
pp. 033095
Author(s):  
Irina Zaitseva ◽  
Tatiana Svechinskaya ◽  
Vladimir Zakharov ◽  
Natalia Zakharova ◽  
Andrey Murashko
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Optimal Distribution ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document