scholarly journals Conflict without an Apparent Cause

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Mathews ◽  
Bagchi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Long Period ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
The World ◽  
True State ◽  
Processing Information ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Over Time

A game-theoretic model of repeated interaction between two potential adversaries is analyzed to illustrate how conflict could possibly arise from rational decision-makers endogenously processing information, without any exogenous changes to the fundamentals of the environment. This occurs as a result of a convergence of beliefs about the true state of the world by the two players. During each period, each adversary must decide to either stage an attack or not. Conflict ensues if either player chooses to initiate an attack. Choosing to not stage an attack in a given period reveals information to the player’s rival. Thus, over time, beliefs about the true state of the world converge. Depending upon the true state of the world, we can ultimately have either of the two adversaries initiating an attack (either with or without regret) after an arbitrarily long period of tranquility. When this happens, it is as if conflict has suddenly arisen without any apparent cause or impetus. Alternatively (again, depending upon the true state of the world), we could possibly have beliefs converge to a point where neither adversary wants to initiate conflict.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Model of Choosing a Valuable Good via a Short List Heuristic

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 199 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Ramsey
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Search Procedure ◽  
Short List ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
High Level

The Internet gives access to a huge amount of data at the click of a mouse. This is very helpful when consumers are making decisions about which product to buy. However, the final decision to purchase is still generally made by humans who have limited memory and perception. The short list heuristic is often used when there are many offers on the market. Searchers first find information about offers via the Internet and on this basis choose a relatively small number of offers to view in real life. Although such rules are often used in practice, little research has been carried out on determining, for example, what the size of the short list should be depending on the parameters of the problem or modelling how the short list heuristic can be implemented when there are multiple decision makers. This article presents a game theoretic model of such a search procedure with two players. These two players can be interpreted, for example, as a couple searching for a flat or a second-hand car. The model indicates that under such a search procedure the roles of searchers should only be divided when the preferences of the players are coherent or there is a high level of goodwill between them. In other cases, dividing the roles leads to a high level of conflict.

scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

scholarly journals A Game-Theoretic Model of Strategic Interaction Using Advertising: Simulating the Evolution of the Cournot Nash Equilibrium under Different Competitive Scenarios

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 85
Author(s):  
Malcolm Brady
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Analytical Model ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Advertising Effectiveness ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Competitive Disadvantage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Over Time

This paper examines the behaviour of two firms competing in a duopoly, where firms can influence demand through use of advertising. The paper simulates the strategic interaction of the two firms based on a game-theoretic Cournot analytical model. The evolution over time of the Nash equilibrium is graphically displayed for a number of different competitive scenarios. The results show that there exist threshold levels of advertising effectiveness at which duopoly behaviour bifurcates, that perfectly cooperative advertising can lead to competitive disadvantage, and that perfectly predatory advertising can lead to stagnation or losses.

scholarly journals Game-theoretic model for diversification of multi-period investments under uncertainty over time

2019 ◽  
pp. 64-73
Author(s):  
Vladimir Nikolaevich Mikhno ◽  
◽  
Galina Alekseevna Mikhno ◽  
Tatiana Iuryevna Ivanova ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Over Time

State Intervention in Collective Action

2021 ◽  
pp. 33-53
Author(s):  
Calla Hummel
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Informal Workers ◽  
The World ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Different Levels

Chapter 2 develops a theory of state intervention in collective action. It argues that as unorganized people create negative externalities, officials increasingly have an incentive to encourage people who organize self-regulating organizations. When officials intervene with cash, licenses, and access to the bureaucracy, they lower the barriers that kept people from organizing on their own. Once informal workers take these incentives and start organizations, officials can bargain over regulation and enforcement with representatives instead of a mass of individuals. The theory builds on contributions from Olson (1965), Ostrom (1990), and Holland (2017). The theory is formalized in a game theoretic model to show that officials and informal workers are strategically linked. The chapter uses the model to demonstrate the exact conditions under which we can expect informal workers’ organizations as a result of officials’ encouragement. The model produces multiple equilibria that reflect the different levels of organization that we observe in informal sectors around the world. The equilibrium conditions generate clear expectations for the patterns that we should see in the empirical chapters if the theory is correct.

scholarly journals Price Increasing Timing of Competitive Perishable Products

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-37
Author(s):  
Wensi Zhang ◽  
Jinlin Li ◽  
Lun Ran
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Optimal Time ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Perishable Products ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Optimal Time Point

AbstractDynamic pricing has been proven to be an effective tool to increase revenue in many industries. We discuss the optimal time point to increase price of perishable products under duopoly competition in revenue management. We propose a game-theoretic model to describe the price increasing timing problem of competitive perishable products in the same market. By solving this problem, we show the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium point and Cournot equilibrium point when choosing the optimal price switching time. To illustrate our results, we also present a numerical example. Our results are applicable for decision makers to determine the optimal time to stop discounting.

The Logic of Deterrence

1987 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare
Keyword(s):  
Structural Characteristics ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Credible Threat ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Relationship Of

AbstractThis article describes the important structural characteristics of a recently developed game-theoretic model of deterrence, summarizes the major deductions drown from it, and discusses its implications for both the theory of deterrence and the current strategic relationship of the superpowers. The model shows that a credible threat and a power advantage are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for stable deterrence. It also suggests that, even under ideal conditions, deterrence is an intricate and fundamentally fragile relationship that rests, ultimately, upon the preferences and perceptions of key decision-makers rather than upon the nature and composition of each side’s strategic arsenal.

Better Policies from Policy-Selective Aid?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Annen ◽  
Stephen Knack
Keyword(s):  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Recipient Country ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Global Budget ◽  
Institutional Assessment ◽  
Assessment Policy ◽  
The World ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Abstract The increased policy selectivity of aid allocations observed in recent years provides aid-recipient countries with an incentive to improve policies. The paper estimates that a change in the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment policy index from 1.5 to 2 for a recipient is associated with an increase of about 13 percent in aid. The analysis also finds a modest but statistically significant positive relationship between the global level of policy-selective aid and policy, suggesting that policy-selective aid improves policies in aid-recipient countries. This effect is properly identified, as the level of policy-selective aid in the global aid budget is exogenous to a recipient country’s policy choice. Furthermore, the paper provides a game-theoretic model that establishes the link between the policy selectivity of the global budget and better recipient-country policies in equilibrium.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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