How (Not) to Compare?: Not Being Inside, Nor Outside

Global Jurist ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gürkan Çapar

Abstract Despite the clear clue given by Kim L. Scheppele as to the shortcomings of governance checklists, it is surprising that comparative constitutional lawyers have not yet followed it up. In fact, what Scheppele hinted at is that the methodologies we have used so far fall short of detecting the interaction effect of the particular components; this is why we need new methodologies and new ways of seeing. To address this, this article will incorporate some tools, having already taken hold in legal philosophy, into the methods discussions in comparative constitutional law in particular and comparative law in general. Upon benefiting from the distinction between internal and external points of view and showing how hermeneutical one differs from the others, the article will make a discursive analysis of the 2010 constitutional amendment in Turkey through the lenses of these three points of view.

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 373
Author(s):  
Rodrigo González Quintero ◽  
Luis Javier Moreno Ortiz

Resumen:Este artículo se centra en la poco explorada cuestión las competencias secundarias de la Corte Constitucional colombiana, en especial sobre la competencia de decidir sobre las excusas a los emplazamientos que hace el Congreso en ejercicio de su control político y público. Para este propósito se estudia el origen de esta competencia en la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, se la analiza en el contexto de otras experiencias constitucionales y se considera,a partir de fuentes teóricas (normativas y doctrinales) y evidencia empírica(estudio de casos), dos hipótesis sobre su naturaleza y alcance, para concluirque se trata de una competencia jurisdiccional, que se concreta en una providencia judicial que hace tránsito a cosa juzgada, y que puede tenerse comouna modalidad especial del control de constitucionalidad.Abstract:This article is focused on the ill studied topic of the Colombian Constitutional Court’s ancillary powers, and especially on its decisions regarding a person’s refusal to attend hearings related to Congress’ control functions. Thus, the text begins with the origins of this power discussed at the constituent assembly, then analyzing it in Comparative Constitutional Law. Also taking into account both theoretical and practical elements — such as doctrine, norms and case law—, it does propose two hypotheses concerning its character and effects, concluding that entails an exercise of judicial power with res iudicata force and that it comprises a especial type of judicial review.Summary:Introduction. I. An Approach to the Colombian Judicial Review System. II. Ancillary Powers to Judicial Review: Debates and Adoption at the Constitutional Assembly. III. Ancillary Powers to Judicial Review in the Constitutional Court’s Case Law. IV. Ancillary Powers to Judicial Review in Comparative Law. V. Constitutional Court’s Decisions regarding Excuses for Subpoenas. Nature. Holdings. VI. Conclusions. Bibliography 


Author(s):  
María Luz Martínez Alarcón

The number of aforados has been discussed in recent times in Spain. Most authors, after saying that this procedural exception exists only exceptionably in the Comparative Constitucional Law, request a substantial decrease of its figure in our country. However, this research of Comparative Constitutional Law reveals that the aforamiento is usual in relation to the Head of State and the Government members in the European constitutionalism. By contrast, the parliamentary aforamiento is an exceptional situation. Anyway, the Comparative Constitutional Law, although useful, should not be decisive in order to take decision about the future of this privilege in our country. In this regard, it is absolutely necessary to take into account its objectives and the causational and proportionately relationship between the adopted measure (aforamiento)and the achievement of those objectives in the political, institutional and social context of the specific country. And the truth is that the arguments to justify this institution, an exception to the principle of equality, are certainly weak.El número de aforados en nuestro país ha sido objeto de una fuerte polémica en los últimos tiempos en España. La mayoría, tras afirmar que esta institución se prevé de forma absolutamente excepcional en los países con los que compartimos una tradición jurídica común, solicita una reducción sustancial de esta cifra. Sin embargo, este análisis de derecho constitucional comparado revela que el aforamiento es una práctica habitual con relación a los Jefes de Estado (en el marco de una responsabilidad, eso sí, muy limitada) y a los miembros de Gobierno en el constitucionalismo europeo. Sí que es excepcional, sin embargo, el aforamiento parlamentario. En todo caso, el recurso al derecho comparado, aunque útil, no debe ser el elemento decisivo en la decisión sobre el futuro de esta institución en nuestro país. En este sentido resulta inexcusable tomar en consideración los fines pretendidos por la misma y la relación de causalidad y proporcionalidad existente entre su previsión y la consecución de dichos fines en el marco político, institucional y social del país de referencia en el que se inserta. Y lo cierto es que los fundamentos para justificar su presencia en nuestro país son un tanto endebles para conducir, como conducen, a limitar el principio de igualdad ante la ley.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Albert

Scholars of comparative constitutional law would suggest that the United States Constitution is the world’s most difficult democratic constitution to change by formal amendment. This article suggests that the Constitution of Canada may be even harder to amend. Canadian constitutional politics have proven the textual requirements for major constitutional amendment so far impossible to satisfy. But the extraordinary difficulty of formal amendment in Canada derives equally from sources external to the text. Major constitutional amendment also requires conformity with extra-textual requirements imposed by Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution of Canada, parliamentary and provincial as well as territorial statutes, and arguably also by constitutional conventions — additional rules that may well make major constitutional amendment impossible today in Canada. These as yet underappreciated extra-textual sources of formal amendment difficulty raise important questions for Canadian constitutionalism, namely whether in making the Constitution virtually impossible to amend they weaken democracy and undermine the purpose of writtenness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID E LANDAU ◽  
ROSALIND DIXON ◽  
YANIV ROZNAI

Abstract:The unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine has emerged as a highly successful, albeit still controversial, export in comparative constitutional law. The doctrine has often been defended as protecting a delegation from the people to the political institutions that they created. Other work has noted the doctrine’s potential utility in guarding against abusive constitutionalism. In this article, we consider how these justifications fare when expanded to encompass claims against the original constitution itself, rather than a later amendment to the text. That is, beyond the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, can or should there be a doctrine of an unconstitutional constitution? Our question is spurred by a puzzling 2015 case from Honduras where the Supreme Court held an unamendable one-term limit on presidential terms, as well as protective provisions punishing attempts to alter that limit, to be unconstitutional. What is particularly striking about the case is that these provisions were not later amendments to the constitution, but rather parts of the original 1982 constitution itself. Thus, this article examines the possibility of ‘an unconstitutional constitution’, what we predict to be the next trend in global constitutionalism.


Author(s):  
Philipp Dann ◽  
Michael Riegner ◽  
Maxim Bönnemann

This introductory chapter argues for and conceptualizes a ‘Southern turn’ in comparative constitutional law. It takes stock of existing scholarship on the Global South and comparative constitutional law, situates the volume in this context, and seeks to move the debate forward. Its argument has three elements: the first is that the ‘Global South’ has already become a term used productively in various disciplines and in legal scholarship, even though in very different and sometimes under-theorized ways. Secondly, we argue that the ‘Global South’ is a useful concept to capture and understand a constitutional experience that is distinct from, and at the same time deeply entangled with, constitutionalism in the Global North. Thirdly, we contend that the Southern turn implies a specific epistemic, methodological, and institutional sensitivity that has implications for comparative constitutional scholarship as a whole. This sensitivity embraces epistemic reflexivity, methodological pluralism, as well as institutional diversification, collaboration, and ‘slow comparison’ and thus points the way towards an understanding of the discipline as ‘world comparative law’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 601-610 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Bartole

The continuing importance of the study of comparative constitutional law – A European perspective – The Venice Commission and international monitoring of national constitutional systems – Authoritarian tendencies and the European Constitutional Heritage – Interpretation and application of constitutional provisions depends on the context – Comparative law as a common endeavour of judges, lawyers, and scholars


Author(s):  
W. Elliot Bulmer

The rise of the Scottish national movement has been accompanied by the emergence of distinct constitutional ideas, claims and arguments, which may affect constitutional design in any future independent Scotland. Drawing on the fields of constitutional theory, comparative constitutional law, and Scottish studies, this book examines the historical trajectory of the constitutional question in Scotland and analyses the influences and constraints on the constitutional imagination of the Scottish national movement, in terms of both the national and international contexts. It identifies an emerging Scottish nationalist constitutional tradition that is distinct from British constitutional orthodoxies but nevertheless corresponds to broad global trends in constitutional thought and design. Much of the book is devoted to the detailed exposition and comparative analysis of the draft constitution for an independent Scotland published by the SNP in 2002. The 2014 draft interim Constitution presented by the Scottish Government is also examined, and the two texts are contrasted to show the changing nature of the SNP’s constitutional policy: from liberal-procedural constitutionalism in pursuit of a more inclusive polity, to a more populist and majoritarian constitutionalism.


Author(s):  
ALEXANDRA A. TROITSKAYA

The two main approaches to the use of the comparative method in legal research, functional and cultural, have some "predetermined" considerations regarding the results that will (or should) be discovered by comparing various legal phenomena — should the emphasis be on similarities or differences between these phenomena. These considerations are based on the vision of, respectively, the universal or pluralistic nature of law of various societies, and in fact they are able to correct substantially the process of cognition of legal phenomena using the comparative method, adjusting it to the desired result. In the case of similarities, we can talk about artificially narrowing the circle of countries under investigation. In the case of differences, the isolation of systems and the uniqueness of their cultural characteristics are unreasonably exaggerated. The alternative assumptions presented in the theory of comparative law regarding the existence of universal principles of law or the fundamental uniqueness of each legal system require a critical rethinking of constitutional provisions and practice in comparative studies. The use of the comparative method in constitutional law is not reducible to the implementation of the ideas of political philosophy, and objective conclusions should not be replaced by predetermined normative guidelines. The similarities and differences revealed by the researcher of constitutional ideas, norms and practices can be considered as a result of comparison of independent value.Constitutional law is associated with a variety of substantial constructs existing in the world, not excluding, however, their intercommunication. Understanding these constructions requires attention to both the similarities and the differences in specific legal orders (as well as the reasons for their functioning in this, and not another form). The use of the comparative method in the absence of striving for predetermined results is simultaneously aimed at understanding the laws of development of constitutional institutions and maintaining the horizon of their diversity as an important component of this development. Each time, the researcher should distance himself from his prejudices regarding the similarities or differences between the institutes under study, rechecking whether the obtained results are really the results of applying the comparative method, and not the initial constructions.The logic of a comparative study corresponds to the construction of theories of "middle level", aimed at forming the theoretical model of a particular legal in-stitution, taking into account the practice of implementing this institution in specific states. The focus on middle-level theories within the framework of the comparative method allows one to go beyond the description of single systems, formulate conclusions at the level of generalization that ensure the comparability of the studied objects, and at the same time maintain an understanding of the diversity of constitutional models.


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