scholarly journals Nasjonalrapport for Norge

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-194
Author(s):  
Martin Børresen ◽  
Marius Pilgaard ◽  
Marie Bjørneby

Abstract Since the Tax Reform of 1992 Norway has had a tax system of relatively low tax rates and broad tax bases. Norway, along with other Nordic neighbours, did quite early substantially reduce its statutory corporate tax rate - reduced from 50.8 to 28 per cent as part of the 1992 Reform. After 1992 the rate has been constant at 28 until it was reduced marginally to 27 in 2014. Since 1992 the principal objective in designing the corporate tax system has been to ensure resource effectiveness. The role of the corporate (and capital) income tax is therefore to secure public revenue but at the same time minimising distortion. An important feature of the system is therefore that normal return on capital is taxed at the same rate, irrespective of whether it is earned as business income or not. The Report identifies three main challenges to the current corporate tax system. The first challenge discussed is the system’s effects on investments. It cannot be overlooked that the corporate tax rate in Norway is currently higher than the tax rate of many countries Norway is commonly compared with (e.g. other Nordic countries). The Report suggests that this can contribute to a reduction in the level of investment in Norway. The second identified challenge is the tax distortion between debt and equity finance. The Report briefly discusses neutrality in financing through equal tax treatment of debt and equity finance. The Report then discusses the implications and differences of an ACE and a CBIT model in this context. The final challenge discussed is base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). Differences in countries’ tax rules create vast opportunities for tax planning, and largely for the benefit of multinational enterprises (MNEs), inter alia through transfer pricing. The Report suggests that BEPS over time may imply a serious threat in maintaining the revenue from the corporate tax base. The Report then acknowledges that a reduction in the formal tax rate may only to some extent address the problem; which indicates a need to consider other supplementing measures. One such measure is the interest deduction limitation rule, made effective from 2014. The rule was introduced to address profit shifting in MNEs. More generally the Report recognises that Norway cannot freely introduce measures against BEPS following international obligations. Finally the Report mentions the appointment of a Tax Commission in 2013. The Commission’s mandate is to review the Norwegian corporate tax system in light of international developments. The Commission shall deliver its report in the autumn of 2014.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
Peter Koerver Schmidt

Abstract It is argued th**at the higher degree of economic integration across borders and the international trend towards a reduction of corporate income tax rates have had a significant impact on the Danish corporate tax regime in recent years. Accordingly, during the last ten years the Danish statutory corporate tax rate has been lowered further, while several government actions at the same time have been taken in order to combat international tax avoidance and evasion. As a result, new anti-avoidance provisions have been introduced and some of the older anti-avoidance provisions have been tightened in order to prevent base erosion and profit shifting. Thus, to some extent Denmark has already tried to address a number of the key pressure areas mentioned in the recently published OECD BEPS report, such as international mismatches in entity and instrument characterization, the tax treatment of related party debt financing, transfer pricing and the effectiveness of anti-avoidance measures. However, the article concludes that these anti-avoidance provisions often suffer from being quite complex, very broad in scope and open to criticism from an EU law perspective.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (85) ◽  
pp. 95-108
Author(s):  
Alex A. T. Rathke

ABSTRACT We investigate tax-induced profit shifting in Brazil and the impact of tax havens on the shifting behavior of firms. Profit shifting research in Brazil is virtually non-existent, although the shifting incentives in Brazil are prominent. Our research fills this gap with evidences in the novel Brazilian context. Profit shifting is a tax-minimization strategy where multinational enterprises perform intra-firm transactions to allocate taxable profits to low-tax locations. Brazil combines a remarking set of profit shifting incentives, especially a high corporate tax rate, extremely complex tax system, and distinguished transfer pricing rules. Further researches may leverage from the shifting incentives in Brazil, since it provides opportunities to investigate additional factors that affect the shifting behavior of firms. We analyze 989 transaction-by-country observations for the period of 2010-2017. Baseline analysis follows the robust least squares approach with controlling covariates. Linear estimate model derives from the conventional Cobb-Douglas production function, to analyze the impact of shifting incentives on profit maximization. We find that Brazilian firms have a high level of intra-firm transactions with related parties located in low-tax countries, especially with tax havens. It represents a strong evidence of profit shifting behavior in Brazilian firms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nala Kurniawan ◽  
◽  
Anggari Saputra ◽  

To adhere with Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 13, Indonesia enacted regulations concerning Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) to address the issue of tax avoidance. Those regulations introduced the requirement of CbCR in Indonesia, where Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in Indonesia are required to provide tax authorities with geographic breakdown of their profitability, tax payments, and activities wherever they operate. Using the newly implemented CbCR in Indonesia as a treatment for private disclosure requirement, this study examines the effect of CbCR on MNEs tax avoidance. Employing EUR 750 million consolidated revenue threshold for disclosure and utilizing regression discontinuity design as well as difference-in-differences analysis, we document a 4-8 percentage point increase in effective tax rates among affected MNEs, thus reflecting a decrease in tax avoidance in treatment firms. Our findings contribute (i) to the recent empirical literature on how CbCR as a private disclosure affects corporate tax avoidance behavior and (ii) to the policy evaluation whether CbCR regulation has achieved its objective.


2021 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 02037
Author(s):  
Egidijus Kundelis ◽  
Renata Legenzova ◽  
Julijonas Kartanas

Research background: Multinational enterprises (MNEs) employ tax avoidance by ability to use differences in tax systems of various countries to successfully incur effective tax rate that is lower than the statutory one. Literature analysis revealed that previous research rarely concentrated on profit shifting practices in small economies. It mostly covered large countries (USA, Germany) or regions (e.g. Europe). Research on Lithuania, as a small open economy characterized by lower corporate income tax rates, is a relevant case for the analysis. Purpose of the article: The purpose of the article is to assess profit shifting via transfer mispricing in Lithuanian companies. Methods: Regression analysis with fixed effects was applied to a sample of 3,563 Lithuanian companies for the period of 2010–2018. The data was retrieved from Amadeus database. Findings & Value added: The results of testing profit shifting channel – transfer mispricing – showed that tax incentives significantly affect earnings of MNEs in the sample while results of domestic firms are puzzling. Earnings of multinationals in the sample are strongly affected by statutory tax rate difference between the subsidiary operating in Lithuania and the parent company in a foreign country. Such results may imply that in small economies like Lithuania (characterized by lower tax rates and lower tax avoidance costs) profit shifting via transfer mispricing is used by MNEs as a channel of corporate tax avoidance.


2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (154) ◽  
pp. 65-82
Author(s):  
Nicola Liebert

The global mobility of capital and the availability of tax havens enable multinational corporations and wealthy individuals to escape tax payments due in their home countries. Most states react by shifting more of the tax burden onto labour and consumption, while lowering corporate tax rates in an effort to remain internationally competitive, thereby creating a tax system that is both inequitable and socially and economically unsustainable. However, there is scant evidence that lower taxes on capital in fact contribute to higher investment, but they do lead to profit shifting for the purpose of tax planning. Alternative tax systems such as unitary taxation could help to stop profit shifting and slow down tax competition.


1996 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu-hsing Li ◽  
Kashi R. Balachandran

The purpose of this paper is to study transfer pricing under asymmetric information and taxation. In accordance with the empirical evidence documented in accounting literature, this paper assumes that the firm uses one pricing system instead of two pricing systems—one for the tax purposes and the other for internal control. We provide a closed-form solution for the optimal mechanism under a dual-price system, which allows for the price credited to the manufacturing division to not equal the price charged to the distribution division. The equilibrium outcomes of the analysis suggest several interesting findings. Under a dual-price system, both divisional accounting profits at equilibrium change in the same direction with respect to the change of tax rate. However, the direct effect is larger than the indirect effect. Under a dual-price system, the division with the lower tax rate should be credited more profits than the division with the higher tax rate, but it would not fully bear all the profits.


Author(s):  
Rebecca Reineke ◽  
Katrin Weiskirchner-Merten

This study examines how spillovers affect a multinational company's choice of an intangible's location and the corresponding transfer price for using this intangible. Our model uses a company with a domestic division in a high-tax country and a foreign division in a low-tax country, where each division's activities generate spillovers on the other division's income. In contrast to previous studies, our analysis incorporates an intangible's optimal location when the company trades off tax minimization and efficient activities. By locating the intangible abroad, the company reduces its tax liability, whereas locating the intangible domestically yields more efficient domestic division activities. For a high spillover of the domestic division, the company locates the intangible domestically. Our model supports empirical evidence regarding intangibles' location that is interpreted as "home bias". Additionally, we show how variations in regulatory parameters-arm's length range and tax rate differential-affect the divisions' activities and the intangible's location.


Author(s):  
Annet Wanyana Oguttu ◽  
Monica Iyer

This chapter analyzes whether the international tax reform measures instituted under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project are effective in ensuring African countries get a fair share of taxes from multinational enterprises (MNEs) transacting within their borders, so that they can finance their development goals and promote the human rights of their citizens. The OECD chose to focus on curtailing sophisticated tax-avoidance schemes by strengthening existing anti-avoidance provisions. MNEs have abused these existing laws, however, making them largely ineffective. Given that MNEs are always a step ahead in devising new tax-avoidance strategies, one wonders whether emphasis on strengthening anti-avoidance laws will achieve much. The OECD seems to have missed an opportunity to evaluate the whole tax system and deal with the very root of the problems inherent in international taxation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 500-505
Author(s):  
Sebastián Bustos ◽  
Dina Pomeranz ◽  
José Vila-Belda ◽  
Gabriel Zucman

This paper reviews common challenges of taxing multinational firms, using Chile as a case study. We briefly describe key international tax avoidance methods: profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing and debt shifting. We discuss the prevalent policy to tax multinationals--the arm's length principle--and alternative proposals using apportionment formulas. Novel data from Chile show that multinationals make up a large share of GDP but report lower profit and effective tax rates than local firms. In 2011, Chile implemented a reform following OECD guidelines to enforce the arm's length principle. We discuss potential effects on tax collection and welfare.


1993 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Omer ◽  
Karen H. Molloy ◽  
David A. Ziebart

Given the recent emphasis on effective tax rates by policy makers and accounting researchers, this study investigates the relation between firm size and corporate tax burdens on a yearly and an industry basis. The analysis is conducted using five effective tax measures employed in previous studies in order to determine the degree to which inferences between size and tax burden are robust across these different effective tax measures. The results indicate that the relation is fairly robust across measures and, in instances in which the relation is not upheld by our analysis, sample composition explains differences in the observed relation between firm size and corporate tax burden.


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