For the love of football?

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch ◽  
Christian Rullang
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Consumption ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
The Public ◽  
Volunteer Activity ◽  
Human Capital Model ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Model Versus ◽  
Using Data

SummaryUsing data for a large sample of German football referees, we studied the motives for becoming a football referee. Based on a long modelling tradition in the literature on the economics of volunteering, we studied altruistic motives (public-goods model) versus non-altruistic (egoistic private-consumption and human-capital) motives. We differentiated between self-attributed and other-attributed motives. We found that altruistic motives on average are less strong than other motives. Other-attributed altruistic motives are stronger than self-attributed altruistic motives, indicating the presence of a self-interest bias. We further found that referees who report strong altruistic motives have a higher willingness to quit refereeing when other referees would referee more matches, consistent with the public-goods model. In line with the human-capital model, altruistic motives are stronger for senior referees. Altruistic motives are also stronger for those referees who view refereeing as a volunteer activity.

Public Goods, Private Consumption, and Human Capital: Using Boosted Regression Trees to Model Volunteer Labour Supply

2016 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Consumption ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Regression Trees ◽  
Boosted Regression Trees ◽  
Red Cross ◽  
The Public ◽  
Partial Dependence

AbstractEconomists use three types of models to describe volunteer labour supply: the public-goods model, the private-consumption model, and the human-capital model. We used data from an online survey questionnaire of volunteers working for the German Red Cross to study the extent to which utility components representing these three types help to explain volunteer labour supply. We analysed the survey data using boosted regression trees, where we controlled for several other potentially important socioeconomic correlates of volunteer labour supply. We used measures of relative influence and partial dependence plots to analyse the strength and the direction of the correlation of the utility components and the other socioeconomic variables with volunteer labour supply.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

scholarly journals Delayed Graduation and Overeducation in Italy: A Test of the Human Capital Model Versus the Screening Hypothesis

2020 ◽  
Vol 152 (2) ◽  
pp. 533-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Aina ◽  
Francesco Pastore
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Human Capital Model ◽  
Model Versus

Abstract Exploiting the human capital versus screening hypothesis frameworks, this paper studies the link between delayed graduation and overeducation, and their effect on wages, by using the ISFOL-Plus data. The evidence lines towards predictions based on the signalling model. However, as to the determinants of overeducation the coefficient of delayed graduation is significant only for delays of 3 years or more and also controlling for the entire set of covariates. This suggests that delay conveys a signal of low skill.

scholarly journals Managing for Citizen Satisfaction: Is Good Not Enough?

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian K. Collins ◽  
Hyun Joon Kim ◽  
Jie Tao
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Performance Management ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Citizen Satisfaction ◽  
The Public ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Public Managers ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Public Economy

Citizen satisfaction is a popular means of performance management. It underscores a common conception that citizens are customers who are concerned about the quality of public goods and services. We offer a theory that suggests the quantity of public goods and services is also important. We develop our theory based on democratic models of the public where citizens are concerned about equity and accessibility to public goods and services. Using data from two municipal surveys and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), we test three hypotheses and find that both quality and quantity of public service provision are significant antecedents to citizen satisfaction. In our conclusion, we explain how these results call for a more complex conceptualization of the performance associated with managing for citizen satisfaction, and we recommend public managers develop and employ skills that recognize the complex consumptive and democratic attributes of citizens in a public economy.

scholarly journals The formation of terrorist groups: an analysis of Irish republican organizations

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 699-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONY W. DNES ◽  
GRAHAM BROWNLOW
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Irish Republican Army ◽  
The Public ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
History Of ◽  
Irish Republicanism ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms ◽  
Specific Human Capital

AbstractWe examine the history of the organization of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and assess whether Republican terrorism reflected the possession of valuable group-specific human capital within the terrorist cell. The analysis is motivated by economic models of the formation of specialized groups. We also note the public-goods co-ordination problem facing terrorist groups, given their inability to use mainstream enforcement mechanisms. Of particular interest are four well-defined historical examples of factionalism within the IRA. The history of Irish republicanism is consistent with the prediction that increasing the opportunities for cell members outside of life in the organization, particularly through amnesty, destabilizes the organization but leaves a hardcore of remaining terrorists. The gap between terrorist characteristics and those belonging to members of wider society is more gradated than predicted.

An Empirical Test of the Cultural Capital Hypothesis

1995 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
James H. Johnson ◽  
Elisa Jayne Bienenstock ◽  
Jennifer A. Stoloff
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Public Education ◽  
Cultural Capital ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Cultural Influences ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Public Education System ◽  
Urban Inequality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Using Data

Using data from the Multi-City Survey of Urban Inequality, an exploratory, empirical analysis of the cultural capital hypothesis was conducted. The analyses indicate that, while the types of cultural influences cited by proponents of this thesis clearly have negative effects on employment when viewed in isolation from other factors, they are not significant when statistical controls for human capital variables are incorporated into the model. Our findings suggest the need to invest more resources in the public education system and in efforts to combat racial discrimination in the labor market.

scholarly journals Quorum-sensing and cheating in bacterial biofilms

2012 ◽  
Vol 279 (1748) ◽  
pp. 4765-4771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Popat ◽  
Shanika A. Crusz ◽  
Marco Messina ◽  
Paul Williams ◽  
Stuart A. West ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Quorum Sensing ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Cell Signalling ◽  
Bacterial Pathogen ◽  
Bacterial Biofilms ◽  
Clinical Implications ◽  
Group Level ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Clear Support

The idea from human societies that self-interest can lead to a breakdown of cooperation at the group level is sometimes termed the public goods dilemma. We tested this idea in the opportunistic bacterial pathogen, Pseudomonas aeruginosa , by examining the influence of putative cheats that do not cooperate via cell-to-cell signalling (quorum-sensing, QS). We found that: (i) QS cheating occurs in biofilm populations owing to exploitation of QS-regulated public goods; (ii) the thickness and density of biofilms was reduced by the presence of non-cooperative cheats; (iii) population growth was reduced by the presence of cheats, and this reduction was greater in biofilms than in planktonic populations; (iv) the susceptibility of biofilms to antibiotics was increased by the presence of cheats; and (v) coercing cooperator cells to increase their level of cooperation decreases the extent to which the presence of cheats reduces population productivity. Our results provide clear support that conflict over public goods reduces population fitness in bacterial biofilms, and that this effect is greater than in planktonic populations. Finally, we discuss the clinical implications that arise from altering the susceptibility to antibiotics.

scholarly journals Reassessing the public goods theory of alliances

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316802110052
Author(s):  
Joshua Alley
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
Military Spending ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Model Specification ◽  
Large Share ◽  
The Public ◽  
Alliance Politics ◽  
Economic Weight ◽  
Using Data

The public goods theory of alliances exerts substantial influence on scholarship and policy, especially through its claim that small alliance participants free-ride on larger partners. Prior statistical tests of free-riding suffer from model specification and generalizability problems, however, so there is little reliable and general evidence about this prediction. In this study, I address those limitations with a new test of the free-riding hypothesis. Using data on 204 alliances from 1919 to 2007, I examine how often states with a small share of total GDP in an alliance decrease military spending while states with a large share of allied GDP increase military spending. I find little evidence to support this expression of the free-riding hypothesis. This implies that free-riding based on economic weight is unusual in alliance politics, which may be due to limits on alliance security as a public good or bargaining between alliance members.

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