Kelsen, Heller and Schmitt: Paradigms of Sovereignty Thought

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus

AbstractEyal Benvenisti has sought to provide an optimistic account of international law through reconceptualizing the idea of sovereignty as a kind of trusteeship for humanity. He thus sketches a welcome antidote to trends in recent work in public law including public international law that claim that international law is no more than a cloak for economic and political interests, so that all that matters is which powerful actor gets to decide. In this Article, I approach his position through a discussion of the debate in Weimar about sovereignty between Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller. I try to show that Heller’s almost unknown legal theory might be helpful to Benvenisti’s position. Heller shared with Schmitt the idea that sovereignty had to have a central role in legal theory and that its role includes a place for a final legal decision. Indeed, much more than Schmitt, Heller regarded all accounts of sovereignty as inherently political. However, in a manner closer to the spirit of Kelsen’s enterprise than to Schmitt’s, he wished to emphasize that the ultimate decider - the sovereign decision unit of the political order of liberal democracy - is entirely legally constituted. Moreover, Heller argued that fundamental principles of legality condition the exercise of a sovereign power in a way that explains the specific legitimacy of legality and which might supply the link between sovereignty and ideas such as trusteeship and humanity.

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus

The Weimar Republic is frequently invoked in political theory as an example when the issue is the appropriate response of liberal democracies to internal, fundamental challenges. I explore that example through the lens of a 1932 court case that tested the legality of the federal government's “coup” against Prussia. In my analysis of the court's judgment and of the arguments of three political and public law theorists, Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller, I argue for Heller's democratic vision of the rule of law. In my conclusion, I compare problems in Kelsen's position with problems in the recently articulated position of John Rawls in order to suggest what lessons Weimar may have for contemporary political theory.


Author(s):  
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson

This chapter takes us into the domain of legal theory and legal philosophy as it places the questions of Internet jurisdiction in a broader theoretical, and indeed philosophical, context. Indeed, it goes as far as to (1) present a definition of what is law, (2) discuss what are the law’s tools, and (3) to describe the roles of law. In addition, it provides distinctions important for how we understand the role of jurisdictional rules both in private international law and in public international law as traditionally defined. Furthermore, it adds law reform tools by introducing and discussing the concept of ‘market sovereignty’ based on ‘market destroying measures’––an important concept for solving the Internet jurisdiction puzzle.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG KAMMERHOFER

AbstractHans Kelsen is known both as a legal theorist and as an international lawyer. This article shows that his theory of international law is an integral part of the Kelsenian Pure Theory of Law. Two areas of international law are analysed: first, Kelsen's coercive order paradigm and its relationship to the bellum iustum doctrine; second, the Kelsenian notion of the unity of all law vis-à-vis theories of the relationship of international and municipal law. In a second step, the results of Kelsenian general legal theory of the late period – as interpreted and developed by the present author – are reapplied to selected doctrines of international law. Thus is the coercive order paradigm resolved, the unity of law dissolved, and the UN Charter reinterpreted to show that the concretization of norms as positive international law cannot be unmade by a scholarship usurping the right to make law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 44-72
Author(s):  
Michael A. Wilkinson

<Online Only>This chapter examines authoritarian liberalism as a more general phenomenon ‘beyond Weimar’. It looks outside Weimar Germany and takes a longer historical perspective, revealing deeper tensions in liberalism itself, specifically its inability to respond to the issue of socio-economic inequality in a mass democracy. The major Weimar constitutional theorists—Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, and Hermann Heller—had no answer to the social question as a matter of constitutional self-defence. The chapter then discusses the political economy of the various crises across Europe—in Italy, France, and Austria—revealing a similar quandary. As Karl Polanyi argued, in these contexts, the turn to authoritarian liberalism fatally weakened political democracy and left it disarmed when faced with the fascist countermovement. Later in the interwar period, proposals for neo-liberalism would be introduced, symbolized by the organization of the Walter Lippman Colloquium in 1938.</Online Only>


Author(s):  
Feisal G. Mohamed

A modern politics attaching itself to the state must adopt a position sovereignty, by which is meant the political settlement in which potestas and auctoritas are aligned. Three competing forms are identified: unitary sovereignty, divided and balanced sovereignty, and the view that sovereign power must be limited by universal principles. Each of these forms can be divided into “red” and “black” varieties, depending on the imagined relationship between sovereign power and modern conditions of flux. A chapter outline introduces the figures who will be explored in the book as a whole: Thomas Hobbes; William Fiennes, Lord Saye and Sele; John Barclay and the romance writers of the 1650s whom he influences; John Milton; and Andrew Marvell. Also described is the book’s sustained engagement of Carl Schmitt, and the ways in which his thought on sovereignty is an example of the competition amongst the concept’s three competing forms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-106
Author(s):  
Sebastián Green Martínez

Abstract As the number of investment arbitrations under the Energy Charter Treaty has soared in recent years, parties and arbitrators have faced arguments concerning its Article 21 on taxation measures, which had seldom been applied before. In 2014, the tribunal ruling on the Yukos trilogy held that even though Article 21 excludes taxation from the scope of the treaty, the carve-out could apply “only to bona fide taxation actions, i.e., actions that are motivated by the purpose of raising general revenue for the State”. Article 21 also provides that in cases regarding expropriation “[t]he Investor or the Contracting Party alleging expropriation shall refer the issue of whether the tax is an expropriation or whether the tax is discriminatory to the relevant Competent Tax Authority. Failing such referral by the Investor” in cases of investor-state arbitration, the tribunal “shall make a referral to the relevant Competent Tax Authorities”. The Yukos tribunal considered said referral to be a futile exercise when it is unequivocal that the host State acted in bad faith towards the foreign investor. As a consequence of the Yukos trilogy, the Energy Charter Secretariat has published a report on the issue that recommends potential amendments to clarify Article 21. A number of investor-state arbitral tribunals have also addressed these issues since the Yukos trilogy. Taking a public international law approach, this article critically explores awards and decisions rendered by those tribunals, paying particular attention to their findings on Article 21 vis-à-vis the sovereign power to tax. This article concludes that recent awards dealing with Article 21 arguments have struck an appropriate balance between the prerogatives of States and their obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty. Thus, the article affirms that no amendment seems necessary.


2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 2013-2039 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin von Bogdandy ◽  
Philipp Dann

The administration of the traditional nation-state used to operate as a rather closed system to the outside world. Today, cooperation between the public authorities of different States and between States and international bodies is a common phenomenon. Yet the characteristics and mechanics of such cooperation can hardly be understood using the concepts domestic public law or public international law currently on offer. Conventional concepts, such as federalism, confederalism or State-centered “realism” hardly fathom the complexity of interactions or reflect the changed role of the State, while more recent concepts, such as multi-level systems or networks, seem to encompass only parts of the phenomena at hand. Given this void, we propose to explore the notion of “composite administration” (Verbundverwaltung) and argue that it offers a concept which can combine more coherently the seemingly diverging legal elements of cooperation and hierarchy that distinguish administrative action in what often is called a multi-level administrative system. Even though the concept of composite administration was originally designed and further developed with respect to the largely federal European administrative space, we suggest testing the concept in the wider context of international cooperation. We believe that it offers valuable insights and raises critical questions, even though we do not intend to insinuate any proto-federal prospects of the institutions discussed in this paper.


Author(s):  
Shu-Perng Hwang

This article critically approaches the recent decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court regarding the ban on strikes for civil servants. It shows that the judgment cannot be seen as a decision committed to international public law, as some scholars suggest. By once more adopting a material understanding of Art. 33 para. 5 Basic Law and thereby not only confirming the constitutionality, but in particular the constitutional status of the ban on strikes for civil servants, the court holds on to the absolute primacy of the Basic Law that is not to be undermined by the ECHR or the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as a means of interpretation. The reference to the need to contextualize the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as well as the emphasis on the national particularity of the Federal Republic of Germany clearly indicate that, by developing a state-centred principle of commitment to public international law, the court does not seek to align and harmonize the requirements of the ECHR and the Basic Law by developing a state-centred principle of commitment to public international law but rather to achieve a delimitation of competences between the spheres of the ECtHR and the Federal Constitutional Court.


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