Mobilization Against the Left? Partisan Consequences of Voter Turnout in the Post-Communist Context

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Nový

AbstractDoes higher turnout support left-wing parties, as many previous studies assume? Theoretical discussions thus far have been relatively inconclusive. This study proposes three different explanatory mechanisms for examining an aggregate-level relationship between turnout and electoral support for political parties in the post-communist milieu. The conventional hypothesis, based on the assumptions of a successful re-stratification of society and the relevance of class voting, states that higher turnout benefits the left. The second hypothesis is derived from the Michigan model of party identification. In this case, political parties with less loyal electorates would be expected to profit from higher rates of electoral participation. However, this article makes the case for a third possible explanation, termed simply “mobilization against the left,” which reverses the conventional hypothesis. The idea is that the more people come to the polls, the stronger the post-communist right-wing parties will be. This analysis includes two Czech regions that can be said to be farthest away from each other in terms of their socioeconomic and political characteristics. Having analyzed the 2010 Czech parliamentary election results across 1444 electoral districts in two regions, Central Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, we conclude that there is certain empirical evidence that supports the proposed explanatory mechanism regarding the relationship between voter turnout and share of votes for political parties.

Author(s):  
Michal Nový

Does higher turnout support left-wing parties, as many previous studies assume? And does communist legacy somehow project on the mentioned relationship? The theoretical discussion is still relatively unclear. This study proposes three different explanatory mechanisms of examining aggregate-level relationship between turnout and electoral support for political parties in the post-communist milieu. The mainstream hypothesis, based on the assumptions of a successful re-stratification of the society and the relevance of class voting, states that higher turnout benefits the left. The second option is derived from the Michigan model of party identification. In this case, political parties with less loyal electorate should profit from higher rates of electoral participation. However, this article makes a case for a third possible explanation, which turns the conventional hypothesis upside down and can be termed simply as „mobilization against the left“. The idea is that the more people come to the polls, the stronger the post-communist right wing parties will be. Moreover, I include in my analysis only two electoral districts (regions) that can be said to be the farthest away from each other in their socioeconomic and political characteristics. Such an approach makes it possible to answer the question whether the expected effect is uniform or unequal across electoral districts in one country. Based on the analysis of election results in 1444 constituencies of two electoral districts in the Central Bohemian and Moravian-Silesian regions in the 2010 Parliamentary elections, I conclude that the proposed approach to the issue of party support and voter turnout has strong empirical support.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Lasoń ◽  
Andrzej Torój

We investigated the spatial variation patterns of voting results in Polish parliamentary election in 2015 across 380 regions. That election was a milestone event in Polish politics that substantially affected Poland’s internal and foreign policy directions and promoted two emerging political parties as runners-up against the well-established ones. While socio-economic, cultural and geographical factors such as economic activity, historical legacies (post-Russian East vs post-German West) and economic dichotomies (cities vs the countryside) explain most variations for most parties, they do not appeared to fit as determinants of the new parties’ support, especially of right-wing populists. Demographic target groups of individual parties appear to be relatively unresponsive to their pre-election offerings. The spatial specification of econometric models considerably improves their statistical properties. We also examined mixed-W models to account for the unobservable spatial effects stemming from the construction of constituencies. Their distinctive sets of candidates added significantly to the explanation of the spatial variation in voting.


Author(s):  
Elisabeth Ivarsflaten ◽  
Scott Blinder ◽  
Lise Bjånesøy

The “populist radical right” is a contested concept in scholarly work for good reason. This chapter begins by explaining that the political parties usually grouped together under this label are not a party family in a conventional sense and do not self-identify with this category. It goes on to show how political science scholarship has established that in Europe during the past thirty or so years we have seen the rise of a set of parties that share a common ideological feature—nativism. The nativist political parties experiencing most electoral support have combined their nativist agenda with some other legitimate ideological companion, which provides deniability—a shield against charges that the nativist agenda makes the parties and their supporters right-wing extremist and undemocratic. The chapter goes on to explain that in order to make progress on our understanding of how and why the populist radical right persuades citizens, we need to recognize: first, that nativism is the only necessary ingredient without which the populist radical right loses its force; and second, that nativism in contemporary established democracies has tended not to persuade a large share of voters without an ideological companion.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
ERIK NEIMANNS

Abstract Research on the politics of social investment finds public opinion to be highly supportive of expansive reforms and expects this support to matter for the politics of expanding social investment. Expanding social investment, it is argued, should be particularly attractive to left-wing voters and parties because of the egalitarian potential of such policies. However, few studies have examined to what extent individual preferences concerning social investment really matter politically. In this paper, I address this research gap for the crucial policy field of childcare by examining how individual-level preferences for expanding childcare provision translate into voting behavior. Based on original survey data from eight European countries, I find that preferences to expand public childcare spending indeed translate into electoral support for the left. However, this link from preferences to votes turns out to be socially biased. Childcare preferences are much more decisive for voting the further up individuals are in the income distribution. This imperfect transmission from preferences to voting behavior implies that political parties could have incentives to target the benefits of childcare reforms to their more affluent voters. My findings help to explain why governments frequently fail to reduce social inequality of access to seemingly egalitarian childcare provision.


Res Publica ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-188
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Jagodzinski ◽  
Jürgen Friedrichs ◽  
Hermann Dülmer

During the last years immigration has aggravated the socialproblems in many disadvantaged urban districts. High proportions of foreigners are concentrating in those areas which suffer from unemployment and bad housing conditions. The accumulation of social problems has created a climate of insecurity, social prejudices, and political dissatisfaction. Since political discontent presently is not remedied by the established political parties, it results in low voting participation and increasing proportions of right wing votes. The close connection between the intensity of social problems on the one side, low voter turnout and high success of right extremist parties on the other side, is empirically established by an ecological analysis of the recent state elections in Hamburg.


2021 ◽  
pp. 517-543
Author(s):  
Patrícia Calca

How have Portuguese political parties, especially the ones in coalition governments, operated? The main focus of this chapter is the study of coalition governments in Portugal since the 2000s. This chapter shows how the country’s governments have shifted back and forth from left-wing single-party governments to right-wing coalition governments during this period. It aims to improve the understanding of Portuguese governments by shedding light on their specificities and dynamics. It is thus useful as a standalone chapter or as a source for multi-country comparisons. The chapter is initiated with a brief description of Portugal’s institutional setting. It is developed further by delving into the country’s party system followed by a discussion of government-formation issues. In conclusion, the chapter considers all the previous information going deeper into coalition governance mechanisms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 205630512092663
Author(s):  
Vanessa Ceia

That Twitter is a major form of political mobilization and influence has been well documented. But what is the role of linked media—references to newspapers, photos, videos, and other external sources via URLs—in political Twitter messaging? How are linked references employed as campaign tools and rhetorical devices in messages published by political parties on Twitter? Is there a quantifiable relationship between a party’s ideology and linked media in tweets? With the spread of fake news, threats to a free press, and questioning of the legitimacy of political messaging on the rise globally, the sources on which parties draw to convince voters of their online messaging deserve critical attention. To explore the above questions, this article examines uses of linked media in tweets generated by the official accounts of Spain’s top five political parties during, in the lead-up, and in the immediate aftermath of the Spanish General Elections held on April 28, 2019. Grounded in a corpus of 10,038 tweets collected between March 1 and May 15, 2019, this study quantifies, compares, and critiques how linked media are integrated and remixed into tweets published by the left-leaning Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (@PSOE), right-wing Popular Party (@populares), left-wing Podemos (@ahorapodemos), neoliberal Citizens (@CiudadanosCs), and far-right Vox (@vox_es) parties. Evidence reveals that each party links to media from somewhat homophilic groups of news outlets, journalists, and public figures, an analysis of which can shed light on how parties construct their digital self-representations, ideological networks of information, and attempt to sway voters.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Hamed Mousavi

Liberal Zionists blame Israel’s five decade long occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip primarily on Revisionist Zionist ideology and its manifestation in right wing parties such as the Likud. They also argue that the “Two State Solution”, the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, will forever solve this issue. This paper on the other hand argues that while the Israeli left have divergent opinions from the revisionists on many issues, with regards to the “Palestinian question” and particularly on the prospects of allowing the formation of a Palestinian state, liberal Zionists have much closer views to the right wing than would most like to admit. To demonstrate this, the views of Theodore Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, David Ben-Gurion, the most important actor in the founding years of the state, as well as the approach of left wing Israeli political parties are examined. Finally, it is argued that none of the mainstream Zionist political movements will allow the creation of a Palestinian state even on a small part of Palestine.


1987 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-850 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Michael Stevenson

AbstractThis article examines changes in individuals' identification with Canadian federal political parties in the period 1977 to 1981. The analysis suggests that differences in class and ideology have a significant, if not very large effect on shifts in partisan identity. There was a slight bias toward more upper-class identification with the Progressive Conservative party and more lower-class identification with the Liberal party. Unstable partisans were at least as ideologically constrained as stable partisans, and partisan instability was more pronounced amongst the more left-wing individuals. Changes in partisanship were more likely among younger respondents, particularly lower-class and more left-wing youth. The largest bloc of unstable partisans was closest ideologically to the more left-wing stable New Democratic party partisans, and shifted only between the New Democratic and Liberal parties. A smaller bloc moved to the Progressive Conservative party and was ideologically closest to its more right-wing stable partisans.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-167
Author(s):  
Peter G. Snow

Students of Latin American political parties have long assumed a strong correlation between social class and party identification, yet this assumption has never been tested empirically in any of the Latin American nations. This is probably due in large part to the lack of reliable survey data; however, even the mass of aggregate voting data has seldom been analyzed systematically. As a result, most of what we know—or think we know—about voting behavior in Latin America is based upon the intuitive assumptions of North American scholars. “If I were a member of the Chilean middle class, I would probably vote for the Radicals or Christian Democrats, but on the other hand if I were quite wealthy I would probably vote for the Conservatives.”Students of Argentine politics assume that the Conservative parties, always representing the interests of the nation's aristocracy, have received the bulk of their votes from the large landowners; that the interests of this group consistently have been opposed by the Radical parties who receive their electoral support from the urban middle classes; and that the more recently formed Peronist parties have championed the cause of, and been supported at the polls by, the industrial workers. It is the purpose of this article to test these assumptions, primarily through analysis of aggregate voting data, but also by examining the social backgrounds of party leaders and their actions while in power.


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