Schemata zur agnatischen und kognatischen Verwandtschaft nach römischem Recht in Handschriften mit westgotisch-römischem Recht, II: Das Schema zu den cognati

Author(s):  
Wolfgang Kaiser

Abstract Schemata of agnatic and cognatic kinship according to Roman law in manuscripts of Visigothic-Roman law II: The schema of the cognati. Following ZRG RA 134 (2017) 353–408, the subject of this article is the schema of cognatic kinship. The schema has been transmitted by several manuscripts of the Lex Romana Visigothorum alongside an excerpt from Aelius Gallus' De verborum, quae ad ius pertinent, significatione, two schemata of agnatic kinship, and a schema of succession according to ius civile. The article offers a critical edition of the schema.

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-48
Author(s):  
Warren Swain

Intoxication as a ground to set aside a contract is not something that has proved to be easy for the law to regulate. This is perhaps not very surprising. Intoxication is a temporary condition of varying degrees of magnitude. Its presence does however raise questions of contractual autonomy and individual responsibility. Alcohol consumption is a common social activity and perceptions of intoxication and especially alcoholism have changed over time. Roman law is surprisingly quiet on the subject. In modern times the rules about intoxicated contracting in Scottish and English law is very similar. Rather more interestingly the law in these two jurisdictions has reached the current position in slightly different ways. This history can be traced through English Equity, the works of the Scottish Institutional writers, the rise of the Will Theory, and all leavened with a dose of judicial pragmatism.


Author(s):  
Pamela Barmash

The Laws of Hammurabi is one of the earliest law codes, dating from the eighteenth century BCE Mesopotamia (ancient Iraq). It is the culmination of a tradition in which scribes would demonstrate their legal flair by composing statutes on a repertoire of traditional cases, articulating what they deemed just and fair. The book describes how the scribe of the Laws of Hammurabi advanced beyond earlier scribes in composing statutes that manifest systematization and implicit legal principles. The scribe inserted the statutes into the structure of a royal inscription, skillfully reshaping the genre. This approach allowed the king to use the law code to demonstrate that Hammurabi had fulfilled the mandate to guarantee justice enjoined upon him by the gods, affirming his authority as king. This tradition of scribal improvisation on a set of traditional cases continued outside of Mesopotamia, influencing biblical law and the law of the Hittite Empire and perhaps shaping Greek and Roman law. The Laws of Hammurabi is also a witness to the start of another stream of intellectual tradition. It became a classic text and the subject of formal commentaries, marking a Copernican revolution in intellectual culture.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Sławomir Godek

SOME REMARKS ON THE STUDY OF THE ROMANIZATION OF LITHUANIAN STATUTESSummary The article is dedicated to the issues connected with the reception of Roman Law in the Lithuanian statutes of 1529, 1566, and 1588. After an analysis of the existing scholarly accomplishments in the field, one cannot but conclude that the study of the influence of the Roman Law on Lithuanian codifications has hardly been started yet. Despite the fairly long tradition of research in this field, so far only selected elements of the first and second statutes have been analyzed in order to identify Roman constituents. The research carried out in 1930s by Raphael Taubenschlag, Franciszek Bossowski, and Karol Koranyi demonstrated which Roman Law noticeably influenced the statutory regulations pertaining to family law, law of property, law of succession, criminal and procedural law. Their observations partly confirmed the findings previously made in the nineteenth century by Aleksander Mickiewicz, Franciszek Morze, and Ignacy Daniłowicz. At the same time, nothing is still known about the scope of Romanization in the third Lithuanian statute or about the transformations which Roman elements underwent in each of the statutes. Without further study of the subject, one cannot assess the role of Roman law in the Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita).It seems that the most fertile ground for identification of Roman elements in the third Lithuanian statute is tutorship and succession law, especially testamentary succession. Some interesting and original observations could be made on the basis of a more thorough comparative analysis of the pertinent Roman and Lithuanian regulations.


Author(s):  
Christopher W. Morris

It is often said that the subject matter of political philosophy is the nature and justification of the state. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel thinks that political science is “nothing other than an attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity.” John Rawls famously understands “the primary subject of justice [to be] the basic structure of society,” restricting his attentions to a society “conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies,” and assuming that “the boundaries of these schemes are given by the notion of a self-contained national community.” Contemporary political philosophers often follow suit, disagreeing about what states should do, and simply assuming that they are the proper agents of justice or reform. The history of philosophy and the development of political concepts seem to be central to understanding the state. The influence of Roman law and republican government, and the rediscovery of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, are obvious important influences. The modern state emerged first in Western Europe in early modern times.


1976 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 132-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Crook

Two of the Herculaneum Tablets, though fragmentary and obscure, furnish evidence that justifies a re-examination of the role played in Roman law and society by the institution which is the subject of this paper:Tab. Herc. LXXXIII:L. V[e]nidius En[ny]chus testand[i ca]usa dixs[i]t[L.] An[n]io Rufo se honoris ius emerere [ut]si vellet ex numero decurionum aut au[gus]-talium nominatis a se decem de petition[ibus]nostris discep[t]atorem dicas ra[t]ione posc[[…]e H[S] M[‐]me sibi debere s[t]i[puletur] …LXXXIV:…] quem et superius nom[i]-n[a]s[ti…] Fes[ti]nium Proculumdisc[e]ptatorem paratus sum ire,si minus necessario c[oa]ctus a te spo(n)-sionem tecum faciam. VAC.


Traditio ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 37-61
Author(s):  
Michael S. Driscoll

The subject of penance and confession is central in the writings of Alcuin of York (†804), and found in many different literary genres: e.g., liturgical writings, devotional works, letters, and small treatises. The genius of Alcuin, as well as the principal thrust of his work at the court of Charlemagne, lay in pedagogical concerns. Within the school reform, however, we find traces of theological thought, most notably his ideas regarding penance. His overriding interest was pastoral rather than theoretical. He was concerned about the well-being of his pupils and it was for them that he composed his most important treatise on confession and penance, Ad pueros sancti Martini.


1946 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-170
Author(s):  
Kopel Kagan

No satisfactory definition of Dominium in Roman Law has yet been achieved. Amongst English writers Austin many years ago found great difficulty in this question while in modern times Professor Buckland has written ‘it is thus difficult to define Dominium precisely.’ Again, Poste, dealing with Gaius' discussion of dominium, says that his opening statements are ‘deplorably confused.’ These examples are enough to indicate the condition, of uncertainty which prevails. In my submission this uncertainty exists mainly because the conception of ususfructus has never yet been explained adequately. Of Possessio it has been said ‘the definition of Possessio to give the results outlined is a matter of great difficulty. No perfectly correct solution may be possible,’ and this statement is generally accepted as a correct assessment of the present position in juristic literature. But here, too, in my opinion, the reason is again connected with usufruct, for the possessio of the usufructuary has not yet been adequately determined. Gaius (2.93) tells us ‘usufructuarius vero usucapere non potest; primuum quod non possidet, sed habet ius utendi et fruendi.’ Ulpian holds that he had possessio in fact (‘Naturaliter videtur possidere is qui usum fructum habet’ D.41.2.12). On this subject Roby says ‘the fructuary was not strictly a possessor and therefore if he was deprived from enjoying he had not a claim to the original interdict de vi but in virtue of his quasi-possessio a special interdict was granted him.’ Austin saw difficulty in the whole problem of possessio. He wrote ‘by Savigny in his treatise on possessio it is remarked that the possessio of a right of usufruct … resembles the possessio of a thing, by the proprietor, or by an adverse possessor exercising rights of property over the thing. And that a disturbance of the one possession resembles the disturbance of the other. Now this must happen for the reason I have already stated:—namely, that the right of usufruct or user, like that of property, is indefinite in point of user. For what is possession (meaning legal possession not mere physical handling of the subject) but the exercise of a right ?’


Think ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (34) ◽  
pp. 25-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

The idea that all the entities in the world may be, for legal and moral purposes, divided into the two categories of ‘persons’ and ‘things’ comes down to us from the tradition of Roman law. In the law, a ‘person’ is essentially the subject of rights and obligations, while a thing may be owned as property. In ethics, a person is an object of respect, to be valued for her own sake, and never to be used as a mere means to an end, while a thing has only a derivative value, and may be used as a means to some person's ends. This bifurcation is unfortunate because it seems to leave us with no alternative but to categorize everything as either a person or a thing. Yet some of the entities that give rise to the most vexing ethical problems are exactly the ones that do not seem to fit comfortably into either category. For various, different, kinds of reasons, it seems inappropriate to categorize a fetus, a non-human animal, the environment, or an object of great beauty, as a person, but neither does it seem right to say of such things that they are to be valued only as means.


1942 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Daube

Wherever there exists any kind of administration of justice, people will soon realize that a man who makes, or receives, a declaration has to be very careful if he wants to be quite sure of its ultimate legal effect; and the same, of course, is true of all manner of legal business. A man may believe that the promise he is giving has one meaning, but later be told by the judge that it has another; or he may enter into an agreement on the assumption of the existence of certain facts, which afterwards turn out not to be as assumed. There are many ways in which such a discrepancy between verba and voluntas, or letter and spirit, or act and intent, can come about; and a not infrequent one seems to be that the two parties to a contract wish to cheat one another. Very naturally, the temptation to take advantage of a person's lack of forethought must be particularly great in an age when it is permissible to interpret the words of an agreement in a strict and narrow fashion, and when a formal undertaking is considered valid no matter by what trickery you have been led to give it. The Spartan king, Cleomenes, concluded a truce with Argos for thirty days; but he broke it by night, the truce having been made for thirty days. Q. Fabius Labeo, for the Roman senate, arbitrated a boundary dispute between Nola and Naples. He interviewed the parties separately, appealed to their generosity and induced them to make substantial concessions. In the end, there was a large strip of territory left between Nola and Naples, which Labeo awarded to Rome. By the time of Cicero, both these cases were regarded as cases of fraud and as illustrating the maxim summum ius summa iniuria. The history in Roman law of the problem of verba and voluntas has been the subject of much discussion during the past few years. I may, perhaps, be forgiven for drawing attention to a Biblical narrative which is dominated by this problem, though the commentators do not appear to have noticed it. It is the story of the sale of his birthright by Esau.


Author(s):  
Guido Rossi
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

In the study of the history of insurance, much attention has been paid to early modern jurists. Their importance as a source for the study of the subject is, however, debatable. Early modern jurists were more interested in systematising insurance than in describing it for what it was. Their main effort lay in explaining this non-Roman contract in Roman law terms. To do so, something had to be sacrificed - reality.



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