North Korea in 1982: Continuing Revolution under Kim Jong Il

Asian Survey ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109
Author(s):  
Rinn-Sup Shinn
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Kim Jong Il

scholarly journals The religious phenomenon of Juche ideology as a political tool

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fransiskus I. Widjaja ◽  
Noh I. Boiliu ◽  
Irfan F. Simanjuntak ◽  
Joni M.P. Gultom ◽  
Fredy Simanjuntak
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
The State ◽  
Communist Country ◽  
Kim Il Sung ◽  
The People ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
Juche Ideology ◽  
Modern Era

This study aims to determine the motive that led to the establishment of Juche by Kim Il Sung amidst the influence of communism and its transformation into religion in North Korea. North Korea is a communist country dictated by Kim Jong-Un of the Kim dynasty and known for its cruelty. The country underwent several changes from Marxism-Leninism to familism to determine its strength in Juche. This ideology that acts as a religion was influenced and strengthened Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong-Un and built by shifting the concept of marxism-Leninism to construct a new understanding of Juche. It will be demonstrated that this ideology was influenced by Confucianism, Christianity, Nationalism, Chinese Communism, and Russian Communism. In the modern era, imperialism was used as an ideological tool to restrict backwardness. This theory allegedly helped Kim Il-Sung establish a unitary, one-person rule over North Korea. ‘It will be examined whether Juche ideology is a tool the state has used to convince people of their government. Pronouncements, an intentional religion in which the people were to believe that their Ruler (Kim Il Sung) was a supreme human or an ideology that morphed into a religion’. It will be demonstrated that, when they started honoring Kim as their god, no other religion was permitted.Contribution: This research offers readers an understanding of the value of humanity in the binding ideology of Juche. However, the Juche Ideology can serve as a missiological bridge towards mission goals, which require the experience of spiritual, physical, and social liberation.

Hybrid in Form, Socialist in Content: The Formal Politics of Chŏlga in the North Korean Revolutionary Opera Sea of Blood

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-445
Author(s):  
STEPHEN JOHNSON
Keyword(s):  
Popular Music ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Cultural Hybridity ◽  
Colonial Era ◽  
Music Genres ◽  
The North ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
Analytical Standards ◽  
Korean Nation

AbstractKim Jong Il considered the 1971 premiere of the opera Sea of Blood a watershed moment in opera history. He lauded its innovative use of chŏlga (‘stanzaic song’) rather than aria and recitative. By Western analytical standards, however, chŏlga is simple and predictable, so scholars have thus far glossed over its conventions and their signification. This article instead argues that chŏlga conventions exhibit cultural hybridity and that Kim leveraged such hybridity to advocate a modern, popular, and national sound for North Korea. I begin by outlining hybrid characteristics of colonial-era popular music that chŏlga inherited. I then explore Kim's engagement with such trends in his speeches on chŏlga and demonstrate that cultural hybridity was central to his understanding of sonic modernity. Finally, I analyse a scene from Sea of Blood that pits chŏlga against other music genres, leading to a symbolic victory for the form and for the Korean nation.

Climate Change and Regime Perpetuation in North Korea

Asian Survey ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 378-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Habib
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Food Insecurity ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Agricultural Sector ◽  
Limited Capacity ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
Climate Hazards

Climate change is a new variable that may weaken the Kim Jong-il regime by disrupting North Korea's agricultural sector, leading to greater food insecurity and erosion of the state's institutions. North Korea has limited capacity to adapt to climate hazards, which could exacerbate existing stresses and push the regime into terminal decay.

Pyongyang finds few alternatives as China ties fray

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Relations ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Political Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Chinese Investment ◽  
Track Record ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
Investment Opportunities ◽  
Potential Alternative ◽  
Korean State

Subject The outlook for China-North Korea foreign relations. Significance A ceremony in Pyongyang on December 17 marked the third anniversary of the death of Kim Jong-il. Unlike on previous occasions, no Chinese delegation was invited. Official exchanges between North Korea and its sole ally have slowed to a trickle. Beijing has frozen investment in North Korean infrastructure. Chinese and North Korean state media exchange critical remarks. Frustrated with Pyongyang's snubs and its perseverance with its nuclear weapons programme, Beijing is putting more pressure on North Korea than ever before -- while Pyongyang attempts to reduce China's ability to do this and retaliates in kind. Impacts North Korea's dire track record vis-a-vis foreign investors will hamstring its attempts to drum up investor interest more widely. Despite China's presumed influence, Chinese investors are far from immune to political risk. Political risk has increased for Chinese investors in North Korea, but has not fallen for non-Chinese investors. Russia will be offered investment opportunities in North Korea, but will accept only projects viable on purely commercial grounds. Though disappointment has repeatedly followed promising signs, South Korea offers the highest-potential alternative to Chinese investment.

Defining the Nature and Future of the Party–Military Relations in North Korea

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongseok Woo
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Political Role ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
Military Control ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Near Future

Since Kim Jong-il officially launched his Songun politics in 1998, conflicting assessments have generated two competing arguments regarding the political role of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). The military garrison state argument suggests that Songun politics brought about the decline of the party and political ascendance of the military, while the party’s army model argues that the KPA is still the party’s army and under the party’s firm control. This article suggests that the debate mischaracterizes the KPA’s political place in North Korea and that the military has not been a politically influential organ from the state-building to the current Kim Jong-un era. This article identifies two distinct patterns of military control mechanisms—namely partisan (1960s–1990s) and personalistic (1998–2008)—and argues that the different control methods have little to do with the KPA’s political strength or weakness. Rather, they merely reflect the dictator’s ruling method of choice for regime survival. The analysis illustrates that the current Kim Jong-un regime is more stable than many outside observers may estimate, and a military coup is highly unlikely in the near future.

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