Hybrid in Form, Socialist in Content: The Formal Politics of Chŏlga in the North Korean Revolutionary Opera Sea of Blood

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-445
Author(s):  
STEPHEN JOHNSON
Keyword(s):  
Popular Music ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Cultural Hybridity ◽  
Colonial Era ◽  
Music Genres ◽  
The North ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
Analytical Standards ◽  
Korean Nation

AbstractKim Jong Il considered the 1971 premiere of the opera Sea of Blood a watershed moment in opera history. He lauded its innovative use of chŏlga (‘stanzaic song’) rather than aria and recitative. By Western analytical standards, however, chŏlga is simple and predictable, so scholars have thus far glossed over its conventions and their signification. This article instead argues that chŏlga conventions exhibit cultural hybridity and that Kim leveraged such hybridity to advocate a modern, popular, and national sound for North Korea. I begin by outlining hybrid characteristics of colonial-era popular music that chŏlga inherited. I then explore Kim's engagement with such trends in his speeches on chŏlga and demonstrate that cultural hybridity was central to his understanding of sonic modernity. Finally, I analyse a scene from Sea of Blood that pits chŏlga against other music genres, leading to a symbolic victory for the form and for the Korean nation.

Songs for New Leaders

2020 ◽  
pp. 241-268
Author(s):  
Keith Howard
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Popular Music ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Olympic Games ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Pop Culture ◽  
Major Group ◽  
The Third ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
Winter Olympic Games

This chapter first turns the spotlight on how fascist and socialist states approach popular music, both in respect to control and censorship and in attempts to create authorized pop repertories, arguing for a redefinition of “popular.” It then introduces the two North Korean pop bands established in the mid-1980s, Pochonbo and Wangjaesan. Two vignettes explore how pop songs functioned as a “state telegraph” during the 1994–1997 transition period to Kim Jong Il that began with Kim Il Sung’s death, and during 2009–2011 as the third leader, Kim Jong Un, was eased into power, following the death of Kim Jong Il. Featuring Moranbong as the major group, it next discusses the revival in pop culture that began around 2010, finding evidence for this revival stretching back to the beginning of the new millennium. An epilogue briefly considers 2018, when North Korea sent an expanded Samjiyŏn troupe with 130 musicians to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games and South Korea reciprocated, sending K-pop stars to Pyongyang. From 2015, with the second incarnation of Moranbong, and then in 2018 with the Samjiyŏn troupe, the clock was turned back, and songs once again became the primary musical tool of the northern regime, reinforcing ideology, and signaling changes both within North Korea and in North Korea’s relations with the outside world.

scholarly journals The Ideological Perspective of Modern Conflict Reality in a Closed Society: the North Korean Case

Discourse ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-48
Author(s):  
B. V. Kabylinskii
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Kim Il Sung ◽  
The North ◽  
Direct Observations ◽  
Third World Country ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
Ideological Perspective ◽  
Closed Society ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Conflict Research

Introduction. Socio-philosophical studies of the patterns of conflict being in modern discourse need to be clarified from the point of ontology. The analysis of the conflict specifics of a closed society in an ideological perspective allows us to discover the ontological foundations of self-conflict. In order to empirically reinforce conflict research, the relationship of conflict and ideology should be considered on the basis of specific cases. North Korean sociocultural realities are among the most visible forms of a closed society in modern discourse and provide ample opportunity to comprehend the conflicting reality modeled by ideological tools of influencing the mass consciousness.Methodology and sources. Methodologically, the work is based on social and philosophical reflection based on direct observations in North Korea during a visit to Pyongyang in the autumn of 2016 and a content analysis of Russian literature acquired in North Korea (works by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, fundamental scientific works by North Korean scientists and periodicals of an ideological nature).Results and discussion. Ideology is understood as a variety of views and ideas transmitted to the subject with the goal of reorienting or keeping his perception in a certain mode of sociocultural reality. The subject's ideological programming in modern discourse claims to be a leader in the field of modeling sociocultural life in general and, in particular, the “conflict reality” cluster. The author analyzes the ideological foundations of North Korean conflict reality, laid down by the founder of the state, Kim Il Sung, and continued by his heir Kim Jong Il in the militarized Songun doctrine.Conclusion. On the base of study of the ideological aspects of conflict reality in the DPRK, it can be concluded that in a closed society, the ontological boundary between the real and the apparent in everyday life is eliminated. At the same time, a closed society with a paramilitary ideology meets the criteria for a successful development for a third world country, as embodied in globalist dogma.

The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements

2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce W. Bennett ◽  
Jennifer Lind
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Leadership Transition ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Refugee Crisis ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Stability Operations ◽  
The North ◽  
Kim Jong Il

In North Korea, the upcoming leadership transition in the Kim Jong-il regime will be a precarious time for the Kim family's hold on power. A collapse of the North Korean government could have several dangerous implications for East Asia, including “loose nukes,” a humanitarian disaster, a regional refugee crisis, and potential escalation to war between China and the United States. To respond to a collapse and these problems, neighboring countries may perform several military missions to stabilize North Korea. These include the location and securing of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, stability operations, border control, conventional disarmament, and combat/deterrence operations. Assuming that collapse occurs in a relatively benign manner, military missions to stabilize North Korea could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops. If collapse occurs after a war on the peninsula, or if it sparks civil war in North Korea, the number of missions—and their requirements—would grow. Because of the size and complexity of these missions, and because of the perils associated with mismanaging them, advance and combined planning is essential. Combined planning should include those actors (e.g., China, South Korea, and the United States) that could otherwise take destabilizing action to protect their own interests.

Assessing the leadership transition in North Korea: Using network analysis of field inspections, 1997–2012

2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ishiyama
Keyword(s):  
Network Analysis ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Political Reform ◽  
Leadership Transition ◽  
Republic Of Korea ◽  
The West ◽  
The North ◽  
Kim Jong Il ◽  
History Of ◽  
Using Data

This paper examines changes in the in the composition of the North Korean elite from 1997 to 2012, a particularly tumultuous period in the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Specifically, the paper assesses the changing composition of the leadership networks around both Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, using data from the entourages that accompanied the great leaders on their “on the spot guidance” inspection tours. The paper finds that there have been significant changes in the leadership elite since the succession of Kim Jong Un. The paper offers some observations regarding the implications these changes have on the receptivity of the regime to a normalization of relations with the West and future economic and political reform.

The Japanese Factor in the Making of North Korean Socialism

2020 ◽  
pp. 225-251
Author(s):  
Ernest Ming-Tak Leung
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Colonial Rule ◽  
Direct Experience ◽  
Colonial Era ◽  
Stepping Stone ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Juche Ideology

This article explores a commonly ignored aspect of Japan–North Korean relations: the Japanese factor in the making of Korean socialism. Korea was indirectly influenced by the Japanese Jiyuminken Movement, in the 1910s–1920s serving as a stepping-stone for the creation of a Japanese Communist Party. Wartime mobilization policies under Japanese rule were continued and expanded beyond the colonial era. The Juche ideology built on tendencies first exhibited in the 1942 Overcoming Modernity Conference in Japan, and in the 1970s some Japanese leftists viewed Juche as a humanist Marxism. Trade between Japan and North Korea expanded from 1961 onwards, culminating in North Korea’s default in 1976, from which point on relations soured between the two countries. Yet leaders with direct experience of colonial rule governed North Korea through to the late 1990s.

Why Has There Been No People’s Power Rebellion in North Korea?

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Andrew Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Rural Areas ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Information Control ◽  
Al Jazeera ◽  
The North ◽  
New Information ◽  
Effective System ◽  
The Right

One scenario put forward by researchers, political commentators and journalists for the collapse of North Korea has been a People’s Power (or popular) rebellion. This paper analyses why no popular rebellion has occurred in the DPRK under Kim Jong Un. It challenges the assumption that popular rebellion would happen because of widespread anger caused by a greater awareness of superior economic conditions outside the DPRK. Using Jack Goldstone’s theoretical expla-nations for the outbreak of popular rebellion, and comparisons with the 1989 Romanian and 2010–11 Tunisian transitions, this paper argues that marketi-zation has led to a loosening of state ideological control and to an influx of infor-mation about conditions in the outside world. However, unlike the Tunisian transitions—in which a new information context shaped by social media, the Al-Jazeera network and an experience of protest helped create a sense of pan-Arab solidarity amongst Tunisians resisting their government—there has been no similar ideology unifying North Koreans against their regime. There is evidence of discontent in market unrest in the DPRK, although protests between 2011 and the present have mostly been in defense of the right of people to support themselves through private trade. North Koreans believe this right has been guaranteed, or at least tacitly condoned, by the Kim Jong Un government. There has not been any large-scale explosion of popular anger because the state has not attempted to crush market activities outright under Kim Jong Un. There are other reasons why no popular rebellion has occurred in the North. Unlike Tunisia, the DPRK lacks a dissident political elite capable of leading an opposition movement, and unlike Romania, the DPRK authorities have shown some flexibility in their anti-dissent strategies, taking a more tolerant approach to protests against economic issues. Reduced levels of violence during periods of unrest and an effective system of information control may have helped restrict the expansion of unrest beyond rural areas.

Unseen Laws- A Quantitative Approach to Developments in North Korea’s Legal System

2018 ◽  
pp. 22-62
Author(s):  
Martin Weiser
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The North ◽  
Legal Texts ◽  
Policy Fields ◽  
Policy Agendas ◽  
Broad Policy ◽  
Sophisticated Analysis ◽  
Detailed Picture ◽  
Law Making

The position of law in North Korean politics and society has been a long concern of scholars as well as politicians and activists. Some argue it would be more important to understand the extra-legal rules that run North Korea like the Ten Principles on the leadership cult as they supersede any formal laws or the constitution.1 But the actual legal developments in North Korea, which eventually also mediate those leading principles and might even limit their reach, has so far been insufficiently explored. It is easy to point to North Korean secrecy as a main reason for this lacuna. But the numerous available materials and references on North Korean legislation available today have, however, not been fully explored yet, which has severely impeded progress in the field. Even publications officially released by North Korea to foreigners offer surprisingly detailed information on legal changes and the evolution of the law-making institutions. This larger picture of legal developments already draws a more detailed picture of the institutional developments in North Korean law and the broad policy fields that had been regulated from early on in contrast to the often-assumed absence of legislation in important fields like copyright, civil law or investment. It also shows that different to a monolithic system, various law-making institutions exist and fulfil discernably different legal responsibilities. Next to this limitation in content, scholars in the field currently also have not used all approaches legal developments in the North Korea could be analysed and interpreted with. Going beyond the reading of legal texts or speculating about known titles of still unavailable legislation, quantitative approaches can be applied ranging from the simple counting of laws to more sophisticated analysis of legislative numbering often provided with legislation. Understanding the various institutions as flexible in their roles and hence adoptable to shifts in leadership and policy agendas can also provide a more realistic picture of legal practices in North Korea.

North Korea in 1982: Continuing Revolution under Kim Jong Il

Asian Survey ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109
Author(s):  
Rinn-Sup Shinn
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Kim Jong Il

The Impact of Sanctions on North Korea’s Foreign Trade from the Perspective of the Comparative Advantage Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 4-15
Author(s):  
I. A. Korgun ◽  
G. D. Toloraya
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Trade ◽  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
National Economy ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Transformation ◽  
Global Trade ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The North ◽  
The Impact

The presented study analyzes the opportunities for North Korea to capitalize on its competitive advantages in foreign trade in the context of sanctions.Aim. The study aims to identify mechanisms that allow North Korea to engage in foreign trade in circumvention of UN sanctions and to analyze their impact on the national economy.Tasks. The authors analyze the structure of North Korea’s national economy, its initial competitive advantage, identify the specific features of North Korea’s foreign trade in the context of sanctions, and determine the consequences of illicit trade in circumvention of sanctions for the national economy.Methods. This study uses an interdisciplinary approach that combines the classical theory of competitive advantage with the concept of rent seeking, with the concept of rent seeking and analysis of trade flows.Results. The study shows that, despite the restrictions imposed by sanctions, North Korea strives to make the most of its advantages, such as resource availability and cheap labor, in global trade. The country builds its own export-import chains in circumvention of sanctions. These chains are rather mobile, flexible, and controlled by the elite. As a result, benefits from trade that could be evenly distributed among the population are concentrated in the hands of a narrow segment of society. ‘Rent seeking’ makes it possible to formulate the negative consequences of these processes for the North Korean economy and the international community.Conclusions. Solving the North Korean issue requires an economic transformation in the country through the replacement of restrictive sanctions with more constructive ones. The exclusion of North Korea from open global trade leads to the country’s marginalization and impairs the transparency of international commodity flows.

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