Sports Politics in North Korea utilizing Inter-Korean Sports Cooperation : Focusing on the Main Features of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-97
Author(s):  
Jeong-pil Heo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fransiskus I. Widjaja ◽  
Noh I. Boiliu ◽  
Irfan F. Simanjuntak ◽  
Joni M.P. Gultom ◽  
Fredy Simanjuntak

This study aims to determine the motive that led to the establishment of Juche by Kim Il Sung amidst the influence of communism and its transformation into religion in North Korea. North Korea is a communist country dictated by Kim Jong-Un of the Kim dynasty and known for its cruelty. The country underwent several changes from Marxism-Leninism to familism to determine its strength in Juche. This ideology that acts as a religion was influenced and strengthened Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong-Un and built by shifting the concept of marxism-Leninism to construct a new understanding of Juche. It will be demonstrated that this ideology was influenced by Confucianism, Christianity, Nationalism, Chinese Communism, and Russian Communism. In the modern era, imperialism was used as an ideological tool to restrict backwardness. This theory allegedly helped Kim Il-Sung establish a unitary, one-person rule over North Korea. ‘It will be examined whether Juche ideology is a tool the state has used to convince people of their government. Pronouncements, an intentional religion in which the people were to believe that their Ruler (Kim Il Sung) was a supreme human or an ideology that morphed into a religion’. It will be demonstrated that, when they started honoring Kim as their god, no other religion was permitted.Contribution: This research offers readers an understanding of the value of humanity in the binding ideology of Juche. However, the Juche Ideology can serve as a missiological bridge towards mission goals, which require the experience of spiritual, physical, and social liberation.


Discourse ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-48
Author(s):  
B. V. Kabylinskii

Introduction. Socio-philosophical studies of the patterns of conflict being in modern discourse need to be clarified from the point of ontology. The analysis of the conflict specifics of a closed society in an ideological perspective allows us to discover the ontological foundations of self-conflict. In order to empirically reinforce conflict research, the relationship of conflict and ideology should be considered on the basis of specific cases. North Korean sociocultural realities are among the most visible forms of a closed society in modern discourse and provide ample opportunity to comprehend the conflicting reality modeled by ideological tools of influencing the mass consciousness.Methodology and sources. Methodologically, the work is based on social and philosophical reflection based on direct observations in North Korea during a visit to Pyongyang in the autumn of 2016 and a content analysis of Russian literature acquired in North Korea (works by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, fundamental scientific works by North Korean scientists and periodicals of an ideological nature).Results and discussion. Ideology is understood as a variety of views and ideas transmitted to the subject with the goal of reorienting or keeping his perception in a certain mode of sociocultural reality. The subject's ideological programming in modern discourse claims to be a leader in the field of modeling sociocultural life in general and, in particular, the “conflict reality” cluster. The author analyzes the ideological foundations of North Korean conflict reality, laid down by the founder of the state, Kim Il Sung, and continued by his heir Kim Jong Il in the militarized Songun doctrine.Conclusion. On the base of study of the ideological aspects of conflict reality in the DPRK, it can be concluded that in a closed society, the ontological boundary between the real and the apparent in everyday life is eliminated. At the same time, a closed society with a paramilitary ideology meets the criteria for a successful development for a third world country, as embodied in globalist dogma.


Author(s):  
Dongwoo Yim

Recent residential developments in Pyongyang (P’yŏngyang) show a pattern distinguished from previous eras in the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il periods. Since Kim Jong Un’s rise to power, major developments, such as the Mirae Scientist Street and Ryomyong Street developments, resemble real estate developments in other capitalist cities. Instead of repeating the same designs, they provide unique designs in each building, and dedicate more to commercial spaces and residential units, while reducing supporting amenities such as daycares, schools and civic amenities that are not profitable in the market. With signs of the transformation of Pyongyang, this paper addresses how residential developments have been occurring since the reconstruction of the city in relationship to socialist microdistricts, and how recent developments challenge the idea of the socialist microdistrict.


Author(s):  
A. James McAdams

This chapter considers three of prominent socialist states that were not directly affected by the revolutions of 1989–1991—North Korea, China, and Cuba. At the time, these states had recognized that they, too, were no longer living in the world of Marx and Lenin. In different ways, each of these states drifted away from the different conceptions of single-party rule. In North Korea, the break was complete. Under successive despots, Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un, the party's leading role was fully supplanted by the institution of dynastic rule. In China, the shift was gradual and less conspicuous. A new generation of leaders, represented by Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, routinely invoked the principle of party rule to justify their policies. But they did not necessarily practice it. Indeed, by the 2000s, one was hard-pressed to say what specifically made the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) communist. Only Fidel Castro showed any consistency, but in a way that did not serve the party idea. Although he had two options to institutionalize his vision, the party and the military, he evidently remained convinced until his final days that he was the epicenter of his country's revolution.


Asian Survey ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 550-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jae-Cheon Lim

Abstract Focusing on the early stage, this paper compares the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il succession with the Kim Jong Il-Kim Jong Un succession. Analyzing their differences and similarities, the study attempts to provide a better understanding of the leadership formation of Kim Jong Un, who now rules North Korea.


Asian Survey ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109
Author(s):  
Rinn-Sup Shinn
Keyword(s):  

1989 ◽  
Vol 4 (0) ◽  
pp. 167-187
Author(s):  
Joong-Hyung Lee

As the social trend to learn more about North Korea grows, the person and past career of Kim Il-Sung have been thrown into controversy. In this context, Kim Il-Sung's anti-Japanese guerilla activities in Manchuria focused on the raid of Pochonbo Police Station and who is the leader of the Sixth Division of the Anti-Japanese United Army. Also, this article compared two groups of scholars, that is, proKim who is positive side of Kim's Identity and conKim who denied Kim's past to the North Korea's claims. It has been demonstrated conclusively that many anti-Japanese activists used the name of General Kim Il-Sung and the present Kim Il-Sung in North Korea must be one of them. And Kim Il-Sung's anti-Japanese activities were not revolutionary armed resistances but rathcr small scale guerilla activities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-445
Author(s):  
STEPHEN JOHNSON

AbstractKim Jong Il considered the 1971 premiere of the opera Sea of Blood a watershed moment in opera history. He lauded its innovative use of chŏlga (‘stanzaic song’) rather than aria and recitative. By Western analytical standards, however, chŏlga is simple and predictable, so scholars have thus far glossed over its conventions and their signification. This article instead argues that chŏlga conventions exhibit cultural hybridity and that Kim leveraged such hybridity to advocate a modern, popular, and national sound for North Korea. I begin by outlining hybrid characteristics of colonial-era popular music that chŏlga inherited. I then explore Kim's engagement with such trends in his speeches on chŏlga and demonstrate that cultural hybridity was central to his understanding of sonic modernity. Finally, I analyse a scene from Sea of Blood that pits chŏlga against other music genres, leading to a symbolic victory for the form and for the Korean nation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 135-158
Author(s):  
Keith Howard

Chapter 5 is the second of three chapters on “revolutionary operas.” It explores how revolutionary operas reflect and are distinct from parallel genres in the Soviet Union, as well as how they may have been influenced by Chinese model works. It shows how ideology, including Soviet socialist realism and North Korean nationalism, and also collective creation and “seed theory,” is embedded in operas. It discusses the involvement of the North Korean leadership, and in particular Kim Jong Il, in opera creation, and explores the impact of comments made by the leadership after the premieres of the first three operas. The chapter asks what was known about opera in Korea before 1945, offering a discussion of the traditional genre of p’ansori, its twentieth-century ch’anggŭk staged equivalent, and how these two genres—and specific musicians associated with them who moved from Seoul to Pyongyang and continued their careers there into the 1960s—fared. These older forms were effectively stopped dead when Kim Il Sung remarked that they were reminiscent of a time when people traveled by donkey and wore horsehair hats, and, after the five revolutionary operas, they were replaced by “people’s operas” in the new, revolutionary opera mold.


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