Saudi Arabia and UAE in the Horn of Africa

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Shady Ahmed Mansour ◽  
Yara Yehia Ahmed

This article explains the active policies adopted by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) towards the Horn of Africa, which could be attributed to the existence of rival regional powers, especially Iran and Turkey, and their adoption of policies deemed threatening to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. It uses “alliance politics” to explain how both countries are containing regional threats by building alliances with countries in the Horn of Africa by promoting military and trade relations and boosting development.

Subject Sudan's foreign relations. Significance As aftershocks from the Gulf crisis ripple across the Horn of Africa, Sudan appears to be playing a dangerous strategic game. Recent months have seen Sudan seek deals with Turkey and Qatar, as well as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), even as these extra-regional powers are locked in a fractious rivalry that is playing out in Africa as a contest for influence. Impacts Even with external support, Sudan’s economic crisis is unlikely to ease quickly. Economic tensions may explode into a new wave of popular anti-government protests. Mismanagement and corruption will remain serious obstacles to wider investment and business in Sudan.


2021 ◽  
pp. 097508782110341
Author(s):  
Ismail Numan Telci

The Horn of Africa has visibly started to play a more distinctive role in international relations in the past years. Comprising Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti, the region is home to competition between countries of the region and influence of external actors. The region is increasingly a part of Middle East regional politics and is home to competition among regional powers such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran. It is critical to articulate how each country formulates an agenda for the region. Therefore, the article seeks to explain how each regional power came to establish policies with each of the Horn of Africa country to set the stage for a strategy that depends on the region. While the study focuses on the motivations and instruments of involvement of these actors in the Horn of Africa politics, it also focuses on the relationship patterns between these external powers and Horn of African countries. The study aims to generate a policy-oriented analysis as well as a framework with regard to the role of external actors in the Horn of Africa politics.


Significance The ‘Abraham Accords’ have secured the United Arab Emirates (UAE) bipartisan political support in Washington, but also feed into the growing regional ‘cold war’ between the UAE and Turkey in theatres stretching from the Horn of Africa into the Eastern Mediterranean. Impacts The Emirati example might spur Saudi efforts to take measures to placate a possible incoming Biden administration, regarding Yemen or Qatar. Economic dependence will constrain business-focused Dubai from pressing Abu Dhabi for a less confrontational approach on Tehran and Doha. The UAE would face regional political pushback if Israel resumes its ‘frozen’ plan to annex areas of the West Bank.


Subject Outlook for Mauritania's ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Significance President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani has recently sought to reaffirm the strong partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that were cultivated by his predecessor, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, even as he pursues a markedly more liberal approach to domestic political affairs. Prominent exiles were allowed to return home earlier this month. This raises an apparent contradiction, given the two Gulf states’ endorsement of Ould Abdel Aziz and his repressive internal policies. Impacts Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will remain key sources of financial support for Nouakchott. A 2-billion-dollar aid package from the UAE will likely be disbursed over many months or perhaps several years. As the new chair of the G5 Sahel, Ould Ghazouani will seek to sustain hitherto inconsistent Emirati and Saudi support for the bloc.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

This essay examines how and why Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have pursued policies that have aligned closer to Israel since 2011. The disruptive impact of the Arab Spring and its turbulent aftermath altered threat perceptions in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which increasingly saw Islamism and Iran as the major sources of regional instability. For Saudi and Emirati leaders committed to adopting a more forceful approach to shaping the post-Arab Spring landscape, Israel no longer represented the primary fissure in Middle Eastern politics. Although the process of creating informal ties between the Gulf states and Israel has been decades in the making, the nature of the post-2011 connections between Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Israel have greater strategic depth and are taking place in a far more open setting than ever before.


Significance The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has in recent years sharply increased its military and commercial involvement in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. It provides equipment, training and armed forces to support a range of regional allies. Its greatest commitment is the Yemen war, which has severely strained the 110,000-strong Emirati armed forces, inflicting 96 combat fatalities since 2015. Impacts Even if capacity freed up, the UAE would only enter larger conflicts as part of coalitions backed by strong international mandates. If Washington took a strong military lead in Syria, Abu Dhabi might provide assistance. Emirati defence industries will grow strongly and look for new export markets.


Subject Federal National Council election. Significance Women won seven out of 20 available seats in what is being promoted as the ‘largest election to date’ in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The country on October 7 held the fourth-ever vote for membership of its only elected body, the Federal National Council (FNC), with results announced on October 13. Impacts The new Council will be a mechanism to cement the dominance of Abu Dhabi and -- to a lesser extent -- Dubai in national decision-making. The FNC’s success may serve as a model for states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia to hold elections without direct accountability. Any push to expand the FNC’s role beyond its current advisory status will be shut down and may prompt reprisals.


Author(s):  
Hélène Thiollet ◽  
Laure Assaf

AbstractMass migration to the Gulf cities has produced, over time, de facto cosmopolitan situations. Even though cosmopolitanism is somewhat present in national narratives and official propaganda, foreign residents face exclusionary contexts where policies and practices keep them excluded from the national community. This chapter unpacks the internal tensions characteristic of cosmopolitanism in the exclusionary contexts of the Gulf by comparing cities in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. These tensions operate within migrants’ everyday practices and modes of consumption in urban spaces. We argue that these practices are best understood as a form of segregated cosmopolitanism through which the different migrant communities both acknowledge (and at times consume) urban diversity and maintain certain boundaries. Building upon the analysis of discourses and ethnographic fieldwork in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Jeddah, this research engages with theories of cosmopolitanism from a situated perspective. It moves away from the classical, normative approach to cosmopolitanism and highlights the fragility of everyday cosmopolitan situations.


Significance The ten-nation alliance led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has made significant progress since its intervention began in March 2015. A UAE-led ground force re-established President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi's government to Aden in September 2015; Saudi-led forces have advanced north, fighting to control the Red Sea ports, Ta'izz city, and the eastern road to Sana'a from Ma'rib province. Saudi Arabia has also fought an ongoing struggle to prevent Huthi commando raids and rocket attacks along its southern border in Jizan province. Impacts Saudi Arabia and the UAE face the prospect of costly ongoing military and aid commitments in Yemen. The UAE may face an intensified domestic terrorism threat from AQAP. The UAE is building a permanent power projection base in Eritrea, and may become a more muscular actor in the Horn of Africa. The campaign will cement the Saudi-UAE military alliance against Iran.


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