Entering Farmwork

Author(s):  
Sarah Bronwen Horton

This chapter focuses on migrant men’s experiences of farmwork in both their sending countries and in the U.S in order to understand why foreign-born Latino men face higher rates of workplace illness and death, The majority of farmworkers in California come from peasant origins in Mexico and Central America, where they learn that hard work is the foundation of masculinity. Yet U.S. labor and immigration policies intersect with the pressures of working on labor crews to transform migrants farmworkers’ work habitus. Farmworkers’ historic exclusion from the promises of the New Deal makes work one of their only forms of economic security, forcing them to be “exceptional workers.” By delivering an indebted workforce to the fields, U.S. immigration policy only heightens migrants’ dependence on their jobs. Meanwhile, the intensified work pressures created by subcontracting teach migrant men to privilege their work over their health in order to keep their jobs.

Author(s):  
Sylvie Laurent

This chapter will address King’s reasoning on the role and purpose of the modern American state in guaranteeing economic security and wellbeing for all. King argued, like welfare rights activists, that these were fundamental social obligations to the state. This chapter will show how his Scandinavian- inspired proposals demonstrate that King was willing to build on the New Deal


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 819-820
Author(s):  
Nicol C. Rae

The rise of partisanship in Congress has been one of the most conspicuous features of American politics during the 1990s. David Rohde's (1991) Parties and Leaders in the PostReform House demonstrated that much of this rise in partisanship could be attributed to the convergence in congressional voting between Northern and Southern Democrats. Since the New Deal, the latter had traditionally allied with Republicans on many issues in a bipartisan conservative coalition that generally dominated both Houses of Congress and constrained liberal legislative outcomes. While Rohde and Barbara Sinclair (Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking, 1995) have emphasized how institutional rule changes in the 1970s created a much greater incentive for party loyalty among member of Congress, relatively little attention has been paid to the extent to which enhanced partisanship in Congress has been driven by “bottom-up” electoral imperatives. Stanley Berard's new book on Southern Democrats in the House convincingly shows that major changes in the southern electoral environment were equally important in promoting convergence in the voting records of Northern and Southern Democrats, leading to a more partisan House overall.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Bell

In 1944 President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s State of the Union address set out what he termed an “economic Bill of Rights” that would act as a manifesto of liberal policies after World War Two. Politically, however, the United States was a different place than the country that had faced the ravages of the Great Depression of the 1930s and ushered in Roosevelt’s New Deal to transform the relationship between government and the people. Key legacies of the New Deal, such as Social Security, remained and were gradually expanded, but opponents of governmental regulation of the economy launched a bitter campaign after the war to roll back labor union rights and dismantle the New Deal state. Liberal heirs to FDR in the 1950s, represented by figures like two-time presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, struggled to rework liberalism to tackle the realities of a more prosperous age. The long shadow of the U.S. Cold War with the Soviet Union also set up new challenges for liberal politicians trying to juggle domestic and international priorities in an era of superpower rivalry and American global dominance. The election of John F. Kennedy as president in November 1960 seemed to represent a narrow victory for Cold War liberalism, and his election coincided with the intensification of the struggle for racial equality in the United States that would do much to shape liberal politics in the 1960s. After his assassination in 1963, President Lyndon Johnson launched his “Great Society,” a commitment to eradicate poverty and to provide greater economic security for Americans through policies such as Medicare. But his administration’s deepening involvement in the Vietnam War and its mixed record on alleviating poverty did much to taint the positive connotations of “liberalism” that had dominated politics during the New Deal era.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael F. Meffert ◽  
Helmut Norpoth ◽  
Anirudh V. S. Ruhil

Aggregate party identification (macropartisanship) has exhibited substantial movement in the U.S. electorate over the last half century. We contend that a major key to that movement is a rare, massive, and enduring shift of the electoral equilibrium commonly known as a partisan realignment. The research, which is based on time-series data that employ the classic measurement of party identification, shows that the 1980 election triggered a systematic growth of Republican identification that cut deeply into the overwhelming Democratic lead dating back to the New Deal realignment. Although short-term fluctuations in macropartisanship are responsive to the elements of everyday politics, neither presidential approval nor consumer sentiment is found responsible for the 1980 shift.


Author(s):  
Robyn Muncy

This chapter details events in Josephine Roche's life from 1933 to 1934. Roche's experience at Rocky Mountain Fuel primed her for the New Deal. As Franklin Roosevelt's administration began to grapple in 1933 with the devastation caused by the Great Depression, Roche was asked to serve in several capacities. Early on, the most important was in the National Recovery Administration, an attempt to stabilize the U.S. economy through industry-wide economic planning. Shortly after that, Roche broke through yet another gender barrier by running for governor of Colorado. She took this bold step because the sitting state executive refused to cooperate with the relief programs of the New Deal, and Roche wanted Colorado effectively linked with the national government. She did not succeed, but her gubernatorial bid was nevertheless significant. It demonstrated both the centralizing force that Washington exerted through the New Deal and some of the bases for resistance. It also drew a direct line between progressivism in the early twentieth century and progressivism in the New Deal, highlighting a range of tactics for diminishing inequality that New Dealers brought straight from the Progressive Era into the 1930s.


2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel T. Rodgers

Charles Evans Hughes's career ran along the fault lines of most of the major political events of his lifetime. Muckraking catapulted him to fame. He governed New York during four key years of the Progressive era as an effective administrator and earnest reformer. He stayed with the Republican Party when the Progressives bolted in 1912. He ran for the presidency in 1916 but missed the prize, albeit by a narrower electoral college margin than any other contender until the very end of the century. He was instrumental in negotiating the international naval disarmament accords of 1921–22, landmarks of progressive internationalism in their day that fell under sharp criticism a decade later. He presided over the U.S. Supreme Court during the key years of the New Deal, though in most histories of the 1930s Court he comes across as something of an also-ran behind its more memorable shapers: Brandeis, Cardozo, Sutherland, Black, even Roberts. Hard to pin to any achievement or distinct idea, slipping in and out of the dramatic movements of his day, he was the kind of man who makes history but easily falls out of the history books.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-450
Author(s):  
Howard Gillman

Less than two years after Justice Harlan Fiske Stone reportedly advised Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of labor that “You can do anything under the taxing power,” the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in U.S. v. Butler that Congress had no authority to create a system whereby farmers would receive subsidies for limiting production, with the funds coming from a tax on basic commodities. While Stone, along with Brandeis and Cardozo, voted to uphold this feature of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, a majority led by Justice Owen J. Roberts declared that this particular scheme of taxing and spending interfered with the reserve powers of the states to control local manufacturing and agriculture. Roberts cited the great nationalist Joseph Story for the proposition that “the Constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be a frame of a national government, of special and enumerated powers, and not of general and unlimited powers.… A power to lay taxes for the common defence and general welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general power. It is limited to those objects. It cannot constitutionally transcend them.” The AAA was “a scheme for purchasing with federal funds submission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to the states. … If the Act before us is a proper exercise of the federal taxing power, evidently the regulation of all industry throughout the United States may be accomplished by similar exercise of the same power.”


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