From the Bird’s Eye

2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 221-228
Author(s):  
Xiao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal History ◽  
District Court ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
District Courts ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
Legislative Reform ◽  
The Past

Criminal sentences are rarely reversed for being too long. Of the approximately one million federal sentences imposed in the past fifteen years, appellate courts have only held about two dozen substantively unreasonable. Judges have, even in public statements, described substantive reasonableness review as “functionally nonexistent” and “a waste of time.” Against this backdrop, three decisions from the Sixth Circuit published within the last year are nothing short of remarkable. In each case, the panel concluded that the district court, despite following standard processes and procedures, had nonetheless imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. This Article examines these cases in detail, to glean lessons for scholars and practitioners. I argue that, in each decision, the Sixth Circuit took a bird’s eye perspective to the issues at hand, reaching a common-sense decision based on aggregative sentencing data, case law, and the defendant’s prior criminal history. These factors, I further argue, provide a model for other appellate courts who hope to engage in more searching substantive reasonableness review. I also acknowledge some limits to the Sixth Circuit’s approach. In each of these three cases, the appellate court reined in district courts for imposing above-guideline sentences. The decisions, however, say little about what—if any—role an appellate court should play in mitigating harsh sentences that are within (or even below) the guidelines. Reform of such sentences may require stakeholders to look elsewhere, including either legislative reform or appointment of a more diverse set of district judges.

(d) Appellate courts in a case like this, where there is room for legitimate judicial difference, should refrain from interfering unless it is considered that the decision reached was based on the application of wrong principles or the case is clearly wrongly decided. Decision of court Appeal dismissed. 4.8 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASE LAW AND LEGISLATION 4.8.1 Introduction The discussion of George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v finney Lock Seeds (1985) has indicated what happens when a problem about the meaning of a statutory provision goes before a court. In this section, attention will be given to statutory interpretation in court. The courts and tribunals have, as one of their most important tasks, the application of legislative rules to various fact situations. They must decide whether these legislative rules apply to given situations. Already in this text there have been several illustrations of words not meaning what they appear to mean. Despite the supposed certainty of statutory rules, rules in ‘fixed verbal form’. Words can change over time, and courts will disagree over the meaning of words. Choices of meaning, not perceived by the drafters, may lie latent in the words and are drawn out in court in a manner defeating intention, narrowing, extending or making meaningless the ambit of the rule. Many people need to apply statutory rules, often this application will be purely routine but sometimes doubts will arise. Such doubts may, or may not, reach court. How do judges set about deciding the meaning of words? Reference has already been made to the three rules of statutory interpretation. The literal, the mischief and the golden rules (see Figure 3.2, above, in the introduction to Chapter 3). These rules it should be remembered are rules of practice not rules of law. Do judges really use the rules of statutory interpretation? If so, which rule do they use first? Judges rarely, if ever, volunteer the information that they are now applying a certain rule of interpretation. Often, judges look to see if there can be a literal meaning to the words used in the disputed statutory rule. However, there is no rule that states that they must use the literal rule first. Holland and Webb (1994) quite correctly assert that interpretation is more a question of judicial style than the use of interpretational rules. Indeed, should a student attempt to use the rules of statutory interpretation as a guide in the interpretation of a statutory word or phrase, the uselessness of the rules as an interpretational tool becomes immediately apparent. However, as a justificatory label they may have a function. As students gain experience in reading judgments they notice vast differences in judicial styles. Some judgments seem to be based on a blow by blow analysis of precedents and earlier usage of words, others seem based on tenuous common sense rationales. Decisions based on the external context of the statute will be identified. This covers situations where judicial decision making appears to be based on issues of

2012 ◽  
pp. 117-117
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Verbal Form ◽  
External Context ◽  
Law And Legislation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Over Time

The author's arsenal: loosening standards for protectability and substantial similarity in video game copyright

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-43
Author(s):  
Oliver Brown
Keyword(s):  
Video Games ◽  
Video Game ◽  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Case Law ◽  
District Court ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The Past ◽  
Game Industry ◽  
Economic Expectations ◽  
Cultural Conversation

This article examines and critiques the American copyright regime's increasingly protective approach to video games and their subject matter. Over the past decade, a trio of district court decisions have bolstered protection for video games by relaxing standards for protectability and substantial similarity. Subsequent rulings, concerning both games and other forms of intellectual property, suggest this protective streak will continue. While heightened protection might provide a necessary deterrent to ‘cloning’ and other kinds of impermissible copying, it will also endanger valuable forms of appropriation. After decades of limited copyright involvement, mimesis has become an important element of game creation – widely tolerated by the gaming community as a source of inspiration, interoperability, and cultural conversation. A more expansive view of protectability may inhibit imitative behavior that has, in the past, benefited new creators and fans without harming the economic expectations of prior authors. Moreover, that new approach, which relies heavily on juries for unpredictable, case-by-case determinations, may restrict the financial and creative outlook of the video game industry at large. In its first section, this article identifies the elements of video games that have been deemed protectable under copyright law. The second section summarizes foundational video game case law, in which courts established restrictive standards for protectability and substantial similarity. The third then discusses the paradigm shift towards more expansive protectability, recounting cases where courts found games worthy of heightened protection. In its fourth section, this article argues that the protective trend has yet to peak, looking to evidence gleaned from recent copyright suits. A concluding section outlines the risks of overprotection, cautioning against a potentially unreasoned and impractical copyright standard.

New Zealand

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Ward ◽  
Gledhill Kris
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Family Court ◽  
District Court ◽  
District Courts ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
Court Of Appeal

New Zealand is a common law country. The judicial structure is the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, which are appellate courts only; the High Court, which hears appeals from District Courts in some situations but is also a court of first instance; the District Court, which is principally a court of first instance but also hears appeals from some Tribunals; and various Tribunals. There is also a Family Court, in which warranted District Court judges sit, and which—along with the High Court—deals with adult protection matters.

scholarly journals The Patient Protection And Affordable Care Act Of 2010: Constitutional?

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-82
Author(s):  
Martin D. Carrigan
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
National Health Insurance ◽  
National Health ◽  
Affordable Care Act ◽  
District Court ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
District Courts ◽  
Obama Administration ◽  
Patient Protection

After decades of debates and policy discussions, in early 2010, the Obama Administration, with the Democrat party controlling both the House and the Senate, passed a National Health Insurance Act. The Patient Protection and Affordability Act was immediately challenged in court. One district court in Florida declared it unconstitutional. Two other district courts and an appellate court declared it constitutional. This paper looks at the Act and those issues.

Dutch Courts Safeguarding Rights under the EEC-Turkey Association Law. Case Note on District Court Rotterdam Judgments of 12 August 2010, and District Court Roermond Judgment of 15 October 2010

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narin Tezcan-Idriz*
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Case Note ◽  
District Court ◽  
District Courts ◽  
Political Climate ◽  
High Court ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government

AbstractTwo District Courts in the Netherlands found the obligation to integrate imposed on some categories of third-country nationals by the Law on Integration (Wet Inburgering), to be incompatible with the standstill and non-discrimination provisions of the EEC-Turkey Association Law. In their judgments the courts followed the guidance provided by the case-law of the Court of Justice and resolved the cases accordingly. In the current political climate, where immigration issues are hotly debated, these judgments were not welcomed by the government and the municipal authorities involved in the cases. The judgments were immediately taken to appeal to the Centrale Raad van Beroep (the Administrative High Court).

Medicaid & Medicare: D.C. Appellate Court Denies Claim for Medicare Reimbursement of GME Cost

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-205
Author(s):  
choeffel Amy
Keyword(s):  
Medical Center ◽  
Federal District ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
University Of Pennsylvania ◽  
District Court ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Department Of Health ◽  
Administrative Proceedings ◽  
Summary Judgment

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld, in Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System v. Shalala, 170 F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999), a federal district court ruling granting summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in a case in which Presbyterian Medical Center (PMC) challenged Medicare's requirement of contemporaneous documentation of $828,000 in graduate medical education (GME) expenses prior to increasing reimbursement amounts. DHHS Secretary Donna Shalala denied PMC's request for reimbursement for increased GME costs. The appellants then brought suit in federal court challenging the legality of an interpretative rule that requires requested increases in reimbursement to be supported by contemporaneous documentation. PMC also alleged that an error was made in the administrative proceedings to prejudice its claims because Aetna, the hospital's fiscal intermediary, failed to provide the hospital with a written report explaining why it was denied the GME reimbursement.

India

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shreya Atrey
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Final Analysis ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Social Model ◽  
Disability Rights ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
Persons With Disabilities ◽  
High Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Domestic Law

This chapter provides an expository account of Indian appellate courts’ engagement with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the developing case law on disability rights. As a dualist State, India has ratified but not incorporated the CRPD into its domestic law. This has not deterred frequent references to the CRPD in litigation at the highest level. The appellate courts—High Courts and the Supreme Court—have resorted to the CRPD in diverse ways. The analysis of the small but not insignificant body of case law shows that these instances can be classified into two broad themes of ‘citation’ and ‘interpretation’. In the final analysis, the overall impact of references to the CRPD can be considered largely positive but still modest in the absence of new legislation embracing the human rights framework and social model of the CRPD in India.

Does the Injunction Gap Violate Implementers’ Fair Trial Rights Under the ECHR?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Past ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Federal Supreme ◽  
Validity Of A Patent

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.

scholarly journals L'inconstitutionnalité des pouvoirs du protonotaire spécial

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-454
Author(s):  
Serge Bouchard ◽  
Marie-Michèle Lavigne ◽  
Pascal Renauld
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
District Court ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Labour Relations ◽  
Court Judge ◽  
Administration Of Justice

The office of special prothonotary was created in 1975 by an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure. The main purpose of the change was to ease the administration of justice before the courts. For this reason, the special prothonotary received many assignments which were reserved until then to a judge sitting in chambers and even to the court itself. Such transfer of duties and powers may conflict with section 96 of the BNA Act, which acts as a bar to prevent the withdrawal of judicial functions from a superior, county or district court. This paper deals with the interferences between various sections of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 96 of the BNA Act. The first part of the paper deals with the approach adopted by the courts. The true test, according to the case-law, is to determine the nature of the function involved. Since only judicial functions are protected by section 96, it is intravires the Legislature of Quebec to confer on a board or tribunal administrative or ministerial powers. If the transfer involves judicial functions, the courts will use the test adopted by the Privy Council in Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works and by Sir Lyman Duff in In re Adoption Act, and examine whether the transferee is analogous to a superior, district or county court. The courts will also have to apply the « 1867 statute books test » : was the particular function conferred to the prothonotary before 1867 ? If the results of each of the two tests are affirmative, then the function is one protected by section 96 of the BNA Act and its transfer is ultra vires the provincial Legislature. If the results are negative, the courts will examine if the provisions involved have the effect of vesting in the special prothonotary the powers of a superior court judge. If the courts conclude that it is so, then, the assignment is ultra vires the powers of the provincial Legislature. The second part deals with each of the assignments transferred to the special prothonotary. These are threefold in nature: 1. Actions by default to appear or by default to plead under article 195 C.C.P. ; 2. Jurisdiction under article 44.1(1) C.C.P. ; 3. Interlocutory or incidental proceedings, contested or not, but, if so, with the consent of the parties. The paper concludes that most of the provisions dealing with the duties and powers of the special prothonotary are unconstitutional

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