Europe in Georgia’s Identity Discourse

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 128-155
Author(s):  
Salome Minesashvili

Georgia’s European identity, often regarded as the basis of its pro-Western foreign policy, has been contested in the domestic arena by alternative agendas. While government changes are usually deemed instigators of change in this contestation, no systematic analysis has been conducted on the effect of external developments. Considering that Georgia’s relations with the West and Russia have been evolving and that the debates on European identity inherently relate to foreign policy, this article asks to what extent and how contestation within the European identity discourse changes in response to different external events. To elucidate these questions, the study unpacks European identity discourse in Georgia between 2012 and 2017 in the context of various ongoing foreign policy developments. These include developments in Georgia–European Union (EU) and Georgia–Russia relations, the war in Ukraine, and internal issues of the EU. Moreover, instead of common pro- and anti-European binary positions, identity discourse is analyzed as a combination of three identity categories via media in which each category constructs different degrees of difference with Europe. This article finds that advocates of each category interpret different foreign policy developments to reinforce, rather than challenge, their positions; thus, contestation and division in the discourse persist over time.

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (11) ◽  
pp. 38-46
Author(s):  
A. Kokeev

Relations between Germany, the US and NATO today are the core of transatlantic links. After the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, NATO has lost its former importance to Germany which was not a "frontline state" anymore. The EU acquired a greater importance for German politicians applying both for certain political independence and for establishing of a broad partnership with Russia and China. The task of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) development has been regarded by Berlin as a necessary component of the NATO's transformation into a “balanced Euro-American alliance”, and the realization of this project as the most important prerequisite for a more independent foreign policy. Germany’s refusal to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to the first serious crisis in US Germany relations. At the same time, there was no radical break of the deeply rooted Atlanticism tradition in German policy. It was Angela Merkel as a new head of the German government (2005) who managed to smooth largely disagreements in relations with the United States. Atlanticism remains one of the fundamental foreign policy elements for any German government, mostly because Berlin’s hope for deepening of the European integration and transition to the EU CFSP seems unrealistic in the foreseeable future. However, there is still a fundamental basis of disagreements emerged in the transatlantic relationship (reduction of a military threat weakening Berlin’s dependence from Washington, and the growing influence of Germany in the European Union). According to the federal government's opinion, Germany's contribution to the NATO military component should not be in increasing, but in optimizing of military expenses. However, taking into account the incipient signs of the crisis overcoming in the EU, and still a tough situation around Ukraine, it seems that in the medium-term perspective one should expect further enhancing of Germany’s participation in NATO military activities and, therefore, a growth in its military expenses. In Berlin, there is a wide support for the idea of the European army. However, most experts agree that it can be implemented only when the EU develops the Common Foreign and Defense Policy to a certain extent. The US Germany espionage scandals following one after another since 2013 have seriously undermined the traditional German trust to the United States as a reliable partner. However, under the impact of the Ukrainian conflict, the value of military-political dimension of Germany’s transatlantic relations and its dependence on the US and NATO security guarantees increased. At the same time, Washington expects from Berlin as a recognized European leader a more active policy toward Russia and in respect of some other international issues. In the current international political situation, the desire to expand political influence in the world and achieve a greater autonomy claimed by German leaders seems to Berlin only possible in the context of transatlantic relations strengthening and solidarity within the NATO the only military-political organization of the West which is able to ensure the collective defense for its members against the external threats. However, it is important to take into consideration that not only the value of the United States and NATO for Germany, but also the role of Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance as a “representative of European interests” has increased. The role of Germany as a mediator in establishing the West–Russia relations remains equally important.


2021 ◽  
Vol 107 (7) ◽  
pp. 18-26
Author(s):  
Lyubov Fadeeva ◽  

The author of the article attempts to use the theories of the European identity, memory politics, identity politics by placing them in the context of the European (international) security. The author considers it fundamentally important to pay attention not so much to the threats to European identity, but to how identity is used to legitimize foreign policy of the European Union. The article highlights such perspectives of this problem as the confrontation inside the EU on the politics of memory and identity and the justification of the EU foreign policy towards Russia by the need to protect the European identity and European values. The author uses the discourse-analysis and identity research methods. The main emphasis is placed on the competitiveness of identity politics and the possibilities of using it for political purposes, to legitimize solutions to ensure the security of the European Union and the world as a whole.


Author(s):  
Vadim TRUKHACHEV

In the second half of 2021, the presidency of the European Union will be held by Slovenia, admitted to the EU and NATO 17 years ago. This small post-Yugoslav state with a strong Central European identity has a very active foreign policy, which is worth a closer look. In its main directions, Slovenian interests clearly overlap with Russian ones. The Slovenian-Russian relations are rather contradictory, there are different approaches to Russia among the Slovenian elites, but these differences are not as polar and visible as in the Visegrad Group countries or in Austria.


2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-46
Author(s):  
Kubilay Arin

When Turkey’s Justice and Development Part (AKP) came to power in 2002, it brought a new strategy to foreign policy. Some scholars ascribed this reorientation to the rise of neo-Ottomanism, others to Islamization, and yet others to a Middle Easternization of foreign policy. All labels have one element in common: They give weight to Islam and Turkey’s imperial past as soft power assetsin the conduct of foreign policy by rejecting secular Kemalism in the country’s diplomacy. The AKP capitalized on Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy and Necmettin Erbakan’s multi-dimensional foreign policy by using Turkey’s pivotal geopolitical location to transform it into a global actor. The ongoing Islamic revival has caused the country’s attempted full westernization to slow down. But the West itself is hardly a monolithic bloc, given its own many internal cultural, linguistic,religious, political, and economic differences. I therefore describe Turkey as a “hybrid,” a modern and developing “semi-western” state, and argue that over time it will become ever more “socially conservative.”


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksander Lust

In referenda held in 2003, over 90% of Lithuanians supported joining the European Union (EU), while only two-thirds of Estonians did. Why? This article shows that Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the EU. Most Lithuanians hoped that EU membership would help Lithuania overcome its economic backwardness and isolation. By contrast, many Estonians worried that the accession would reinforce Estonia's underdevelopment and dependency on the West. I argue that these expectations reflected the two countries' strategies of economic reform. Lithuania sold state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their managers and continued to trade heavily with Russia, which slowed down the modernization of its economy. Estonia sold SOEs to foreigners and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West, which hurt its traditional sectors (particularly agriculture) and infrastructure.


Author(s):  
Serhii Horopakha

On 1st July 2013, the Republic of Croatia officially became the 28th member of the European Union. This event marked the fulfillment of a foreign policy goal, along with joining NATO in 2009, as a major step forward in the country’s long-term consolidation process. The article therefore analyzes the key events of the Croatia – EU relations in 2007-2008, which moved this Balkan country closer to implementing its Euro-integration course. Particular attention is paid to the peculiarities of the pre-accession negotiations with the European Union, as well as to internal and foreign policy factors that had a direct impact on the Euro-integration dialogue between Croatia and the European Union. In this context, emphasis is placed on problem issues that slowed down the dynamics of the negotiation process to a certain extent, in particular the unilateral application by Croatia of the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone, and measures taken by the Croatian authorities to settle them. Significant achievements of Croatia in the negotiation process with the European Union are highlighted, in particular, progress of the country in meeting the European Union criteria as well as a date determination the of pre-accession negotiations completion as an important political sign of the European Union readiness to accept a new member in future.


2021 ◽  
pp. 43-59
Author(s):  
Tomasz Dubowski

In the discussion on the EU migration policy, it is impossible to evade the issue of the relation between this policy and the EU foreign policy, including EU common foreign and security policy. The subject of this study are selected links between migration issues and the CFSP of the European Union. The presented considerations aim to determine at what levels and in what ways the EU’s migration policy is taken into account in the space of the CFSP as a diplomatic and political (and subject to specific rules and procedures) substrate of the EU’s external action.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 117-140
Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
David Bakradze

The article views the geographical area between the EU and Russian borders as a battle space of two, drastically different foreign policy and ideological approaches. The authors argue that in the years since the end of the Cold War, a unique surrogate of former clash of liberal and communist worlds emerged, leading to and underpinning current Hybrid Warfare, underway from Ukraine to Georgia. Its roots lay in the Russian interpretation of the Western attitude towards the East as Neo-colonialist. Relying on the income from its vast energy resources, Russia also tries to develop its version of so called “Soft Power”, used by the West in this region. Though in Russian hands, it is coupled with Moscow’s imperial experiences and resentments, and is becoming a mere element in Hybrid or “non-linear” war. Speaking retrospectively, the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union can be seen as a response to Hybrid threats, posed by Russia against its Western and Southern neighbors. But the question is, whether EU foreign policy initiatives towards this area can and will be efficient and sufficient, if continued to be mostly defensive and limited within Soft Power mechanisms and philosophy, while Russia successfully combines those with traditional Hard Power know-how? The authors argue that in the long run, European or Euro-Atlantic Soft Power tool-kits, spreading Human Rightsbased culture farther in the East, will remain unmatched. But in order to prevail over the Russian revisionist policy here and now, the West, and, particularly, the EU need to re-evaluate traditional foreign policy options and come up with a more drastic combination of Soft/Hard Powers by itself. As the Georgian case shows, the European community should more efficiently use Conditionality and Coercive Diplomacy, combined with clearer messages about partners’ membership perspectives.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 1265-1276
Author(s):  
Ernest Miji Ayeah ◽  

The focus of this article was to test the hypotheses (factors) of influence that enabled the EU and its partners to exert influence in Zimbabwe between 2002 and 2013. Four hypotheses volume of actions, severity of actions, commitment and the timing of actions have been tested. The article has also tested four hypotheses of non-influence (detracting factors) prestige, desirability of violations, internal power struggles and aid-dependence exhibited by the Mugabe regime during this period. The article concludes that it was due to the overwhelming weight of the foreign policy actions over the internal situation of Zimbabwe that finally pushed Mugabe to bowed down. The great lesson learned from the Zimbabwe experience is that the influencing state must evaluate the detracting factors in the target state well in order to select and maximise on the best influencing actions.


2019 ◽  
pp. 89-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quinn Slobodian ◽  
Dieter Plehwe

Since the advent of the European debt crisis in 2009, it has become common to hear descriptions of the European Union as a neoliberal machine hardwired to enforce austerity and to block projects of redistribution or solidarity. Yet by adopting an explanatory framework associating neoliberalism with supranational organizations like the EU, NAFTA, and the WTO against the so-called populism of its right-wing opponents, many observers have painted themselves into a corner. The problems with a straightforward compound of “neoliberal Europe” became starkly evident with the success of the “leave” vote in the Brexit referendum in 2016. If the EU was neoliberal, were those who called to abandon it the opponents of neoliberalism? If the EU is indeed the “neoliberalism express,” then to disembark was by definition a gesture of refusal against neoliberalism. To make sense of the resurgent phenomenon of the far right in European politics, then, our chapter tracks such continuities over time and avoids misleading dichotomies that pit neoliberal globalism—and neoliberal Europeanism—against an atavistic national populism. The closed-borders libertarianism of nationalist neoliberals like the German AfD is not a rejection of globalism but is a variety of it.


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