scholarly journals The Necessary Existence of Inference-Claims

Author(s):  
David Botting

In (2018) Gilbert Plumer argues against the existence of inference-claims on the grounds that they lead to the kind of vicious infinite regress illustrated in Carroll’s famous Achilles and the Tortoise paper (Carroll 1895). In Plumer’s view, it is not simply that neither arguments nor arguers do make inference-claims, but that they can’t do so, on pain of this regress. In further unpublished work Plumer has generalized from this result: it is a mistake to include reference to standards of argument assessment within the content of the argument. Inference-claims (i.e., sufficiency-claims) do not exist, and neither do relevance-claims or acceptability-claims, and all for much the same reason. I will argue that his arguments fail to show that inference-claims do not exist, because the regresses they lead to either are not vicious, not infinite, or can be avoided. Then I hope to show, on the grounds of what I call the ‘completeness’ of the argument, that inference-claims not only do exist but that they must exist. This is not to say that inference-claims are necessarily asserted in an act of arguing, but asserting them would not lead to the kind of harmful consequences Plumer supposes, any more than their mere existence would.

Author(s):  
Bredo Johnsen

In this chapter the authors offer a new reading of Meditation I. First, there is no such thing as “the dream argument” to be found in it; Descartes offers two entirely distinct dream-centered arguments in Meditation I. Second, he never says that any of his three radical skeptical hypotheses—that he has no body, that he is being massively deceived by God, or by a Demon—is possible. The reason he does not do so is that those scenarios are incompatible with the necessary existence of God, which he thinks he has proven. Meditation I is a spectacularly successful rhetorical effort to get his readers to join him in his investigations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Danielle Dionne ◽  
Elizabeth Coppock

This paper addresses the question of how to predict which alternatives are active in scalar implicature calculation, and the nature of this activation. It has been observed that finger implicates 'not thumb', and a Manner-based explanation for this has been proposed, predicting that if English had the simplex Latin word pollex meaning 'thumb or big toe', then finger would cease to have the implicature 'not thumb' that it has. It has also been suggested that this hypothetical pollex would have to be sufficiently colloquial in order to figure in scalar implicature calculation. This paper makes this thought experiment into a real one by using a language that behaves in exactly this way: Spanish has pulgar 'thumb' (< pollex), a non-colloquial form. We first use a fill-in-the-blank production task with both English and Spanish speakers to guage the likelihood with which a speaker will produce a given form as a way of describing a given digit. Production frequency does not perfectly track complexity, so we can then ask whether comprehension follows production frequency or complexity. We do so using a forced choice comprehension task, which reveals cross-linguistic differences in comprehension tracking production probabilities. A comparison between two RSA models -- one in which the speaker perfectly replicates our production data and a standard one in which the speaker chooses based on a standard cost/accuracy trade-off -- illustrates the fact that comprehension is much more closely tied to production probability than to the mere existence of sufficiently simple alternatives.


Author(s):  
R.J. Hankinson

Pyrrhonism was the name given by the Greeks to one particular brand of scepticism, that identified (albeit tenuously) with Pyrrho of Elis, who was said (by his disciple Timon of Phlius) to have declared that everything was indeterminable and accordingly to have suspended judgment about the reality of things – in particular whether they were really good or bad. After Timon’s death Pyrrhonism lapsed, until revived by Aenesidemus. Aenesidemus held that it was inadmissible either to affirm or to deny that anything was really the case, and in particular to hold, with the Academic sceptics, that certain things really were inapprehensible. Instead, the Sceptic (the capital letter denotes the Pyrrhonists, who adopted the term, literally ‘inquirer’, as one of the designations for their school) should only allow that things were no more the case than not, or only so under certain circumstances and not under others. Aenesidemean Scepticism took the form of emphasizing the disagreement among both lay people and theoreticians as to the nature of things, and the fact that things appear differently under different circumstances (the various ways of doing this were systematized into the Ten Modes of Scepticism); the result was meant to be suspension of judgment about such matters, which would in turn lead to tranquillity of mind. Thus ‘Scepticism’ denotes a particular philosophical position, not simply, as in modern usage, that of any philosopher inclined towards doubt. Later Pyrrhonists, notably Agrippa, refined the Sceptical method and concentrated on undermining the dogmatic (that is, anti-Sceptical) notion of the criterion – there is no principled way to settle such disputes without resorting to mere assertion, infinite regress or circularity. We owe to Sextus Empiricus our most complete account of Pyrrhonian argument and the clearest exposition of the Pyrrhonian attitude. Faced with endemic dispute, Sceptics reserve judgment; but this does not render life impossible for them, since they will still react to the way things appear to be, although without believing in any strong sense that things really are as they seem. Furthermore, when Pyrrhonians describe their affective states, they do so undogmatically – and the Sceptical slogans (‘I determine nothing’, ‘nothing is apprehended’, and so on) are to be understood in a similar way, as merely reporting a state of mind and not expressing a commitment. Thus the slogans apply to themselves, and like cathartic drugs are themselves purged along with the noxious humour of dogmatism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-98
Author(s):  
Juan Felipe Miranda Medina

"This work approaches the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that in terms of two complementary concepts: performance and information. In order to do so, I formulate Ryle’s argument of infinite regress in terms of performance in order to show that Stanley and Williamson’s counterargument has no real object: both reject the view that the exercise of knowledge-that necessarily requires the previous consideration of propositions. Next, using the concept of feedback, I argue that Stanley and Williamson’s positive account of knowledge-how in terms of knowledge-that corresponds to the output of the comparison between an intention of action and the perceived outcome of performance. Then, I expound other theories of mind and cognition in which feedback and prediction play a fundamental role in order to explain other ways in which information intervenes in performance—i.e., information is construed as knowledge-that available at subject level that guides performance. Finally, I present some reflections on the impact of the concept of knowledge-how, and possible routes to continue our enquiry on the nature of knowledge. Keywords: knowledge-how, knowledge-that, information, performance, feedback. "


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duane T. Wegener ◽  
Leandre R. Fabrigar

AbstractReplications can make theoretical contributions, but are unlikely to do so if their findings are open to multiple interpretations (especially violations of psychometric invariance). Thus, just as studies demonstrating novel effects are often expected to empirically evaluate competing explanations, replications should be held to similar standards. Unfortunately, this is rarely done, thereby undermining the value of replication research.


Author(s):  
Keyvan Nazerian

A herpes-like virus has been isolated from duck embryo fibroblast (DEF) cultures inoculated with blood from Marek's disease (MD) infected birds. Cultures which contained this virus produced MD in susceptible chickens while virus negative cultures and control cultures failed to do so. This and other circumstantial evidence including similarities in properties of the virus and the MD agent implicate this virus in the etiology of MD.Histochemical studies demonstrated the presence of DNA-staining intranuclear inclusion bodies in polykarocytes in infected cultures. Distinct nucleo-plasmic aggregates were also seen in sections of similar multinucleated cells examined with the electron microscope. These aggregates are probably the same as the inclusion bodies seen with the light microscope. Naked viral particles were observed in the nucleus of infected cells within or on the edges of the nucleoplasmic aggregates. These particles measured 95-100mμ, in diameter and rarely escaped into the cytoplasm or nuclear vesicles by budding through the nuclear membrane (Fig. 1). The enveloped particles (Fig. 2) formed in this manner measured 150-170mμ in diameter and always had a densely stained nucleoid. The virus in supernatant fluids consisted of naked capsids with 162 hollow, cylindrical capsomeres (Fig. 3). Enveloped particles were not seen in such preparations.


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 121-123
Author(s):  
Jeri A. Logemann

Evidence-based practice requires astute clinicians to blend our best clinical judgment with the best available external evidence and the patient's own values and expectations. Sometimes, we value one more than another during clinical decision-making, though it is never wise to do so, and sometimes other factors that we are unaware of produce unanticipated clinical outcomes. Sometimes, we feel very strongly about one clinical method or another, and hopefully that belief is founded in evidence. Some beliefs, however, are not founded in evidence. The sound use of evidence is the best way to navigate the debates within our field of practice.


Author(s):  
Alicia A. Stachowski ◽  
John T. Kulas

Abstract. The current paper explores whether self and observer reports of personality are properly viewed through a contrasting lens (as opposed to a more consonant framework). Specifically, we challenge the assumption that self-reports are more susceptible to certain forms of response bias than are informant reports. We do so by examining whether selves and observers are similarly or differently drawn to socially desirable and/or normative influences in personality assessment. Targets rated their own personalities and recommended another person to also do so along shared sets of items diversely contaminated with socially desirable content. The recommended informant then invited a third individual to additionally make ratings of the original target. Profile correlations, analysis of variances (ANOVAs), and simple patterns of agreement/disagreement consistently converged on a strong normative effect paralleling item desirability, with all three rater types exhibiting a tendency to reject socially undesirable descriptors while also endorsing desirable indicators. These tendencies were, in fact, more prominent for informants than they were for self-raters. In their entirety, our results provide a note of caution regarding the strategy of using non-self informants as a comforting comparative benchmark within psychological measurement applications.


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