scholarly journals Arrangement Investment-Based Insurance with Sharia Principles Post Enactment Law of Number 40 Year 2014 Concerning Insurance

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wetria Fauzi Wetria Fauzi Wetria Fauzi

Indonesia's legal system comes from civil law brought by the Dutch royal government to Indonesia during the colonial period. Civil law can be traced its roots to French civil law to Roman law. Insurance is equated with gambling The concept of insurance in insurance legislation states that insurance is a risk transfer institution. Despite the Law No. 40 of 2014 on Insurance, the law is still conceptualize insurance as an institution of protection. This new insurance law is a dual insurance system, which regulates conventional and sharia insurance systems. It needs to be initiated The Formation of Special Law regulates sharia insurance in Indonesia, because conventional and sharia are two very different things in principle. 

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-620
Author(s):  
Kate Stevens

[It] is not I who am on trial here today, but the Law of the New Hebrides.In 1906, Britain and France jointly annexed the New Hebrides. A y-shaped archipelago in the southwest Pacific Ocean, the New Hebrides—which became Vanuatu upon independence in 1980—comprised some eighty islands characterized by high levels of linguistic and cultural diversity. At the moment of annexation, there were also Presbyterian, Anglican, and Catholic missionaries and Euro-American planters and traders, who overlaid religious and national divisions onto the existing social and linguistics ones. Anglo-French rule under the New Hebrides Condominium added a hybrid legal system to this complex mix. During the colonial period, four distinct jurisdictions existed, indicative of the divided, rival nature of governance. These included joint Condominium law, British common law, French civil law, and from 1928, a native code and courts. The plurality and ambiguity of the legal system left ample space for critique and for alternative, extrajudicial justice, as this article explores.


Author(s):  
Donald R. Kelley

Centuries of Roman jurisprudence were assembled in the great Byzantine collection, the Digest, by Tribonian and the other editors. Roman law became more formal when during the Renaissance of the twelfth century it came to be taught in the first universities, starting with Bologna and the teaching of Irnerius. The main channels of expansion were through the Glossators and post-Glossators, who commented on the main texts and on later legislation by the Holy Roman Emperors, which included “feudal law,” but also by notaries and other proto-lawyers. Christian doctrine also became part of the “Roman” tradition, and canon and civil law were taught together in the universities as “civil science.” According to the ancient Roman jurist Gaius, “all the law which we use pertains either to persons or to things or to actions,” three categories that exhaust the external human condition—personality, reality, and action. In the nineteenth century, the study of Roman law lost its ideological power and became part of philology and history, at least so concludes James Whitman.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50
Author(s):  
Poku Adusei

This article provides comprehensive insights into the study of the Ghana legal system as an academic discipline in the law faculties in Ghana. It urges the view that the study of the Ghana legal system, as an academic discipline, should be transsystemic. Transsystemic pedagogy consists in the introduction of ideas, structures and principles which may be drawn from different legal traditions such as civil law, common law, religion-based law, African law and socialist law traditions to influence the study of law. Transsystemia involves teaching law ‘across,’ ‘through,’ and ‘beyond’ disciplinary fixations associated with a particular legal system. It is a mode of scholarship that defies biased allegiance to one legal tradition in order to foster cross-cultural dialogue among legal traditions. It involves a study of law that re-directs focus from one concerned with ‘pure’ legal system to a discourse that is grounded on multiple legal traditions.


Jurnal Akta ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 441
Author(s):  
Indah Esti Cahyani ◽  
Aryani Witasari

Nominee agreement is an agreement made between someone who by law can not be the subject of rights to certain lands (property rights), in this case that foreigners (WNA) and Indonesian Citizen (citizen), with the intention that the foreigners can master land de facto property rights, but legal-formal (de jure) land property rights are assigned to his Indonesian citizen. The purpose of this paper isto assess the position of the nominee agreement in Indonesia's legal system and the legal consequences arising in terms of the draft Civil Code and the Law on Agrarian. Agreement is an agreement unnamed nominee made based on the principle of freedom of contract and good faith of the parties. However, it should be noted that the law prohibits foreigners make agreements / related statement stock wealth / property (land) for and on behalf of others, sehingga the legal consequences of the agreement is the nominee of the agreement is not legally enforceable because the agreement was made on a false causa.Keywords: Nominee Agreement; Property Rights; Foreigners.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sorush Niknamian

“Incompetency” literally means prohibition and it is commonly used to point to an individual being deprived of his rights to take possession of his properties and his financial rights by the law. And, in other words, the incompetents are the individuals that do not possess “the legal capacity to enjoy a certain right” and are deprived from taking possession of their properties and if such a taking possession of the properties by an incompetent occurs, it is invalid and cannot take effect. In the legal system of Islam, the individual with a sort of a disease that features certain types of conditions leading to the weakness of the mind or insanity is called an incompetent. But the example cases of the incompetent and incompetency have not been delimited in the jurisprudence and law. Thus, the investigation of the instruments of incompetency from the perspective of the jurisprudential texts and the statutory provisions via offering an assumption indicating the non-delimitation of the incompetency instruments scope has resulted in conflicts in the non-litigious affairs law with the civil procedure, the necessity to rethink the causes of insanity as one instrument of incompetency in the civil law, the centrality of the incompetency for its setting the ground for the exertion of the law and the non-litigious affairs regulations as well as the incompetency of some patients with nervous diseases like hysterical conversion and dissociative hysteria and so forth. Therefore, conceptualizing the incompetency, the present study aims at assessing, then criticizing and investigating, the proofs offered by the proponents and the opponents of the incompetency of the patients with hysteria so as to consequently conclude an assumption regarding the hysteric patients’ incompetency and the relevant contradictions, if any, with the non-litigious matters law and civil procedure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-605
Author(s):  
Tomislav Karlović

Considering the main characteristics of fiducia in Roman law, as well as its functions and place within the real property law and the law of obligations, two features that are also prominent in the definition of anglosaxon trust stand out. These are the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the interested parties, as fides (trust) formed the initial basis of both institutes in the period before they were legally recognized, and the transfer of ownership made for specific purpose, different from the regular enjoyment of the object by the owner. However, there is a significant difference between the two (fiducia and trust) becuase of the duality between common law and equity in English legal system. While the mutual interests of the parties to fiducia in Roman law were protected only by personal actions (actiones in personam), parties’ proprietary interests in English trust were (and still are) recognized with the parallel existence of legal and equitable title. In contemporary Croatian law of real property the closest thing to the division of titles exists with regard to the conditionally transferred ownership as regulated in Art. 34 of Ownership and Other Proprietary Rights Act, entaling the division on prior and posterior ownership, both of which can be entered into Land registry and other registries. In the article it is analysed how this division and the following registration of both titles could allow for the effects to be given to trusts, in case it would be pondered on the benefits of accession of Croatia to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. Accordingly, after the exposition of Croatian law, it is given a short overview of English trust with emphasis on trusts of land and, subsequently, of the rules of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. In the conclusion it is argued that perceived incompatibility of trust with civilian legal system can be overcome in Croatia with the help of extant legal rules regarding conditionally transferred ownership. Also, this incompatibility has already been refuted in several European continental countries from which examples lessons should be studied and learned, what would be the next step in the deliberations on the accession to the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition.


Author(s):  
Stephen J. Morse

Stephen J. Morse argues that neuroscience raises no new challenges for the existence, source, and content of meaning, morals, and purpose in human life, nor for the robust conceptions of agency and autonomy underpinning law and responsibility. Proponents of revolutionizing the law and legal system make two arguments. The first appeals to determinism and the person as a “victim of neuronal circumstances” (VNC) or “just a pack of neurons” (PON). The second defend “hard incompatibilism. ” Morse reviews the law’s psychology, concept of personhood, and criteria for criminal responsibility, arguing that neither determinism nor VNC/PON are new to neuroscience and neither justifies revolutionary abandonment of moral and legal concepts and practices evolved over centuries in both common law and civil law countries. He argues that, although the metaphysical premises for responsibility or jettisoning it cannot be decisively resolved, the hard incompatibilist vision is not normatively desirable even if achievable.


1945 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lord Wright

In preparing the few and elementary observations which I am about to make to you tonight I have wondered if the title I chose was apt or suitable. The Common Law is generally described as the law of liberty, of freedom and of free peoples. It was a home-made product. In the eighteenth century, foreign lawyers called it an insular and barbarous system; they compared it to their own system of law, developed on the basis of Roman and Civil Law. Many centuries before, and long after Bracton's day, when other civilised European nations ‘received’ the Roman Law, England held back and stood aloof from the Reception. It must have been a near thing. It seems there could have been a Reception here if the Judges had been ecclesiastics, steeped in the Civil Law. But as it turned out they were laymen, and were content as they travelled the country, and in London as well, to adopt what we now know as the Case System, instead of the rules and categories of the Civil Law. Hence the method of threshing out problems by debate in Court, and later on the basis of written pleadings which we find in the Year Books. For present purposes, all I need observe is that the Civil Lawyer had a different idea of the relation of the state or the monarch to the individual from that of the Common Lawyer. To the Civil or Roman Lawyer, the dominant maxim was ‘quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem’; law was the will of the princeps. With this may be compared the rule expressed in Magna Carta in 1215: No freeman, it was there said, was to be taken or imprisoned or exiled or in any way destroyed save by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. Whatever the exact application of that phrase in 1215, it became a text for fixing the relations between the subject and the State. Holdsworth quotes from the Year Book of 1441; the law is the highest English inheritance the King hath, for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled. That was the old medieval doctrine that all things are governed by law, either human or divine. That is the old doctrine of the supremacy of the law, which runs through the whole of English history, and which in the seventeenth century won the day against the un-English doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of their autocratic power over the persons and property of their subjects. The more detailed definition of what all that involved took time to work out. I need scarcely refer to the great cases in the eighteenth century in which the Judges asserted the right of subjects to freedom from arbitrary arrest as against the ministers of state and against the validity of a warrant to seize the papers of a person accused of publishing a seditious libel; in particular Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Halifax (1769) 19 St. Tr. 1406. In this connexion may be noted Fox's Libel Act, 1792, which dealt with procedure, but fixed a substantive right to a trial by jury of the main issue in the cases it referred to.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Juelda Lamçe

Islamic Law, the third largest global legal system, next to Civil Law and Common Law, has been far -back subject of an increased interest to the academics.  Its main peculiarity is the absorption of theology in the law. There is no clear borderline between juridical and religious regulation. For this reason it is important to understand how certain legal institutes where regulated in the past. In fact, Islamic classic law despite its later evolution is considered the most authoritative legal source, because closest to the Divine Revelation.With regard to the rights and obligations of spouses, they’re conceived in terms of complementary, while their equality is interpreted in terms of moral and spiritual rights and obligations. In order to better comprehend their rights and obligations, it is necessary to analyze the different roles of gender inside the Islamic family.Given the premises, this paper will focus on specific rights and obligations between spouses and with regard to the child-parent relationship. In particular, it will treat the meaning of the supremacy or authority of the man to the woman; the rights and obligations that they have towards the children born in and out of wedlock; the questions on the practice of the polygyny.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 151-177
Author(s):  
Piotr Niczyporuk ◽  
Piotr Kołodko

In the archaic period violations of the prohibition relating to mourning was regarded as a nefas and hence subject to penalisation under religious law. A widow guilty of an infringement was required to make an expiatory sacrifce known as a piaculum, viz. a bovis feta. This religious and customary practice underwent a series of transformations and eventually became a law (ius). In the pre-classical period the prohibition on the remarriage of widows in the period of mourning was perceived primarily as subject to penalties laid down by civil law. This was due to the question of the paternity of any offspring such a widow might bear in the tempus lugendi. The edictum perpetuum names the persons who were liable to infamy if they committed a breach of the prohibition on the remarriage of a widow within the period of mourning for her deceased husband. Such persons could neither engage in postulare pro aliis nor act as a procurator or cognitor. One of the consequences of a sentence of praetorian infamy was the convicted person’s forfeiture of the right to appoint his or her plenipotentiaries for legal proceedings.The classical period brought fundamental changes in the law on remarriage. Nonetheless, even though Augustus encouraged citizens to remarry, yet his legal provisions left widows a certain period of time following the loss of their husband in which they could refrain from remarrying. The reason behind this legal arrangement was not so much mourning as such; it was rather a question of Augustus wanting to show his respect for univirae (women who had been married only once). Augustus kept in force the provisions that gave a bad reputation to people who violated the prohibition of widows’ remarriage. The significance and effectiveness of these regulations made them a subject for jurists’ commentary, on account of the need to avoid situations where the paternity of children born to widows was uncertain. The prohibition on the remarriage of widows also shows that the creators of these regulations wanted marriage to be contracted primarily for the purpose of procreation, which would ensure the continuation of Roman families, especially as regards the perpetuation of their sacra, nomina, and pecunia.


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