BECOMING HUMAN

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-7
Author(s):  
Christopher Jenks

Opponents of abortion sometimes argue that a fetus "wants" to grow up into a real person. But every egg and sperm also "want" to become a person in this sense. And if that is the case, how can one defend either contraception or celibacy, both of which deny life to millions of eggs and sperms that "want" to become people, and both of which also involve repression of "natural" impulses? The question of whether abortion is morally wrong depends on when we become "human." Unfortunately, this does not happen all at once, as in medieval fantasies of the soul's entering the body. It happens bit by bit. We must therefore make some arbitrary decision about when to confer the "right to life." Because nature offers no clear guidance about where this line should be drawn, the most humane solution is to draw it so as to minimize human suffering. I doubt, however, that opponents of abortion will accept this approach, for once you accept it, you will almost inevitably be led to precisely the same "liberal" conclusion the Supreme Court reached five years ago in Roe v. Wade.

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Persano

Negli Stati Uniti il dibattito sull’aborto è sempre un tema molto caldo. Questo saggio, diviso in due parti (la prima parte è stata pubblicata sul precedente numero della rivista) prova a ripercorrere l’evoluzione della giurisprudenza costituzionale statunitense in materia d’aborto, evidenziando i cambiamenti che ciascuna decisione ha apportato al quadro giuridico precedente. In questa seconda parte, la dissertazione sui singoli casi giurisprudenziali decisi dalla Suprema Corte prosegue con il caso Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Esso è stato una vera occasione mancata nella storia dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, perchè venne sfiorata la overrule di Roe v. Wade. Ciononostante, venne sostanzialmente confermato l’impianto delle decisioni precedenti, in considerazione del fatto che una decisione contraria all’aborto avrebbe spiazzato un popolo che per decenni aveva organizzato la propria vita in funzione anche della possibilità di abortire. Con questa decisione si distinse la gravidanza in due periodi: quello della pre-viabilità, in cui la donna era completamente libera di abortire in accordo col medico; quello della post-viabilità, in cui gli Stati avrebbero potuto legiferare, pur dovendo consentire l’aborto nel caso di pericolo per la vita o la salute della madre. Inoltre il diritto d’aborto venne radicato nella libertà riconosciuta nel XIV Emendamento della Costituzione. Nel successivo caso Stenberg v. Carhart fu oggetto di giudizio l’aborto a nascita parziale: una legge del Nebraska aveva bandito questa pratica, ma la legge fu annullata dalla Corte Suprema, nonostante il duro dissenso di ben quattro giudici, fra cui Anthony Kennedy. Successivamente a questa decisione, il Congresso prese l’iniziativa di emanare il Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. Questa legge fu impugnata in via d’azione davanti alla Corte Suprema e ne scaturì la sentenza Gonzalez v. Carhart. In questa decisione la Corte fece un passo indietro rispetto a Stenberg, affermò la legittimità del bando, sostenne che l’aborto a nascita parziale non è mai necessario per tutelare la vita della donna e che Stenberg era fondato su convinzioni erronee sul punto. Il saggio si conclude con delle interessanti considerazioni in merito ai possibili sviluppi futuri circa il tema dell’aborto negli Stati Uniti, auspica la “liberalizzazione del diritto alla vita” ed avanza una originale proposta, valida per tutti i Paesi in cui l’aborto è legalizzato. ---------- Abortion debate is always a hot subject in the United States. This essay, divided into two parts (the first part has been published on the previous issue of this review) tries to go along the development of U.S. constitutional caselaw about abortion, pointing out the change that each judgement caused to the previous law framework. In this second part, the dissertation about U.S. Supreme Court single case-law goes on by Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It was a real missed occasion in the abortion affair in the United States, because it was on the verge of overruling Roe v. Wade. However, the framework of the previous cases was substantially confirmed, considering that a decision against abortion would place out people who for a long time organized their own life in connection to the right of abortion. By this judgement, pregnancy was divided into two periods: pre-viability, when woman was completely free to have an abortion in agreement with her doctor; post-viability, when States could restrict abortion, except for woman life or health risks. Moreover, abortion right was founded on liberty, acknowledged by XIV Amendement. In the following case Gonzalez v. Carhart, partial-birth abortion was judged: a statute of Nebraska banned this activity, but it was stroked down by Supreme Court, despite of the dissenting opinion of four judges (Anthony Kennedy was one of them). After this judgement, the Congress wanted to issue Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. This statute was pre-enforcement challenged to the Supreme Court, and Gonzalez v. Carhart was poured. In this judgment, the Court drew back Stenberg, it stated the ban was legitimate, partial-birth abortion never is necessary to safeguard woman health, and Stenberg was founded on wrong beliefs on this matter. This essay concludes with interesting considerations about possible developments about abortion affair in the United States, wishes “liberty of right to life” and proposes a solution for all the countries where abortion is legal.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


2019 ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
HARSH PATHAK

The constitution and jurist characterized Article 21 as, “the procedural magna carta, protective of life and liberty”. This right has been held to be the heart of the constitution, the most organic and progressive provision in Indian constitution, the foundation of our laws. Article 21 can only be claimed when a person is deprived of his “life” or “personal liberty” by the “State” as defined in Article 12. Violation of the right by private individuals is not within the preview of it. Article 21 applies to natural persons. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien. It, however, does not entitle a foreigner the right to reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e). Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person. The right to life is undoubtedly the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. There would have been no fundamental rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense. This Article will examine the right to life as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of India.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-62
Author(s):  
Choudhary Niharika ◽  
Singh Divyansh

The article seeks to assert that the ritual of Santhara practiced by the followers of Jainism is not a suicide and discerns from the view of the Rajasthan High Court. The authors have used various sources on Santhara for research work and have analysed various case laws on right to die with dignity. At the outset, the article discusses the eminence of Santhara in Jainism. Further, it discusses the foundation of the ‘essential practice’ doctrine through various landmark judgements. The Rajasthan High Court has erred in holding that Santhara is not an essential practice in Jainism, when the same has been proved by Jain ascetics and religious denominations. The High Court ruling also contravenes the Supreme Court judgment, which holds that the right to life includes the right to a dignified life up to the point of death and would also encompass a dignified procedure for death. The article attributes the raison-d'être of the court, to the western perspective, overlooking the religious diversity of the Indian subcontinent and the various practices associated with different religions. Lastly, the article concludes that the Supreme Court needs * Third Year, BBA LLB, National Law University, Jodhpur, India; [email protected]  Third Year, BSc LLB, National Law University, Jodhpur, India; [email protected] to lay emphasis on the difference between essentially religious and secular practices and re-affirm the right of religious freedom.


Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe

This chapter examines Supreme Court cases that were filed over the issue of abortion in Texas. Texas figured in two of the three major decisions on abortion laws in the United States: Roe v. Wade and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. The late 1960s witnessed the introduction of various legislative measures to reform abortion laws. Reform measures based on the American Law Institute proposal were initiated in thirty state legislatures, including Texas in 1967. The same year the American Medical Association backed abortion liberalization, abortions were first mentioned at the Supreme Court. The chapter first discusses the case about the right of married couples to obtain contraceptives, which an 1879 Connecticut law severely restricted, and another case, Griswold v. Connecticut, the third attempt at the Court to kill the Connecticut law. It also considers cases involving Roy Lucas, Texas's mandatory sonogram bill, and Texas Senate HB 2.


2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Casini ◽  
Marina Casini

Il contributo prende in esame le numerose decisioni della Corte Costituzionale riguardanti la legge 194 del 1978 che ha introdotto la disciplina dell’aborto in Italia. La principale impugnazione riguarda il principio di autodeterminazione della donna, ma vengono in questione anche la mancata previsione dell’obiezione di coscienza del giudice tutelare; il ruolo subordinato ed eventuale del padre del concepito nelle procedure che portano all’autorizzazione dell’aborto; la pretesa lesione dei diritti dei genitori rispetto alla minorenne che intende abortire; il diverso trattamento delle minorenni rispetto alle maggiorenni; la mancanza di difesa del concepito dinanzi al giudice tutelare. Gli Autori esaminano anche le decisioni che riguardano l’ammissibilità dei referenda proposti contro la Legge 194, perché consentono di cogliere elementi dai quali traspare il pensiero della Corte in ordine alla L. 194/1978 sia sotto il profilo dell’interpretazione, sia sotto quello della costituzionalità. Nonostante ripetute richieste di intervento, la Corte ha sempre evitato di pronunciarsi sul punto più critico della legge, ovvero la disciplina dell’aborto infratrimestrale dominata dal “principio di autodeterminazione”. Nello stesso tempo la Consulta non ha mai negato l’umanità del concepito e in un caso ne ha affermato chiaramente il diritto alla vita. ---------- The contribution deals with the large number of Constitutional Court’s decisions concerning the law 194/1978 that has introduced the regulation of abortion in Italy. The main impugnation deals with the principle of woman’s self-determination, but also non-prevision of the tutelary judge’s objection of conscience is argued; the subordinate and possible role of the father of new born in the procedures that lead to the authorization of the abortion; the supposed damage of the parents’ rights compared with minor who intends to abort; the different treatment of minors in comparison with adults; the lack of defence of new born compared with the tutelary judge. The Authors also examine the decisions that concern the admissibility of referenda proposed against the Law 194, because they allow to understand elements from which the Court’s thought for what concern the Law 194/1978 under the interpretative and constitutionality profile is showed. Although the several intervention calls, the Supreme Court has always avoided to pronounce a decision on the crucial point of the law, i.e. the regulation on the midtrimestrial dominated by the “self-determination principle”. At the same time the Council has never denied the humanity of the new born and in one case it has clearly affirmed the right to life.


Author(s):  
Mary Ziegler

Decided by the Supreme Court in 1973, Roe v. Wade legalized abortion across the United States. The 7-2 decision came at the end of a decades-long struggle to reform—and later repeal—abortion laws. Although all of the justices understood that Roe addressed a profoundly important question, none of them imagined that it would later become a flashpoint of American politics or shape those politics for decades to come. Holding that the right to privacy covered a woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy, Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, struck down many of the abortion regulations on the books. The lead-up to and aftermath of Roe tell a story not only of a single Supreme Court decision but also of the historical shifts that the decision shaped and reflected: the emergence of a movement for women’s liberation, the rise of grassroots conservatism, political party realignment, controversy about the welfare state, changes to the family structure, and the politicization of science. It is a messy and complicated story that evolved parallel to different ideas about the decision itself. In later decades, Roe arguably became the best-known opinion issued by the Supreme Court, a symbol of an ever-changing set of beliefs about family, health care, and the role of the judiciary in American democracy.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suhayfa Bhamjee

This article examines the question of whether the right to life encompasses the right to die with dignity. It looks at the concepts of autonomy and paternalism as they exist as major themes on either side of the debate. Physician Assisted Suicide (Voluntary Euthanasia) has come under the spotlight in several jurisdictions, not just our own. Most recently in Montana, USA, the issue came before the Supreme Court for deliberation. The states of Washington and Oregon have legislations specific to PAS, legitimizing assisted suicide and removing wrongfulness from the actions of a physician who assists in the prescribed manner. Montana does not have specific legislation, but instead relied on the clauses of its Constitution, and it was held that the right to die with dignity is constitutionally guaranteed in that state. Here, argument is made suggesting that the right to die with dignity, in other words, to seek and easy passing through PAS, is also guaranteed in our Constitution.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Doni Budiono

The  authority  of justice in Indonesia  is executed by  the Supreme Courts and  the  justice  boards/body under the Supreme Courts, including  the general  justice, religious affairs justice, military justice,  state administration  justice,  and  the Constitution Court. According to  certainty in  the Act of  Tax Court, Article1, clause  (5),  tax  dispute   refers to the legal dispute arising in the  taxation  affairs between the  tax payer or the  body  responsible for the  tax with   the government   executives  ( Directorate General of Tax) as the consequence of   the issue of  the decree for the  appeal  to the Tax  Court in accordance with the  tax Act, including the  charge  against the  execution of collection   in accordance with the  Act of Tax Collection by force. The  formation of Tax Court is  designed by  the Executives, in this case, the  Department of Finance, specifically  the Directorate   General  of Tax  which has the right to issue  law  more technical about  tax accord to Article 14,  letter A,  President Decree  no. 44  year 1974,  concerning the  basic  organization of the Department.  Based on  it,  it  is clear that  in addition to execute the government  rules and policy,  this body  has to execute judicial   rules and policy. This is against the  principles of  Judicative  Power/Authority in Indonesia,  which   clearly states that this body  should be under the Supreme Court.   Therefore. It is suggested that   the Act  No UU no.14 Year 2012 concerning  Tax Court   be revised  in accordance with the system of  Power Division  of Justice  as  stated in 45 Constitutions.


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