scholarly journals La Legge 194 di fronte alle decisioni della Corte Costituzionale

2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Casini ◽  
Marina Casini
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Crucial Point ◽  
New Born ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Il contributo prende in esame le numerose decisioni della Corte Costituzionale riguardanti la legge 194 del 1978 che ha introdotto la disciplina dell’aborto in Italia. La principale impugnazione riguarda il principio di autodeterminazione della donna, ma vengono in questione anche la mancata previsione dell’obiezione di coscienza del giudice tutelare; il ruolo subordinato ed eventuale del padre del concepito nelle procedure che portano all’autorizzazione dell’aborto; la pretesa lesione dei diritti dei genitori rispetto alla minorenne che intende abortire; il diverso trattamento delle minorenni rispetto alle maggiorenni; la mancanza di difesa del concepito dinanzi al giudice tutelare. Gli Autori esaminano anche le decisioni che riguardano l’ammissibilità dei referenda proposti contro la Legge 194, perché consentono di cogliere elementi dai quali traspare il pensiero della Corte in ordine alla L. 194/1978 sia sotto il profilo dell’interpretazione, sia sotto quello della costituzionalità. Nonostante ripetute richieste di intervento, la Corte ha sempre evitato di pronunciarsi sul punto più critico della legge, ovvero la disciplina dell’aborto infratrimestrale dominata dal “principio di autodeterminazione”. Nello stesso tempo la Consulta non ha mai negato l’umanità del concepito e in un caso ne ha affermato chiaramente il diritto alla vita. ---------- The contribution deals with the large number of Constitutional Court’s decisions concerning the law 194/1978 that has introduced the regulation of abortion in Italy. The main impugnation deals with the principle of woman’s self-determination, but also non-prevision of the tutelary judge’s objection of conscience is argued; the subordinate and possible role of the father of new born in the procedures that lead to the authorization of the abortion; the supposed damage of the parents’ rights compared with minor who intends to abort; the different treatment of minors in comparison with adults; the lack of defence of new born compared with the tutelary judge. The Authors also examine the decisions that concern the admissibility of referenda proposed against the Law 194, because they allow to understand elements from which the Court’s thought for what concern the Law 194/1978 under the interpretative and constitutionality profile is showed. Although the several intervention calls, the Supreme Court has always avoided to pronounce a decision on the crucial point of the law, i.e. the regulation on the midtrimestrial dominated by the “self-determination principle”. At the same time the Council has never denied the humanity of the new born and in one case it has clearly affirmed the right to life.

scholarly journals Feu la D.C.D. L'arrêt Miller et la peine de mort

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.

scholarly journals Primary law in medicine, its legal nature

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 01002
Author(s):  
K. Zarins
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Economic Opportunities ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

Thework will discuss the problems arising from the thesis that the economic opportunities are incompatible with the person's primary law - the right to life and equality of treatment. An actively maintained hypothesis claims that the country's economic opportunities and funding should not restrict or reduce a person's right to life and health. In this aspect, it will also study the role of the constitutional court. The author points to the fact that the adoption of such, here the Supreme Court decision, successive constitutional court for a preliminary inaccurate claim and interpretation of the country's economic interests, could deny the right of people to life only after the consideration that they are of no use and financially expensive to be maintained.

BECOMING HUMAN

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-7
Author(s):  
Christopher Jenks
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Body ◽  
Human Suffering ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Arbitrary Decision ◽  
Real Person ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

Opponents of abortion sometimes argue that a fetus "wants" to grow up into a real person. But every egg and sperm also "want" to become a person in this sense. And if that is the case, how can one defend either contraception or celibacy, both of which deny life to millions of eggs and sperms that "want" to become people, and both of which also involve repression of "natural" impulses? The question of whether abortion is morally wrong depends on when we become "human." Unfortunately, this does not happen all at once, as in medieval fantasies of the soul's entering the body. It happens bit by bit. We must therefore make some arbitrary decision about when to confer the "right to life." Because nature offers no clear guidance about where this line should be drawn, the most humane solution is to draw it so as to minimize human suffering. I doubt, however, that opponents of abortion will accept this approach, for once you accept it, you will almost inevitably be led to precisely the same "liberal" conclusion the Supreme Court reached five years ago in Roe v. Wade.

scholarly journals Uloga institucije ombudsmena i sudova u sudskim postupcima povodom slučajeva diskriminacije u Bosni i Hercegovini

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 667-683
Author(s):  
Mirza Čaušević
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Bosnia And Herzegovina ◽  
General Information ◽  
Direct Discrimination ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Proceedings ◽  
The Individual

When reading the article’s title, it is important to emphasize the role and importance of the Institution of the Ombudsman for Human Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most important national institution for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, according to the logic of thinking, it can be clearly concluded that the most important segment of action, above mentioned national institution, is to prevent or eliminate all forms of indirect and direct discrimination. Accordingly, the author decided, in addition to introductory and concluding considerations, to divide the article into four (4) parts. The first part of the article entitled “Theoretical Determination of Discrimination” provides general information on the concept, different forms and types of discrimination in accordance with the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unlike the first, in the second part of the article “The Role of the Ombudsman in the Probation of Discrimination Proceedings”, the Ombudsman aims to present the legal position of the ombudsman in court proceedings, with the mandatory indication of the conditions for initiating the proceedings on his own behalf, representing the individual and intervening in the ongoing proceedings. Through practical examples, the author seeks to emphasize the importance, role and importance of the ombudsman in court proceedings. Subsequently, in the third part of the “Role of Courts in the Probation of Discrimination Proceedings”, the author concentrates that, by using the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination, he presents court judgments that discriminate the education system of the Central Bosnia and Herzegovina Canton (non) discriminatory on the basis of the existing segregation in so called. “Two schools under one roof”. Thus, this section primarily analyzes the rejection of the aforementioned claims. Finally, in the fourth (working) section entitled “The Probation of Discrimination Proceeding before the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the author presents positive and negative examples in the work of the Supreme Court of FBiH, and above all clarifies the process of proving discrimination before this court instance. The aim of this paper is to investigate the legal background of the Institution of the Ombudsman for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as judicial instances from the aspect of domestic (national) law, while, on the other hand, special attention is devoted to the actions of the FBiH Supreme Court in cases of discrimination.

scholarly journals Private Prosecutions in Mauritius: Clarifying Locus Standi and Making the Director of Public Prosecutions more Accountable

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Locus Standi ◽  
Statutory Requirement ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Case law shows that private prosecutions have been part of Mauritian law at least since 1873. In Mauritius there are two types of private prosecutions: private prosecutions by individuals; and private prosecutions by statutory bodies. Neither the Mauritian constitution nor legislation provides for the right to institute a private prosecution. Because of the fact that Mauritian legislation is not detailed on the issue of locus standi to institute private prosecutions and does not address the issue of whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions has to give reasons when he takes over and discontinues a private prosecution, the Supreme Court has had to address these issues. The Mauritian Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that a private prosecution may only be instituted by an aggrieved party (even in lower courts where this is not a statutory requirement) and that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take over and discontinue a private prosecution without giving reasons for his decision. However, the Supreme Court does not define “an aggrieved party.” In this article the author takes issue with the Court’s findings in these cases and, relying on legislation from other African countries, recommends how the law could be amended to strengthen the private prosecutor’s position.

scholarly journals Was the Supreme Court right to change the law on the right to a speedy trial?

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reasonable Time ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Speedy Trial

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.

scholarly journals Takamore v Clarke: Tikanga and Merits-Based Resolution of Burial Disputes, a Just Outcome?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Webb
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Cultural Identity ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
General Application ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Intervention

<p>Burial disputes are something of a novelty in New Zealand. Most are resolved amicably by those with ties to the deceased. The exception to has been the long-running case of Takamore v Clarke, the matter finally being resolved by the Supreme Court this year. Burial disputes raise fundamental issues of religious and cultural identity (including tikanga Māori), personhood, and the meaning of family. Despite their rarity in New Zealand, the response of the law in resolving such disputes should “fit the fuss”, having regard to the context in which they arise. This essay begins by discussing the form of resolution advocated for by the majority and minority in Takamore. Their respective approaches are essentially the same, especially with regards to tikanga Māori. This is one of Court intervention coupled with a merits-based assessment of the dispute. However the Court failed to apprehend there was no pressing need for burial, prior to creating a solution of general application. The experience of comparable jurisdictions, where speedy resolution has been necessary (such as Australia) demonstrates that the role of the Court applying such a test in burial disputes is misconceived. Rather than providing “justice” for the parties concerned, merits-based resolution produces unfair and unconvincing outcomes. The more just response is to ensure the parties never get to Court, via mediation. Insofar as agreement is not possible, the role of the Court should be supervisory in the application of a prescriptive test emphasising expediency and ensuring the dispute is resolved out of Court.</p>

scholarly journals Concept of right to life and its protection under the Constitution of India

2019 ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
HARSH PATHAK
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Indian Constitution ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Supreme Court Of India ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Original Sense ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
The Right

The constitution and jurist characterized Article 21 as, “the procedural magna carta, protective of life and liberty”. This right has been held to be the heart of the constitution, the most organic and progressive provision in Indian constitution, the foundation of our laws. Article 21 can only be claimed when a person is deprived of his “life” or “personal liberty” by the “State” as defined in Article 12. Violation of the right by private individuals is not within the preview of it. Article 21 applies to natural persons. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien. It, however, does not entitle a foreigner the right to reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e). Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person. The right to life is undoubtedly the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. There would have been no fundamental rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense. This Article will examine the right to life as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of India.

scholarly journals The Practice of Introducing Restrictions on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly within Administrative Proceedings and the Place of the Judicial Branch of Power in Determining the Admissibility of Such Restrictions

2020 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 162-176
Author(s):  
М. А. Самбор
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Administrative Discretion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Agencies ◽  
Administrative Proceedings ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legal Understanding

The author has researched the practice of the executive branch of power of Ukraine in establishing a collective (general) ban and restriction of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under quarantine, as well as the place and role of the judicial branch of power represented by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in determining the constitutionality of such restrictions and prohibitions. The powers of the Supreme Court on the constitutional submission to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the constitutionality of the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On quarantine to prevent the spread of acute respiratory disease COVID-19 caused by coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and stages of weakening of anti-epidemic measures” dated from May 20, 2020 No. 392 on the establishment of a ban on the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly within administrative proceedings during the introduction of quarantine in Ukraine, as well as the justification of such a constitutional submission. It is important to analyze and form a legal understanding of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the unconstitutionality of restricting and prohibiting the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly during quarantine within administrative proceedings – by adopting the relevant resolution by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which was the result of administrative discretion of the highest agency in the system of executive agencies of Ukraine. In this regard, the study focuses on the motivation and validity of the decision of the agency of constitutional jurisdiction and understanding of those legal and social values that were the basis for the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine while adopting the decision dated from August 28, 2020 No 10-r/2020.

scholarly journals Legal Aid by the State as a Constitutional Right of the Poor: Problems and Challenges in Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Ari Wibowo ◽  
Michael Hagana Bangun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Aid ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

The provision of legal aid is one way to realize access to law and justice for the poor people provided by the state on the mandate of the constitution. Several regulations regarding legal aid have been issued by the state through the Act and its implementing regulations as well as from the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court through the Supreme Court Regulations and the Constitutional Court's decisions. Legal aid is the constitutional right of every citizen to guarantee legal protection and guarantee equality before the law stipulated in Law Number 16 of 2011, the State is responsible for recognizing and protecting the human rights of every individual without differing backgrounds so that everyone has the right to be treated equally before the law is contained in Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. For the poor who experience legal problems in the form of injustice, they can request legal assistance from legal aid institutions that are regulated in legislation. The purpose of providing legal aid is to guarantee and fulfill the right for Legal Aid Recipients to gain access to justice, to realize the constitutional rights of all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality in law, to ensure the certainty that the implementation of Legal Aid is carried out equally across the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. , and to create an effective, efficient and accountable court.

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