scholarly journals A atualidade da ética husserliana

2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo Fabri

O artigo argumenta em favor da atualidade da ética husserliana a partir de três eixos temáticos, que se complementam: a relação entre razão teórica e razão prática no interior da fenomenologia, o conceito de humanidade autêntica e, finalmente, a reflexão fenomenológica sobre a esfera do estrangeiro. Parte-se do pressuposto segundo o qual o pensamento de Husserl abre caminho para uma superação de duas atitudes éticas radicais: o ceticismo de caráter biológico e o universalismo abstrato. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Ética fenomenológica. Ceticismo biológico. Universalismo abstrato. ABSTRACT The paper argues for today’s relevance of Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, by three complementary thematic points. The first one is the relation between theoretical reason and practical reason on phenomenology; the second, the concept of an authentic humanity; finally, the phenomenological reflection on the alien. The main hypothesis is: Husserl does pave the way for the overcoming of two radical attitudes in ethics, namely, biological skepticism and abstract universalism. KEY WORDS – Phenomenological ethics. Biological skepticism. Abstract universalism.

Author(s):  
Luis Román Rabanaque

En contraste con algunas concepciones muy difundidas acerca de la razón, los análisis de Husserl subrayan tanto sus múltiples maneras de darse, es decir, su multidimensionalidad, como su entrelazamiento con la vida, lo que significa que la razón está arraigada en la vida y la vida es racional desde sus raíces. La multidimensionalidad da cuenta de sus diferenciables aspectos teoréticos, prácticos y afectivo-valorativos, mientras que el arraigo se refiere al anclaje de esos aspectos en la experiencia “anónima” que es “previa” al pensamiento. Esto significa que la experiencia es racional en la medida que despliega una estructura constitutiva interna organizada en un sistema de niveles y estratos mediante los cuales se orienta hacia la racionalidad activa. Siguiendo las líneas de una articulación tripartita de la reflexión fenomenológica en los niveles estático, genético y mundovital, este trabajo procura mostrar que tales análisis, junto con este apuntar a una teleología implícita que exige una continuidad entre la vida y la razón, ponen de manifiesto el papel necesario que juega el cuerpo animado en este arraigo. La razón está arraigada en la vida por medio de la experiencia corporal en virtud de la función de “puente” que posee el cuerpo en su condición de cosa material y “órgano” estratificado del sentir y el mover del yo. Así la razón teórica está relacionada con los estratos de la sensibilidad y la cinestesia, la razón práctica se vincula con los estratos cinestésicos y volitivos, y la razón axiológica se asocia con el doble estrato de afección y sentir que subyacen y motivan la valoración. La constitución adopta nuevas formas en el tránsito de la egología a la intersubjetividad y a la experiencia completa mundovital, mientras que el arraigo puede ser ilustrado adicionalmente con el caso de la Tierra como suelo para la experiencia corporal.In contrast with widespread reductionistic conceptions of reason, Husserl’s analyses stress both its multifarious manners of givenness, i.e. its multidimensionality, and its intertwining with life, such that reason is rooted in life and life is rational from its roots. Multidimensionality accounts for distinguishable theoretical, practical and affective-valuing aspects of reason, while rootedness refers to the anchoring of these aspects in ‘anonymous’ experience ‘prior’ to thinking. This means that experience is rational insofar as it displays an inner constitutive structure organized as a system of levels and strata, by means of which it points to active rationality. Following the lines of a threefold articulation of phenomenological reflection in static, genetic and life-wordly levels, this paper aims to show that, together with this pointing to an implicit teleology, which calls for a continuity between life and reason, such analyses also unveil the necessary role played by the Body in this rootedness. Reason is rooted in life by means of Bodily experience, in virtue of the ‘bridging’ function of the Body as a material thing and as the stratified ‘organ’ of the Ego’s sensing and moving. Thus theoretical reason is related to the strata of sensibility and kinaesthesia, practical reason is related to the kinaesthetical and volitional strata, and axiological reason is related to the twofold strata of affection and feeling, which underlie and motivate valuation. This constitution takes on new forms in the transit from egology to intersubjectivity and to the full-fledged life-worldly experience, whereas rootedness can be further illustrated with the case of the Earth as basis-place for Bodily experience.


Author(s):  
Jean Hampton

Whereas theoretical reason is that form of reason that is authoritative over belief, practical reason is that form of reason that applies, in some way, to action: by either directing it, motivating it, planning it, evaluating it or predicting it. Accounts of practical reason include theories of how we should determine means to the ends we have; how we should define the ends themselves; how we should act given that we have a multiplicity of ends; how requirements of consistency should govern our actions; and how moral considerations should be incorporated in our deliberations about how to act. Economics has provided, in recent times, what many regard as the most compelling portrait of practical reason, called ‘expected utility theory’ (hereafter ‘EU theory’). On this theory, rational action is that action which yields the highest expected utility, which is calculated by measuring the utility – or the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ – of the possible outcomes of the action, multiplying the utility of each outcome by the probability that it will occur, and, finally, adding together the results for all the possible outcomes of each action. The action that has the highest expected utility is the rational action. Other technical representations of practical reason have been explored in the branch of social science called ‘game theory’, which studies ‘strategic’ situations in which the action that is rational for any agent depends in part on what other agents do. A theory of practical reason can have one or more of several different goals. If it sets out how human beings actually reason, it functions as a descriptive theory of reasoning. If it sets out a conception of how our reasoning ought to proceed, it functions as a normative theory of reasoning. Theories of reason can also be about actions themselves: if a theory presents a conception of the way our actions should be intelligible or consistent or useful (regardless of the quality of the deliberation that preceded it), it functions as a (normative) theory of behavioural rationale. If it merely presents an account of consistent action that allows us to predict the behaviour of an agent whose previous actions fit this account of consistency, it functions as a descriptive theory. One might say that whereas theoretical reason is supposed to pursue truth, practical reason is supposed to pursue some sort of good or value in human action. Theories that take rational action to be that which achieves, furthers or maximizes (what is regarded as) good, are consequentialist or teleological theories. Theories that believe rational action must sometimes be understood as action that has an intrinsic value or ‘rightness’ regardless of how much good it will accomplish or manifest, are non-consequentialist or non-teleological conceptions of reason. If the theory defines reason as that which serves ends defined by something other than itself, it is an instrumental conception. If it allows reason to have a non-instrumental role, itself capable of establishing at least some of our ends of action, it is setting out a non-instrumental conception. Theories of practical reason that recognize the existence of a special moral reasoning procedure tend to represent that procedure as non-instrumental. Philosophers have disagreed about whether practical reason gives us a way of reasoning prior to choice that can actually motivate us to behave in the way that it directs. Many believe it lacks motivational power, so that it can only give us authoritative directives that must be motivated by something else (for example, by our desires). Finally, the study of practical reason also considers the variety of ways in which one can fall short of being rational; and issues about the nature and possibility of irrational ‘weakness of will’ have been central to this discussion.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. H. Johns

Job (Ayyūb) is a byword for patience in the Islamic tradition, notwithstanding only six Qur'anic verses are devoted to him, four in Ṣād (vv.41-4), and two in al-Anbiyā' (vv.83-4), and he is mentioned on only two other occasions, in al-Ancām (v.84) and al-Nisā' (v.163). In relation to the space devoted to him, he could be accounted a ‘lesser’ prophet, nevertheless his significance in the Qur'an is unambiguous. The impact he makes is achieved in a number of ways. One is through the elaborate intertext transmitted from the Companions and Followers, and recorded in the exegetic tradition. Another is the way in which his role and charisma are highlighted by the prophets in whose company he is presented, and the shifting emphases of each of the sūras in which he appears. Yet another is the wider context created by these sūras in which key words and phrases actualize a complex network of echoes and resonances that elicit internal and transsūra associations focusing attention on him from various perspectives. The effectiveness of this presentation of him derives from the linguistic genius of the Qur'an which by this means triggers a vivid encounter with aspects of the rhythm of divine revelation no less direct than that of visual iconography in the Western Tradition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-41
Author(s):  
Ischak Suryo Nugroho

Islamic education is not only focussed on physical problems such as cognitive but also on spiritualilty which the mind’s ability that is build in tasawuf by tarekat way. Qadiriyah is a taken from the name of its founder Abd. Al-Qadir Jilani who is popular with Syekh Abd. Al-Qadir Jilani Al-Ghawsts atau Quthb Auliya. Syeikh Abd. Al-Qadir is athe founder of spiritual which is masive and organized well. Before Syeikh Abd. Al-Qadir Jilani, Islamic spiritual is individual and not well-organized. According to Al Sya’rani, the form and characteristic of Tarekat Syaikh Abd. Al-Qadir is tauhid . The way to achieve the syariat is by spritual and mental activities. The Syaikh Abd. Al-Qadir Al-Jilani always emphasizes on purificstion from the men’s desire. Some of the lessons are taubat, zuhud, tawakal, syukur, ridha and honest.  Key Words : Islamic Education, Tarekat, Qadiriyah


Author(s):  
Anastasia Fedorova

In Linguistics the terms model and modelling have a vast array of meanings, which depends on the purpose and the object, and the type of the scientific research. The article is dedicated to the investigation of a special procedure of semantic processes modelling, deducing and substantiating the notion “evolutional semantic model”, the content and operational opportunities of which differ drastically from the essence and purpose of the known from the scientific literature phenomenon of the same name. In the proposed research this variety of modelling is oriented towards the description of the dynamics of the legal terms content loading, the estimation of possible vectors of the semantic evolution on the way of its terminalization/determinalization. The evolutional model of semantics has here as its basis the succession of sememes or series of sememes, the order of which is determined with accounting of a number of parameters. The typical schemes of the meaning development, illustrated by the succession of sememes, are considered to be the models of semantic laws (evolutional semantic models = EMS). Their function is the explanation of the mechanism and the order of the stages of the semantic evolution of the system of the words which sprung from one root on the way of its legal specialization, and, therefore, the proposed in the paper experience of semantic laws modelling differs from the expertise of the “catalogue of semantic derivations”, proposed by H. A. Zaliznjak, which doesn’t have as its purpose the explanation of meaning displacements, and from the notion of semantic derivation, models of derivation, dynamic models, worked out by O. V. Paducheva, which also only state such a displacement, without proving its reality. Key words: evolutional semantic model (EMS), modelling, semantic law, sememe, pre(law).


Author(s):  
Jill Vance Buroker

Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason.


Author(s):  
Benj Hellie

Recent neo-Anscombean work in praxeology (aka ‘philosophy of practical reason’), salutarily, shifts focus from an alienated ‘third-person’ viewpoint on practical reason to an embedded ‘first-person’ view: for example, the ‘naive rationalizations’ of Michael Thompson, of form ‘I am A-ing because I am B-ing’, take up the agent’s view, in the thick of action. Less salutary, in its premature abandonment of the first-person view, is an interpretation of these naive rationalizations as asserting explanatory links between facts about organically structured agentive processes in progress, followed closely by an inflationary project in ‘practical metaphysics’. If, instead, praxeologists chase first-personalism all the way down, both fact and explanation vanish (and with them, the possibility of metaphysics): what is characteristically practical is endorsement of nonpropositional imperatival content, chained together not explanatorily, but through limits on intelligibility. A connection to agentive behavior must somehow be reestablished—but this can (and can only) be done ‘transcendentally’.


2009 ◽  
pp. 31-56
Author(s):  
Alessio Quercioli

- Is about the annexation of Veneto to the Reign of Italy in 1866, which deprives students from Italian provinces in the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the only university in Italian language within the boundaries of the double monarchy of Padua. People study in Austria, following classes in German, or enroll in Italian institutes whose qualifications are not acknowledged by Austrian authorities. The decision to study in Italy must be considered as a precise political choice; the youngest challenge the Austrian social and political system, that seems stale and inadequate, by choosing the "young" Reign. Many of these students will join the Italian army as volunteers. This research aims at giving new hints and open the way to further analyses of the «'14 generation», whose exceptionality has always been highlighted. But it is also necessary to focus on the connections with the previous generations - particularly for the "irredentists" - on their non-impromptu choices, which have to be seen as the result of a long cultural and political path.Key words: Students, University, Irredentism, First World War.Parole chiave: Studenti, Universitŕ, Irredentismo, Prima guerra mondiale.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 36-44
Author(s):  
Yarema Kravets’ ◽  

Purpose: The article is devoted to the Sorbian studies work of the Italian Slavic scholar of Lusatian origin Wolfango Giusti (1901-1980) “The Folk Lusatian Serbian Song” (1926), totally unknown in Ukrainian Slavic scholars’ circles. The author of a large number of Sorbian studies publications printed in the 1920s and 1930s in the pages of Italian Slavic editions, he became a true popularizer of Lusatian culture, and his works found a special reverberation in the research papers of authoritative Sorbian scholars. W. Giusti’s name as researcher and translator has recently been more frequently mentioned in Slavistic publications, his interest in Ukrainian poetry, esp. in the 1920s, is written about. The interest in W. Giusti’s literary legacy is linked, in particular, to his being interested in T. Shevchenko’s and M. Shashkevych’s lyrics. In the research under analysis, the Italian scholar stressed that “the soul of the Lusatian people has found its best and fullest expression in their folk song”. Also mentioned by W. Giusti were Ukrainian folk songs, rich in their multi-genre samples. Results: The paper presents a classification of the most characteristic folk songs, the classification coming to be basis-providing for the Italian scholar: W. Giusti relied on authoritative research papers, including those by the scholars K. Fiedler and B. Krawc. The Italian Slavicist acquaints us with songs of love between brother and sister, love songs about the way of life of the whole people, songs resonating with the motif of fidelity. Neither has the literary scholar bypassed the issue of the neighbouring peoples’ influence experienced by Lusatian culture, particularly that of a Germanic culture, providing some examples of a “spiritual analogy” with German folk songs. W. Giusti completed his short essay by promising to offer the reader, before long, “other genres of the extremely rich Lusatian folklore”. The promise came to be fulfilled as early as the next year, in the work published under the title “Folk Lusatian Serbian Songs”. Key words: Lusatian folklore, Wolfango Giusti, folk song, motif of fidelity/infidelity, dramatic mood, classification of songs, aspects of “Wendish” folklore, Germanic influence.


Author(s):  
Moh Rifai

<p>Parents are obliged to take care of their children’s future, especially by rendering sufficient education. Children are believed to bring about happiness every now and then, who generate family’s pride up to the almighty judication. Some people are save and some are not in that court, where children will give sigificant contribution in it. That’s why the children’s well being has become the parents obligation. To bring about children’s well being, parents should also render the good treatments during the life cycle of their children. The main duties of parents for their children are giving them the good names, sending them to the good schools where they can learn religion, and marry them to their good spouses. Psychologically, when children are sent to school for the first time, they will feel that they are put apart from parents’ care, so that may of them have to go difficult phase of adjustment. The adjustment includes that of education so as to run as naturally as possible. To get the naturality of the education delegation, teachers and educators are obliged to be able to nurture any value to students as naturally as possible. Parenting model of teaching serves the requirements of teaching children just the way the parrents do, so that it is assumptively effective in teaching elementary students by taking consideration on the psychologial aspect of children.</p><p> </p><p>Key words:   Parenting Model of teaching, children education optimalization</p>


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