The Gospel of Divine Mercy in King Lear

The paper discusses Shakespeare’s preoccupation with the Christian notions of divine love, forgiveness and justice in The Tragedy of King Lear. In my reading I employ Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenological reflection on the givenness of love and Hans-Urs von Balthasar’s theology of Paschal mystery. I take issue with the Marxist and existentialist interpretations of Shakespeare’s tragedy which prevailed in the second half of the 20th century. My aim is not a simple recuperation of the “redemptionism” of the play, but an in-depth consideration of Christian allusions in the play which may tie love and forgiveness to justice and throw light on the ending of King Lear.

Phenomenology in Gerontology: From Philosophy to Method

Background: Ageing is a complex phenomenon, which can vastly influence different dimensions of life. One of the main concerns in gerontology is to understand how older adults experience ageing and its associated conditions. The aim of this study was to determine the role of phenomenology as a qualitative method in gerontology research. Methods: In this review study, we summarized the key concepts in gerontology, reviewed the philosophy and methodology of phenomenology, presented both descriptive and interpretive phenomenological methods, and highlighted the areas which can be explored in ageing by phenomenology. We also presented some examples for studying the lived experiences of older adults using phenomenological methods. Results: People experience noticeable changes in their body, emotions and social relations as they grow old. The biopsychosocial aspects of ageing are discussed in gerontology as a growing interdisciplinary science. Phenomenology allows the researchers to obtain a deep understanding of older adults׳ lived experiences and it can connect the investigators of this discipline to the inner world of ageing adults. Conclusion: Based on the findings, it can be concluded that ageing is an important experience in life, and phenomenological reflection on the lived experiences of older adults can play a crucial role in increasing our knowledge about ageing.

What is Xenosophia? Philosophical Contributions to Prejudice Research

This chapter explicates the concept of xenosophia, detailing its philosophical roots and its psychological profile as opposite to xenophobia and prejudice. The Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion in Germany is based conceptually and empirically on a model which opens the perspective beyond the focus on the "pathogenic" outcomes such as xenophobia, Islamophobia and other inter-religious and inter-cultural prejudice. Instead, our research design has in-cluded attention also to the "salutogenic" predictors and outcomes. With reference to philosophical-phenomenological reflection about alienness/strangeness, this chapter explicates the concept of xenosophia as the wisdom that might emerge from the encounter with the alien/the strange. The chapter concludes with an outlook on our operationalization of xenosophia for psychology of religion research.

HeartMath as Scientific Meditation Method in Dialogue with Theological Phenomena

The HeartMath Institute originated in 1991 through Doc Childre’s vision of promoting heart intelligence and health. The HeartMath system is an interdisciplinary undertaking, which bridges natural, human, social, spiritual, and ecological sciences, with the goal of promoting personal, social, and global coherence. The general goal of this paper is to introduce HeartMath as a coherent scientific approach to dialogue theological information, as well as a specific meditation method to explore theological phenomena. The particular aim is to contribute a theoretical and practically orientated pilot study with heuristic phenomenological reflection on personal experience of HeartMath theory, practice, meditation, related action, and reports in the form of scientific articles. This study is directly relevant to the DIALOGO conference theme of dialogue between science and theology. Methodology concerns the theoretical and practical value of HeartMath meditation methods as described with examples from HeartMath Global Coherence (GC) and Inner Balance (IB) apps. There are five GC reflective meditations on the theme of science and theology, complemented by five IB purely contemplative meditations. The reflective and discursive focus of the paper is on the monitoring of meditation sessions related to science and theology. The specific focus is on HeartMath techniques, electronic devices, and the planetary health potential of the Global Coherence Initiative.

Social workers’ use of critical reflection

Summary This article explores critical reflection as practiced by social workers in the context of their personal and professional privilege. It was found that social workers in direct practice were not invested in critical reflection about oppressive discourses in their consciousness when interacting with clients. Rather, critical reflection often happened in times of crises or when social workers encountered difficult client situations. Using the phenomenological methodology of Van Manen and the social constructionist perspective, I present and discuss the findings of a qualitative study of semi-structured interviews with 20 social workers in direct practice. Findings Data analysis indicated that critical reflection is not a priority for direct practice social workers in the context of privilege. Three themes are identified: (1) No time for reflection, (2) Fear of reflection, and (3) Too much reflection. Nevertheless, social workers were still able to reflect alone, with colleagues and with supervisors, and they outlined the benefits of reflection. Applications Social work agencies should provide infrastructure for reflection, create an atmosphere for workers to freely discuss challenges and difficulties, and reduce their fear of reprisals from management. This article broadens the idea of phenomenological reflection by Van Manen.

The primacy of the noematic. On the methodological relevance of art for phenomenology

As Husserl already noticed, artworks themselves have a phenomenological character. This means, however, that to experience artworks as phenomena no “epoché” and no “phenomenological reduction” is necessary. The leading question of my essay is whether, and possibly how, this observation can be methodologically generalized for understanding phenomena. I discuss if, and possibly how, a phenomenological reflection on art allows and even demands a general conception of phenomenology that nevertheless does not confuse artworks with phenomena in general. My intention is to show that and how phenomenality can be clarified with reference to its spatial character. Accordingly, works of architecture that are artworks will play a decisive role in my argument.

Reflexión, objetivación, tematización: sobre una crítica heideggeriana de Husserl

De acuerdo con una influyente interpretación, ejemplificada por von Herrmann (2000), la postura que se asuma con respecto a la metodología reflexiva marca el contraste entre una vertiente reflexiva y una vertiente hermenéutica de la investigación fenomenológica. Recientemente, autores como Zahavi (2003a, 2005), Crowell (2001) y Cai (2011) han cuestionado la legitimidad de establecer dicho contraste a partir del método de la reflexión. Mi propósito es discutir la crítica central que Heidegger, basándose en Paul Natorp, dirige a la reflexión fenomenológica (GA 56/57, 100). Luego de presentar tres posibles interpretaciones de la crítica de Heidegger, y de sugerir la pertinencia de una de ellas, argumento que para contrarrestar dicha crítica es necesario ir más allá de la defensa de la metodología reflexiva que Husserl esboza en el § 79 de Ideas I, y apelar a una distinción entre una objetualidad cósica y una objetualidad temática, sugerida en textos husserlianos posteriores.According to an influential interpretation, epitomized by von Herrmann (2000), the stance that one takes on the reflective methodology determines a contrast between a reflective and a hermeneutic understanding of the phenomenological investigation. In recent years, authors like Zahavi (2003a, 2005), Crowell (2001), and Cai (2011) have challenged the validity of this interpretation. My aim in this article is to discuss the critique that Heidegger, drawing on ideas from Paul Natorp, addresses to phenomenological reflection (GA 56/57, 100). I first present three possible interpreta-tions of Heidegger’s critique, and suggest the superiority of one of them. Secondly, I argue that in order to respond to that critique one must go beyond the defense of reflection indicated by Husserl in § 79 of Ideas I, and appeal to a distinction between thing-objecthood and thematic objecthood, suggested in some of Husserl’s later writings.

Razón, cuerpo, mundo: el arraigo de la razón en la vida según Husserl

En contraste con algunas concepciones muy difundidas acerca de la razón, los análisis de Husserl subrayan tanto sus múltiples maneras de darse, es decir, su multidimensionalidad, como su entrelazamiento con la vida, lo que significa que la razón está arraigada en la vida y la vida es racional desde sus raíces. La multidimensionalidad da cuenta de sus diferenciables aspectos teoréticos, prácticos y afectivo-valorativos, mientras que el arraigo se refiere al anclaje de esos aspectos en la experiencia “anónima” que es “previa” al pensamiento. Esto significa que la experiencia es racional en la medida que despliega una estructura constitutiva interna organizada en un sistema de niveles y estratos mediante los cuales se orienta hacia la racionalidad activa. Siguiendo las líneas de una articulación tripartita de la reflexión fenomenológica en los niveles estático, genético y mundovital, este trabajo procura mostrar que tales análisis, junto con este apuntar a una teleología implícita que exige una continuidad entre la vida y la razón, ponen de manifiesto el papel necesario que juega el cuerpo animado en este arraigo. La razón está arraigada en la vida por medio de la experiencia corporal en virtud de la función de “puente” que posee el cuerpo en su condición de cosa material y “órgano” estratificado del sentir y el mover del yo. Así la razón teórica está relacionada con los estratos de la sensibilidad y la cinestesia, la razón práctica se vincula con los estratos cinestésicos y volitivos, y la razón axiológica se asocia con el doble estrato de afección y sentir que subyacen y motivan la valoración. La constitución adopta nuevas formas en el tránsito de la egología a la intersubjetividad y a la experiencia completa mundovital, mientras que el arraigo puede ser ilustrado adicionalmente con el caso de la Tierra como suelo para la experiencia corporal.In contrast with widespread reductionistic conceptions of reason, Husserl’s analyses stress both its multifarious manners of givenness, i.e. its multidimensionality, and its intertwining with life, such that reason is rooted in life and life is rational from its roots. Multidimensionality accounts for distinguishable theoretical, practical and affective-valuing aspects of reason, while rootedness refers to the anchoring of these aspects in ‘anonymous’ experience ‘prior’ to thinking. This means that experience is rational insofar as it displays an inner constitutive structure organized as a system of levels and strata, by means of which it points to active rationality. Following the lines of a threefold articulation of phenomenological reflection in static, genetic and life-wordly levels, this paper aims to show that, together with this pointing to an implicit teleology, which calls for a continuity between life and reason, such analyses also unveil the necessary role played by the Body in this rootedness. Reason is rooted in life by means of Bodily experience, in virtue of the ‘bridging’ function of the Body as a material thing and as the stratified ‘organ’ of the Ego’s sensing and moving. Thus theoretical reason is related to the strata of sensibility and kinaesthesia, practical reason is related to the kinaesthetical and volitional strata, and axiological reason is related to the twofold strata of affection and feeling, which underlie and motivate valuation. This constitution takes on new forms in the transit from egology to intersubjectivity and to the full-fledged life-worldly experience, whereas rootedness can be further illustrated with the case of the Earth as basis-place for Bodily experience.

CONRAD-MARTIUS: BEING, ESSENCE, EXISTENCE. IN DISCUSSION WITH ARISTOTLE’S, AQUINAS’ AND HUSSERL’S ONTOLOGIES AND METAPHYSICS

The article deals with Conrad-Martius’ conception of being and existence and explores it by contrasting it with the conceptions of Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl within the framework of their respective ontologies and metaphysics. The article delves into the problems of both the hypostatization and the origin of being in particular. I claim that the hypostatization of being does not concern the Sachverhalt, as Jean Wahl claims, but the noema itself insofar as intentionality transcends what is constituted by consciousness and grasps the essence of the substance itself, whose existence is not absolutely but hypothetically posited. I will further show that even though Conrad-Martius rejects the transcendental reduction, she accepts the eidetic reduction and the positing of a sphere of original and given facts, which are not only absolutely given to consciousness, but also self-grounded and self-sustained. Conrad-Martius’ research traces the origin of these back to a transphysical realm, thus revealing the grounds for the Husserlian sphere of primal facts, which itself remains beyond the reach of phenomenological reflection. Hence Conrad-Martius’ and Husserl’s investigations encounter and complement each other at the point where the real bursts into reality and becomes available to consciousness. These reflections are organized as follows: The first part presents Conrad-Martius’ conception of a real-ontological phenomenology in order to examine her criticism of Husserl’s transcendental reduction. The second part deals with her real-ontological conception of the essence of reality or the “real-reality” and its hypothetically posed existence. The third part concerns the conceptions of being, analogia essendi and categorial being with recourse to Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl and sets these in relation to Conrad-Martius’ own conception. The fourth part deals with her own understanding of the analogia essendi and of real being in order to shed light on the claim concerning the hypostatization of being. The fifth part explores Husserl’s positing of a sphere of primal facticity, Conrad-Martius’ conception of a real entity and its origin in a transphysical realm. The article finally summarizes the main results of these reflections.