This chapter examines antistalking statutes in the United States and abroad. All state and the federal governments have adopted legal mechanisms to address stalking. These enactments attest to the growing awareness of stalking with its associated suffering and economic losses. The statutes are remarkable for both their innovation and their diversity, as different jurisdictions have chosen a wide variety of approaches. In the United States, this variety can be attributed in part to the division of law-making power inherent in federalism, as well as linked to the challenging nature of a problem whose characteristics and effects are just now coming into focus. International legal strategies also vary. In both U.S. and international statutes, criminal law is most often invoked, but civil remedies are increasing. The latter includes injunctions and protection orders, as well as civil rights of action, notice provisions, stalker surveillance, stalker registries, victim compensation, and mental health evaluations and treatment. The murder of the television actress Rebecca Schaeffer in 1989 drew a great deal of media attention to the problem of stalking; in 1990 California became the first state to adopt an antistalking law. The movement progressed rapidly: by 1996, all 50 state legislatures and the U.S. Congress had passed antistalking legislation. There is considerable variation in the existing antistalking laws. Academic commentators have raised questions concerning the constitutionality of these laws under the state and federal constitutions. Early concerns were that limiting a stalker’s contact with his victim might unreasonably intrude on the stalker’s First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly. Statutes were criticized as being vague and overbroad in limiting these rights (Faulkner & Hsiao, 1993). In general, however, state courts have not been receptive to such claims (see, e.g., Bouters v. State, 1995). For example, the Supreme Court of Montana upheld the constitutionality of that state’s antistalking statute against an argument that the law violated the defendant’s free speech rights, finding that the law was not unconstitutionally vague since certain undefined terms had an accepted common usage (State v. Martel, 1995).
The Censorship of Misogynistic Rap Music - A Consideration of Gender-Based Harms and Free Speech
