The Role of Payoff Inequality in the Formation of Coalitions to Provide a Public Good

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-130
Author(s):  
David M. McEvoy ◽  
John K. Stranlund
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-172
Author(s):  
Gabriele Schneider

Foundations, as permanent funds established by a certain legal act, can serve manifold purposes, but often pursue charitable goals. As such, they play an important role for the public good. Therefore, states always had an interest in fostering foundations by providing a pertinent legal framework. In Austria, this topic has not yet been the focus of scholarship. Through this study some light is shed on the implementation of the law on foundations in the Habsburg Monarchy. It focuses on the role of the state and its legal system regarding the regulation and supervision of foundations from 1750 to 1918. This period is characterized by the sovereigns’ endeavor to regulate the position of foundations via extensive legislation. In particular, a system of oversight for foundations was created in order to guarantee the attainment of their charitable goals. In fact, this system prevailed until the end of the 20thcentury.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 40-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrej Angelovski ◽  
Daniela Di Cagno ◽  
Werner Güth ◽  
Francesca Marazzi ◽  
Luca Panaccione

Significance With the advent of President Joe Biden's administration, the country's experience with COVID-19 is becoming part of a new debate over whether healthcare should be a public good and about the role of the company in society. Impacts Efforts to require vaccination as a condition of employment or of returning to workplaces will face legal challenges. The emergence of devices and apps for workers to report their emotional state to management will raise privacy concerns. Tech solutions, such as 'virtual commutes' for remote workers, will do little unless accompanied by effective support for employees. As remote working encourages employee relocation to cheaper locations, it will raise new issues around local pay inequalities. The Biden administration needs support from business to achieve its social justice, climate change and sustainability ambitions.


2011 ◽  
pp. 5-29
Author(s):  
Bruno Jossa

The aim of this article is to discuss some of the main advantages of an employeemanaged system: a labour productivity edge on capitalistic businesses, the suppression of external firm control, slower monopoly-building and softer competition, the eclipse of the paramount role of economics in social evolution and a reduced need for state intervention into the economy. The author's analysis sheds light on whether, and in what sense, economic democracy is a public good proper or just a "merit good". From the classification of cooperative as merit goods it follows that any government, regardless of political-economic orientation, should make it its task to support the growth of the democratic firm system by enforcing tax or credit benefits in its favour.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Otten ◽  
Vincent Buskens ◽  
Wojtek Przepiorka ◽  
Naomi Ellemers

Abstract Norms can promote human cooperation to provide public goods. Yet, the potential of norms to promote cooperation may be limited to homogeneous groups in which all members benefit equally from the public good. Individual heterogeneity in the benefits of public good provision is commonly conjectured to bring about normative disagreements that harm cooperation. However, the role of these normative disagreements remains unclear because they are rarely directly measured or manipulated. In a laboratory experiment, we first measure participants’ views on the appropriate way to contribute to a public good with heterogeneous returns. We then use this information to sort people into groups that either agree or disagree on these views, thereby manipulating group-level disagreement on normative views. Participants subsequently make several incentivized contribution decisions in a public goods game with peer punishment. We find that although there are considerable disagreements about individual contribution levels in heterogeneous groups, these disagreements do not impede cooperation. While cooperation is maintained because low contributors are punished, participants do not use punishment to impose their normative views on others. The contribution levels at which groups cooperate strongly relate to the average normative views of these groups.


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Pitts

The role of marketing communications is to advance the bottom line and the public good – and not necessarily in that order. Giving back is an integral part of the New Normal. And there has never been a better tool to accomplish this mission than social media.But healthcare marketing –and particularly of the regulated variety --is between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, marketers understand the importance and opportunity in social media. It’s where the people are. It’s where the action is. But then there are all those pesky regulatory concerns.As Walter O’Malley –the man who moved the Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles once commented, “The future is just one damn thing after another.”


Author(s):  
Mario Rodrigo Canazza

The Internet presents social and economic attributes of a global public good, requiring governments and multilateral organizations to play central roles in Internet governance. This article examines the Internet as a global public good, identifies the roles of governments and multilateral organizations in global Internet governance, describes the current status of multi-stakeholder governance, and proposes guidelines to improve international cooperation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amr Ismail Adly

Why do many States in transitional economies lack the regulative capacities to evenly distribute property rights among emerging private firms resulting in having public good devoured by particularistic interests? I argue that uneven distribution of property rights is deeply embedded within broader power relations permeating political regimes. This study attempts to develop the concept of politically-embedded cronyism where State incumbents generate and protract uneven distribution of property rights in favor of a few private actors as tactics of regime survival that go beyond the mere interest of self-enrichment as the capture thesis would argue. Politically-embedded cronyism is likely to emerge the more State incumbents retain their relative autonomy from their cronies through higher concentration of power in the executive, less role of societal groups in general and business in particular in the reproduction of the power of top incumbents and higher public asset retention in the post-liberalization period in addition to possessing channels of political incorporation to fledging business.


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