scholarly journals The Influence of The Power Structure on the Social Welfare Expenditures of the Local Governments

2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
김승연
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
The Social ◽  
Welfare Expenditures

scholarly journals Has Economic Competition Improved China’s Provincial Energy Ecological Efficiency under Fiscal Decentralization?

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Zhou ◽  
Teng Wang ◽  
Liang Yan ◽  
Xiong-Biao Xie
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Measure Data ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Ecological Efficiency ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
The Social

The study of environmental-oriented total factor energy efficiency considering pollutants as a non-expected output has attracted wide attention, but few studies have included social welfare into the above framework for analyzing China’s provincial energy ecological efficiency (EEE). In addition, China’s fiscal decentralization and economic competition have created tremendous momentum for economic growth; however, research has been lacking on whether they have improved China’s energy utilization, pollution control and social welfare level. To fill these gaps, by applying the 2000–2016 panel data from 30 provinces and considering the social welfare condition, we use the slacks-based measure data envelopment analysis (SBM-DEA) method to calculate EEE and build empirical model to test the relation between EEE, fiscal decentralization and economic competition. The results reveal that, firstly, in the last 16 years EEE has been getting worse and the situation of the middle and western areas of China are poorer than in the eastern area, with the middle area still deteriorating further. Secondly, economic competition among local governments aggravates the provincial EEE in China, while the high degree of fiscal decentralization in state governments significantly contributes to improve the EEE; and the co-impact of economic competition on EEE has been negatively strengthened against the background of fiscal decentralization. Thirdly, the influence of economic competition on EEE presents a regional difference; economic competition makes the degree of EEE go down in the east and middle regions, while by contrast, economic competition has helped the EEE level in western regions. The conclusions point out that the temporal trend of EEE in various regions of China, and the economic competition actions adopted by most Chinese local governments to enhance their own financial strength, have not improved energy efficiency and pollution control capability, and has reduced the social welfare of the region. Accordingly, policy proposals are that the Chinese government can adjust the fiscal and tax revenue system and preferential tax system of the central government and local governments and curb competition between provincial jurisdictions.

Centralization and decentralization of power structure: A theory of ruling risks and empirical evidence from Chinese history

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 506-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenghan Cao
Keyword(s):  
Qing Dynasty ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Provincial Government ◽  
Power Relationship ◽  
Chinese History ◽  
The Qing Dynasty ◽  
Han Ethnicity ◽  
The Social

In Chinese history, the power relationship between the central and local governments has undergone perennial and critical changes. These changes have given rise to three questions: First, why did some dynasties adopt feudalism at an early stage, merely to curtail the local authority in times of stability? Second, why did the Yuan and Ming dynasties employ a native chieftain system, while the Qing dynasty struggled to bureaucratise the native officers in ethnic minority areas? Third, why were the dynasties of Han ethnicity so hesitant to set up a provincial government while nomadic societies did not view this as a dilemma? Furthermore, why was the Qing dynasty, which was ethnically Han, able to break down these contradictions and create a stable provincial government and provincial state? This paper demonstrates that these changes may be explained by the propensity of the rulers to minimise the ruling risks and constraints that they encountered. Specifically, the ruler’s decision to centralise or decentralise power was constrained by certain challenges, such as fiscal and administrative costs, military technology limitations and political competition. These constraints impelled the ruling class to deviate from the system of prefectures and countries. Under these circumstances, the central government was forced to endure higher social risks and also the potential delegation of power. However, it would reduce the social and delegate risks provided that the constraints were loosened, which triggered the evolution of a power structure between the central and local governments. Another potential driving force behind the changes in the power structure was the dynamic between the social and agency risks. When these risks increased, the central government would readjust the centralisation and decentralisation of power at different government levels to control the rising risks.

scholarly journals Daycare as an entitlement and as a service in the social welfare system

Stanovnistvo ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordana Matkovic
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Welfare System ◽  
Daycare Center ◽  
Daycare Centers ◽  
Residential Services ◽  
Social Welfare System ◽  
The Social ◽  
Further Development

The social welfare reform recognizes the further development and expansion of daycare center services as an important precondition for deinstitutionalization as one of the key objectives of the reform. Decreasing the number of children and adults in residential institutions, their return to their natural families and preventing institutionalization depend primarily on the support provided at local level to the family for taking care of their family members. Today in Serbia there are 49 daycare centers with 1400 children and persons with disability as beneficiaries. Between 2000 and 2007, thirty seven new daycare centers were established, the total number of beneficiaries more than tripled and the NGO sector became equal with the government sector in service provision. Yet, daycare center services are still not sufficiently developed. In 123 municipalities there are no daycare center services at all and overall these services are significantly less accessible than residential services. Daycare center services consist of both well established and sustainable daycare with significant capacity and also of small, project-based daycare centers that provide services for a few hours and have an uncertain future. The second group consists mostly of daycare centers organized by the NGO sector. The monthly costs of daycare center services per beneficiary in 2007 amounted to 13.750 diners on average. According to the survey findings, for example, the annual costs for running a daycare center service for 20 beneficiaries are between 2 and 6 million dinars depending on the complexity of the provided services and programs. The costs of residential placement are on average higher than the costs in daycare centers. Further development of daycare center services in Serbia requires additional and focused efforts at central level in terms of formulating special financial incentives for underdeveloped municipalities, developing professional capacity at local level, educating local governments, conceptualizing and establishing regulatory mechanisms, exchanging good practice examples, etc. Still, placing non-residential services at the heart of the social welfare system can be expected only after undertaking more profound legislative changes. .

First Meeting of the PIDE Committee on Devolution Reforms in Pakistan

2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-161
Author(s):  
Durre-e- Nayab
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Health Education ◽  
Service Delivery ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Human Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Public Services ◽  
Municipal Services ◽  
Fiscal Decentralisation ◽  
National Reconstruction

The Local Government Ordinance (LGO), formulated by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) in 2000 and promulgated by provincial governments in August 2001, assigns powers, responsibilities, and service delivery functions to three levels of local governments: district, tehsil, and union. Responsibilities for the delivery of social and human development services, such as primary and basic health, education and social welfare, are delegated to the district level, whereas municipal services, such as water, sanitation and urban services are assigned to the tehsil level. The LGO does not only deal with the delivery of public services in its plan but also stresses the need for fiscal decentralisation, claiming that “Fiscal decentralisation is the heart of any devolution exercise. Without fiscal decentralisation no authority is devolved.”

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