Sexuality and sexual health of the population with disabilities, with special reference to people with visual impairments

Sexuality represents one of the basic dimensions of human existence, which is channelled through sexual and gender identification and role, sexual orientation, eroticism, emotional commitment, satisfaction, and reproduction. Sexuality is also linked to many significant health problems, especially in the area of reproductive and sexual health. Sexual health is the condition of physical, emotional, mental, and social wellbeing that is linked with sexuality. Knowledge about sexual health, contraception and selection of contraceptives, and the risk of sexually transmittable diseases is not only relevant for individuals? sexuality; it?s also important for encouraging the use of health services and other forms of support that are necessary to protect youth from sexually transmittable diseases and the maintenance of sexual and re-productive health. When it comes to sexuality and care of reproductive and sexual health, some groups are especially vulnerable. Bearing in mind the specific conditions women with disabilities grow up in and their dependence on assistance and support from other people, satisfying their needs for partnership, sexuality, and parenthood becomes unattainable for many, or it takes place under the control of professionals or family members. In this context, people with visual impairments are part of a vulnerable group, acknowledging that visual impairment leads to limitations in everyday life, autonomy, and quality of life to its full potential. The purpose of this article is to describe the phenomena of sexuality and sexual health among people with visual impairments, and to point out the existing international and national normative frameworks relevant to the sexual health of people with disabilities. Existing legislative acts acknowledge the right to a normal sexual life, as well as to the care and maintenance of the sexual health of people with disabilities. However, there are many obstacles and limitations that hamper the practical application of these rights: health issues, communication problems, lack of privacy, people?s acceptance of the inhibition of their own sexuality, or their acceptance of the labelling and normalisation of their situation. Even considering the existence of the regulation, the system of support for maintaining and improving the sexual and reproductive health of women with disabilities is not developed enough. The lack of literature relating to this topic shows that its importance is not recognised enough among the relevant actors, including organisations that advocate for people with disabilities. Realising the existing general legal framework requires the will of policymakers, who could enact and implement specific bylaw regulations, as well as activating the societal actors relevant to this field.

Impact of COVID-19 on mortality in Croatia

The main goal of this paper is to assess the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on mortality in Croatia. We estimate two effects of the pandemic on mortality: (1) excess mortality during 2020 and (2) the age- and cause-specific components of life expectancy decline in 2020. We calculate excess mortality in 2020 as the difference between the registered number of deaths in 2020 and the expected number of deaths from a Poisson regression model based on weekly death counts and population exposures by age and sex from 2016 to 2019. Using decomposition techniques, we estimate age- and cause-specific components (distinguishing COVID-19-related deaths from deaths from other causes) of life expectancy decline in 2020. Our results show that excess mortality in 2020 almost entirely results from the second, autumn-winter wave of the epidemic in Croatia. Expectedly, we find the highest excess in deaths in older age groups. In Croatia, life expectancy in 2020 fell by almost eight months for men and about seven months for women. This decline is mostly attributable to COVID-19-related mortality in older ages, especially among men.

The older population and the COVID-19 pandemic: The case of Croatia

The probability of older people contracting COVID-19 is high, and the disease in this population is in a significant percentage of cases accompanied by severe symptoms that can be fatal. Unlike numerous European countries, Croatia introduced epidemiological measures during the first and second waves of the disease that were no more rigorous for the elderly living in their own homes than those for the general population. However, the urge to stay at home and maintain physical distancing has significantly altered the daily lives of all senior citizens. At the same time, very strict measures were introduced for older residents living in nursing homes during both waves. This paper aims to analyse the differences between the lifestyles of the elderly living in their own homes and those accommodated in nursing homes in the context of the epidemiological measures implemented, and to analyse the dominant narrative about the elderly during the COVID-19 pandemic in Croatia. News stories focusing on the elderly exclusively in terms of care, (in)security, and illness(es) construct a position that further excludes, isolates, and intimidates them. In doing so, most attention is paid to problems within social and health institutions (nursing homes and hospitals), while the elderly living in their own homes are largely marginalised.

The experiences and expectations of returnees to Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic

This article discusses the experiences of Serbian citizens who came back to their country of origin just before or at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the introduction of the state of emergency. We analysed their motives to return and their experiences during self-isolation. We also highlighted the problems they encountered at the beginning of the pandemic and the impact they had expected the pandemic would have on their social and economic status. The paper covers their plans for mobility after the end of pandemic, as well as potential motives for staying in Serbia. The aim is to show that even though a large number of citizens came back to Serbia when the crisis broke out and could not have predicted what would happen to their social and economic status in their destination countries, they still did not intend to stay in Serbia after the end of the pandemic. The whole social system in Serbia would need to be changed for them to decide to stay. Discussion of the results is based on data collected at the beginning of pandemic by researchers from the Institute of Sociological Research, one of whom was the author of this paper. Due to the health risks related to the coronavirus, we used a quantitative method: a questionnaire distributed online via the Google platform. As such, the respondents were mostly young and educated people who took part in the research because they used the internet on a daily basis and were able to fill in the survey easily. For this reason, the results presented in this article cannot be generalised to represent the whole population, but only the respondents of this research. The findings are placed within a contextual framework in which the world?s population is extremely mobile. We recognised a similarly high level of mobility among Serbian citizens, too. The COVID-19 pandemic has affected many different aspects of life, and so a large share of respondents decided to come back to their home country. This was a normal coping strategy, especially for those migrants who did not have officially recognised status in their destination country. Returnees faced many problems when they returned to their home country; they had to self-isolate and did not know what would happen with their jobs once the pandemic was over. They also didn?t know if they would receive an income or what would happen with the social system, either in their home country or in their country of emigration. Analysis of the data revealed that despite their expectations of an economic crisis following the drastic measures introduced to suppress the spread of the coronavirus, a large share of respondents believed that the crisis wouldn?t have an impact on their material and social status in their destination country. Because of that, we noted that most respondents wished to go back to their destination country after the crisis was over. However, it?s suggested that if we want them to stay in Serbia, then the state should introduce measures that include both economic and social reforms.

Childlessness among women of reproductive age in Serbia from a demographic perspective

The social, economic, and cultural changes that have taken place in Europe in the past few decades in the field of fertility have been accompanied by an increase in permanent childlessness. The childlessness level among women born in 1968 is 12% in Serbia, slightly below the European average (14%). The aim of this paper is to explore in more detail the level of childlessness in Serbia and the characteristics of women aged 15-49 without live births. Changes in childlessness over a 60-year period (1961-2020) by five-year age groups were analysed. The basic characteristics of childless women of reproductive age by education, marital status, and age were observed from 1991 to 2011. The paper is based on census and vital statistics data. The authors introduce two new indicators of childlessness: the general childlessness rate (GChR) as the share of women without live births in the total female population aged 15-49, and the age-specific childlessness rate (ASChR) as the percentage of childless women by age. Changes in cumulative fertility rates by age were less influenced by the reproductive behaviour of mothers and much more by an increase in the proportion of childless women. The general childlessness rate until 1991 was relatively stable in Serbia. Since then, it has increased intensely (from 30.1% in 1991 to 41.6% in 2011, and 43.4% in 2020). The increase in childlessness is largely a consequence of the postponement of first births, but also of the increase in permanent childlessness among women aged 45-49. The postponement of first births has occured in all age groups and the ASChR has increased across the board. In Serbia, in 2020, the ASChR reached record values for all five-year age groups (36.5% for women aged 30-34, 21.4% for ages 35-39), as did the level of permanent childlessness (13.8% for ages 45-49). The paper also analyses childlessness by education and marital status. According to census data (1991, 2002, and 2011), the general childlessness rate is lowest among women without any formal education and those who haven?t completed primary school, and highest among women with a primary education. Childlessness rates are particularly high among women in their thirties and forties. The influence of marital status on the level of childlessness was also confirmed. The GChR of single women was at least 10 times higher than the value for ever married women. The GChR ranged from 96% to 89% for single women and invariably slightly above 8% for ever married women. The results of direct standardization showed the greater importance of the changes that occurred between 1991 and 2011 by education and marital status of women aged 15-49 on the childlessness level, as well as their completely opposite effects compared to those caused by the change in the age structure. The large impact of changes in marital structure also indicates the possibility of a certain influence on reducing childlessness in Serbia. As the decreasein marriage is not accompanied by a higher prevalence of stable extramarital unions, it?s possible that the creation of more favourable circumstances for an independent life for young people and for forming a union could contribute to reducing the postponement of childbearing, and thus reducing childlessness during and at the end of the reproductive age. This is especially important considering that family and children are highly valued in Serbia. It should be noted that the high and growing shares of women without children in the 30-34 and 35-39 age groups limit the possibilities of reducing permanent childlessness, particularly in the near future.

Does population ageing impact inflation?

Modern society is characterised by clear and distinct demographic processes, such as the constant decline in the number of children born and the ageing population in developed countries, resulting from complex biological, economic, social, political, and other factors. Demographic changes observed through population ageing have an impact on the economy and inflation. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine the impact of population ageing on inflation in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries. The paper?s authors used data from 1970 to 2016. The ARDL approach was used to test the long- and short-term relationship between population ageing and inflation. The results showed a positive relationship between population ageing and inflation in the long term and a negative relationship in the short term. The ageing population decreases inflation in the short term and increases inflation in the long term.

Net international migration: A panel analysis of economic determinants

Various factors can motivate and encourage individuals to leave their country of origin and engage in the process of international migration. Large migration flows over the past few years, which are a consequence of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, have resulted in a significant increase in academic interest in international migration. Although many factors can encourage international migration, people?s desire to increase their standard of living is undoubtedly one of the most important causes. This empirical study analyses the economic determinants of net international migration. It was conducted using techniques of econometric analysis of panel data on an extensive balanced panel data sample covering 136 countries over a period of 30 years (1990-2019). Although this study focuses on the analysis of the economic determinants of net international migration, it is necessary to point out that in this case it is not a one-way impact. Apart from the fact that economic indicators affect international migration, it is indisputable that there is an effect in the opposite direction, i.e. that migration flows significantly affect the economic performance of the origin and destination country. This influence can be realised through different mechanisms. The potential presence of reverse causality generates a problem of potentially endogenous regressors, which must be considered when selecting model estimation techniques. The estimation of the models was performed using the following two techniques that allow cross-section dependence: (i) standard common correlated effects pooled estimator (CCEP), which is based on the application of the ordinary least squares method; and (ii) modified common correlated effects pooled estimator, which is based on the application of the two-stage least squares method, allowing the presence of endogenous regressors. The obtained findings suggest that the impact of the unemployment rate on net international migration is negative. Estimates generated by the standard CCEP technique (as well as by the modified CCEP technique) show that an increase in the unemployment rate of 1% results in a decrease in net international migration by about 0.03 migrants (0.06 migrants) per 1,000 inhabitants. Education has a positive impact on net international migration. The standard CCEP technique (modified CCEP technique) points to the fact that a 1% increase in education results in an increase in net international migration of about 0.01-0.02 migrants (0.003 migrants) per 1,000 inhabitants. The level of development of the migrant network has a positive effect on net international migration. The standard and modified CCEP technique show that increasing the stock of migrants by 1% increases net international migration by about 0.04-0.05 migrants, i.e. by about 0.01 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants. Finally, estimates obtained using the standard CCEP technique suggest that a 1% increase in per capita gross domestic product (GDPpc) results in an increase in net international migration of about 0.01 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants, while the results of the modified and more credible CCEP technique show that growth in GDPpc by 1% implies a decrease in net international migration by about 0.02 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants. The negative effect of GDPpc could be rationalised by the existence of an inverted-U relationship between GDPpc and emigration (mobility transition curve). Acceptance of such an explanation requires that the following conditions be met: (i) there is an inverted-U relationship between emigration and GDPpc; (ii) the countries in the sample fit within the growing part of this relationship; and (iii) when GDPpc grows, emigration increases absolutely more than immigration.

Understanding the gender dimension of low fertility: Employment and childbearing in Europe

In this text, the gender dimension of low fertility is considered on the basis of the relevant literature and statistical data regarding the impact of employment on reproductive behaviour in postmodern societies. A review of fertility rates and employment rates of women with young children from 2010 onwards leads to several interesting observations. For example, during the period of study, the birth rate in Hungary increased, while it decreased in Finland by 0.4 children per woman. The most stable and relatively high fertility rates are observed in France and Sweden. At the same time, the employment rate of women with children aged three to five grew in Hungary, but the employment rate of those with children under the age of three was extremely low. In countries with higher fertility, the lowest employment rates for women with children under the age of three are in Finland and France, but they are about four times higher than the rate in Hungary. During the observed period, the employment of mothers remained stable at a relatively high level in Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, without differences in female employment according to the age of their children. The fertility rates in these countries are relatively high. The results of empirical research in European countries suggest that the gender dimension of low fertility cannot be understood outside the specific social context, nor without considering the conditions at the micro level. Central to this consideration is the link between low fertility and women?s employment, as raising children is still gender-specific to an extent. However, men can participate in parenthood not only in terms of their reproductive behaviour, but also their right to participate in raising children. In addition, this text identifies negative perceptions of employment that refer to the modalities of worklife balance and the uncertainty regarding female and male employment. Both aspects produce certain effects on the socioeconomic position of the family, which can influence decisions relating to parenthood and the number of children the parents would like to have. In terms of taking action on low birth rates, it could be concluded that endangering families? economic status and reproducing patriarchal gender regimes are not favourable outcomes. This article provides a framework for more concrete research into these issues in Serbian society.

COVID-19 and excess mortality: Was it possible to lower the number of deaths in Slovenia?

This paper presents new data on the age structure of hospitalised SARI (severe acute respiratory infection) patients, with or without COVID-19, broken down by gender, place of infection, and region. The leading hypothesis that COVID-19 deaths are overestimated despite the high share of excess deaths was confirmed, bringing to light the important issue of the demographic breakdown of the population at risk. Thus, the main reason for the decreasing number of COVID-19 deaths is to be sought within the exhausted demographic pool of the elderly population in 2020, when the mortality rate was 19% higher compared to the previous five-year period (2015-2019). Demographic disparities across regions are immense and statistically explain the differences in the ?infected versus deceased? ratio. The excess mortality in 2020 was unusually high, but the projected value for 2020 based on the mortality pattern across age groups from 2015 to 2019 contributed up to one-third of the surplus. So, for one-quarter of alleged COVID-19 deaths (roughly 600 out of some 3,300 in 2020), death was expected to take place in 2020 anyway.

Excess mortality in Europe and Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020

The 2020 pandemic came at a huge demographic cost, particularly regarding the increase in mortality. In this paper we examine excess deaths in Serbia and 34 other European countries in 2020. Methodological inconsistencies and big differences in how COVID-19 deaths were recorded across different countries make it difficult to make any cross-country comparisons, even with the scope limited only to Europe. Since the number of total deaths is a methodologically solid indicator, we looked at the differences between the total number of deaths in 2020 and compared that to deaths in 2019. The lowest increase in mortality - below 5% - occurred in countries in the north of Europe (Norway, Denmark, Finland, Latvia), while the highest increase - over 18% - was recorded in the southern and central parts of the continent (Albania, Northern Macedonia, Spain, Belgium, Poland, Slovenia, Russia). There is no clear geographical regularity. In 2020, Serbia had 12.6% more deaths compared to 2019, which was close to the European average. Within Serbia, statistical differences between regions were not large. Measuring the contribution of COVID-19 deaths to excess mortality is much more problematic. The excess death ratio is more helpful for understanding methodological and data-gathering issues than finding evidence about composition and divergence in mortality. According to this indicator (based on preliminary data), only 25% of excess deaths in Serbia in 2020 were caused by COVID-19, while the European average was 54%. However, in many (primarily Eastern European) countries in 2020, the indirect consequences of COVID-19 on the health of the population were more significant than the direct ones. It is precisely the ratio of COVID-19 diagnoses that led to death in total mortality that shows this. The final results may confirm this statement or indicate potential data manipulation. While this paper focuses only on the year 2020, as of Q1 of 2021, the pandemic is not nearing its end. Based on preliminary data published daily, Serbia had more COVID-19 deaths in the first four months of 2021 than for the whole of 2020. This indicates that the consequences of the pandemic for Serbia will be dire in 2021, regardless of the course the pandemic takes.