scholarly journals The public good game on graphs: can the pro-social behavior persist?

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto da Silva
Author(s):  
Ann-Kathrin Koessler ◽  
Lionel Page ◽  
Uwe Dulleck

AbstractCommunication is a well-known tool to promote cooperation and pro-social behavior. In this study, we examine whether minimal communication in form of public consent with a pre-defined cooperation statement is sufficient to strengthen cooperation in groups. Within the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment, we identify ways by which non-enforceable cooperation statements are associated with higher levels of cooperation in a public good setting. At first, the statement triggers selection; socially oriented individuals are more likely to make the cooperation statement. In addition, we can show that a behavioral change takes place once the statement is made. This change can be attributed to commitment arising from the pledge and to increased coordination between the interaction partners. Depending on the institutional context, these drivers can vary in strength. Comparing compulsory and voluntary cooperation statements, we find that both are effective in motivating higher contributions to the public good.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
David Jimenez-Gomez

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gurdip Uppal ◽  
Dervis Can Vural

AbstractIt is advantageous for microbes to form social aggregates when they commonly benefit from secreting a public good. However, cooperating microbial groups can be evolutionarily unstable, since a cheating strain that does not secrete the public good can reproduce quicker and take over. Here we study the effects of fluid advection patterns on group reproduction as a mechanism to enable or enhance social behavior in microbial populations. We use a realistic advection-diffusion-reaction model to describe microbial growth and mutation in a flow environment. Social groups arise naturally from our model as self-reproducing Turing patterns that can avoid mutant takeovers at steady state. Our central finding is that flow shear enables and promotes social behavior in microbes by limiting the spread of cheating strains. Regions of the flow domain with higher shear admits high cooperativity and large population density, whereas low shear regions are devoid of life due to opportunistic mutations.


Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Danese ◽  
Luigi Mittone

Many anthropological records exist of seemingly worthless tokens exchanged in traditional societies. The most famous instances of such tokens are probably the Kula necklaces and armbands first described by B. Malinowski. In our experiment, each participant can send a token to another participant before each round of a repeated public good game. We use as examples of tokens a bracelet built by the participants in the lab, a simple piece of cardboard provided by the experimenter, and an object brought from home by the participants. Notwithstanding the cheap-talk nature of the decision to send the token, both sending and receiving the token are associated with a significant increase in contributions to the public good. Regression analysis shows that contributions to the public good in the treatments featuring a bracelet and a cardboard piece are higher than in a control study. The home object appears not to have been equally useful in increasing contributions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-352
Author(s):  
Mauricio Salgado ◽  
Alejandra Vásquez ◽  
Alejandra Yáñez

Moral decisions – that is, decisions that consider the consequences for the welfare of others – can be highly inconsistent across contexts. Here, we explore whether the altruism of young people is related to their willingness to cooperate with others, even in groups comprising non-reciprocating peers. Using the distinction between normative and cognitive expectations, we address this topic conducting several lab-in-the-field experiments with high-school students who played the dictator and linear public good games. We found that the altruism of young people in the dictator game and cooperation in the public good game were related, but only in the first rounds of the public good game. This indicates that young people orient their prosocial behaviour based on cognitive expectations, that is, they consider the information they receive regarding the free riding behaviour of peers and adapt their own. Nonetheless, young people who demonstrated high altruism tended to cooperate unconditionally, regardless of whether they belonged to a cooperative or uncooperative group, and despite disappointments. Finally, self-regarding young people were less likely to defect among cooperative peers. Therefore, group characteristics provide the boundary conditions for the consistency of the prosocial behaviour of young people. Some conceptual and policy implications are discussed.


2013 ◽  
pp. 24-48
Author(s):  
S. Bowles ◽  
S. Polanía-Reyes

Explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other pro-social behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted among entirely self-interested individuals. This may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals’ altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social preferences. The opposite also occurs—crowding in — though it appears less commonly.


2018 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Archit Vinod Tapar ◽  
Abhishek Mishra ◽  
Ashish Sadh ◽  
Aditya Billore

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the effect of anthropomorphic entities in the public service advertisements (PSA) on individuals’ pro-social behavior. In addition, the role of individuals’ need for affect and self-construal in moderating the effect of anthropomorphism toward pro-social behavior is explored.Design/methodology/approachAn experimental research design is executed to identify the causal relationship between anthropomorphic representations in the advertisements and pro-social behavior.FindingsThe findings suggest that anthropomorphism in PSA is helpful in increasing compliance behavior amongst individuals. Besides, an individual’s need for affect was found to positively moderate pro-social behavior.Research/limitations implicationsThe authors extend the existing literature on the usage of anthropomorphism in social causes. The authors also explore the role of one of the intrinsic motivations, need for affect, in pro-social behavior.Social implicationsThe study demonstrates how best one could use anthropomorphization in PSA by sensitizing individuals to social causes and compliance behavior.Originality/valueThe study builds upon the existing research on anthropomorphization, need for affect and pro-social behavior in increasing compliance with PSA.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-323
Author(s):  
Julian Krause

This paper presents a model and experimental results of a public good game to explore the effects of fiscal transparency on the provision of a public good. Two types of fiscal transparency are explored. The first is the transparency of the decision-making process and the second is the transparency of government spending. To answer this question a model for the public good “city district quality” with heterogeneous agents is set up and the design and the results of the experiment are presented.


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