Polish Armed Forces in the military operations of the European Union

Res Politicae ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 117-136
Author(s):  
Adrian Chrzuszcz
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-167
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Olender

The article includes an analysis of the peace mission in Lebanon with the participation of the Polish Military Contingent. The organizational structure of the military health service securing our soldiers in that mission was also presented, bearing in mind the initial intended use of Polish units in this mission. The article is looking for an answer to the question about the importance of participation in peacekeeping missions of the Polish Armed Forces. It is also a description of the first mission in Lebanon, with a view to the re-participation of Polish troops in the mission at the end of 2019. Poland is considered a responsible member of NATO and the European Union.


We will conclude the year 2017 by dealing with the security forces of the future. The future is difficult to predict, guess or anticipate, however, some individuals, institutions and corporations are investing efforts in this. Yuval Noah Harari published a book on future, titled Homo Deus - A Brief History of Tomorrow. In this book, he foresees that in the future, we will primarily fight against death. This should be the main guideline for the development of future generations. The fundamental guideline for the development in the field of security forces is not exactly a topic to fill the headlines of daily newspapers, let alone is this a topic that would make bestsellers on publishers’ book shelves. It is, however, a topic that has been forever present in the fields dealing with the provision of security. Consequently, in December, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was established within the framework of the European Union with the aim to contribute to better cooperation of EU Member States in training, capacity development and operational readiness within the framework of defence. This was a reaction to the security situation in Europe, taking into account our immediate and remote neighbourhoods, which has been discussed by many authors in the previous issues of Contemporary Military Challenges. It may be too early to determine the role of Slovenia in PESCO. Nevertheless, it is imperative that we commit ourselves to this topic seriously and responsibly. Not only to this topic, however. We must seriously begin to discuss Slovenia's security future. Few years ago, we were surprised by the floods; in 2014 we were surprised by glaze ice and in 2015, by the European migrant crisis. What have we learned from these experiences? How many panels and other discussions have been organised on these topics, how many proceedings have been published, how many articles have been written? How many changes have we made in the national security system and how well prepared are we for new challenges? When we were preparing to join the European Union and NATO, we organized ourselves systematically, prepared a media campaign, and enjoyed the political support and substantial public support to achieve the goal. What has happened in this country that we no longer devote a pragmatic level of attention to personal and collective security? A lot has happened. Much has been written and said about this, but still... The fact is that our opinions, views and ideas in the field of security and defence differ, which is alright. In the Editorial Committee of Contemporary Military Challenges, we decided to dedicate this issue to security forces of the future with an emphasis on Slovenia. Taking into account the geographical location of Slovenia, Viktor Potočnik focused on the Anti-armour combat in the Slovenian Armed Forces, providing an answer to the question of what and how much equipment Slovenia needs in this field in order to functionally provide for its security. In his article entitled Contributions to the analysis of challenges, future development and scope of armed forces in Slovenia, Alojz Šteiner writes that although Slovenia is in the midst of the processes concerning design, programming and normative regulation of the defence and military system, he believes that a re-analysis or an interim analysis is necessary. He draws attention to the need for a reflection on open issues and adds his opinion on what these challenges are. In his article Military strategic reserve and the transformation of modern armed forces Vinko Vegič discusses the need for a thorough assessment of the military concept of the military strategic reserve. According to the author, the concept of a military strategic reserve is not consistent with the transformation of modern armed forces, its feasibility, and the wider social concept. Miha Šlebir responded to the articles by Kotnik, Potočnik and Žurga published in the last issue of 2016. In his article entitled Guns vs. butter? Comparative analysis of Slovenia’s defence expenditure explains the trend of financing and allocation according to areas within the armed forces of EU member states and what this can mean for Slovenia and its armed forces. Roman Faganel and Dragomir Čevriz indirectly reacted to the article by Tom Young published in the last issue of 2016. Analytical approach to resource planning and decision making in the defence system is the title of an article that brings theoretical starting points with a quantitative analysis of the case. Reliability of individuals in the operation of a modern state critical infrastructure is the article by Brane Bertoncelj, who presents the framework of the model of influence an individual's reliability has on the functioning of the critical infrastructure of a modern state. It notes that the reliability of an individual in unusual circumstances is most dependent on the level of their motivation, competence and affiliation to the organization. We expect to incur interest for a debate on the subject of security forces of the future, which includes numerous topics and at the same time motivate some of you to write articles on topical issues in the field of security, defence and warfare to be published in 2018 editions of Contemporary military challenges.


2020 ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
Andrei Manoilo

This article is devoted to the basic principles, stages and features of the formation of a new type of armed forces in the European Union – the pan-European army of the EU. It is noted that over the entire period of its existence, the European Union has not been able to form its own army, although attempts to implement this project have been made repeatedly – in 1999, 2003, 2004, and possibly in 2018 (in connection with the implementation of the EU program of ongoing structured cooperation PESCO). Initially, the European army was supposed to be equipped with units of all combat arms (from aviation to naval ships); its number at the initial stage should have been at least 50–60 thousands military personnel (then it was planned to increase its number to one hundred and even one hundred and fifty thousand people). However, to date, all that the EU has to intervene in armed conflicts is the multinational EU rapid reaction force, consisting of several battalion tactical groups of 1,500 persons each. These forces showed themselves quite well during the EU military operations in the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa (Somalia, Mali, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Central African Republic), but they are clearly not in the full-fledged army of the European Union or even its core pulling. To compensate for these shortcomings, the PESCO program was launched in March 2018, but after two years of its implementation, the results of this program are rather modest. A good effect was achieved only in the field of «military mobility» (logistics); but on the fulfillment of a number of «obligations» of the countries participating in this program, the European Council does not even have rough information (countries refuse to give it).


2003 ◽  
Vol 55 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dejan Gajic

After the end of World War II leaders of the West European countries had realised the necessity to create new security frameworks, thus making the security of the continent the concern of the Europeans themselves. However, immediately after it had been formed the North Atlantic Alliance, as a trans-Atlantic defence shield against the danger from the "communist East", became the central security component in Europe. Just after the end of the Cold War and disappearance of the "danger from the East" the European leaders initiated the process of creation of the new European defence system. The system would be designed in such a way not to jeopardise the position of the NATO, improving at the same time the security and stability in the continent. In the first part of the article the author considers the course of European integration in the second half of the last century that proceeded through creation of institutions preceding the establishment of the European Union. During the period of creation of this specific form of action performed by the European states at the internal and international levels, the deficiency of integration in the military field was notable. In that regard, the author stresses the role of the Western European Union as an alliance for collective defence of West European countries. The second part of the paper discusses the shaping of the EU security component through the provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which are included in the EU agreements. The Maastricht Treaty defined the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an instrument to reach agreement by member states in the defence field. The Amsterdam Treaty confirmed the role of this mechanism expanding the authorities resulting from it. The Treaty of Nice supplements the existing mechanism by a new military and political structure that should help implement the decisions made by the European Union institutions in the military field. In the third part of the article, the author presents the facts concerning the establishment and internal organisation of the Eurocorps. The creation of this military formation took place in early 1990s and was initiated by the two states of "the old Europe" - Germany and France. The authors also emphasises that the establishment of this formation is the first step towards creation of the armed forces in Europe. The fourth part of the paper treats the Rapid Reaction Force that was established by the Helsinki Agreement (1999). It became operative in early 2003 and its basic aim is to prevent the outbreak of crises in the region and to improve stability in Europe. In spite of the opinions that the establishment of such a force is the skeleton for creation of the European armed forces, the author thinks that, at least in the near future, they will not be a rival to the NATO. In his opinion, their possible military missions will be carried out only when the alliance takes no interest in being engaged in them.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-83
Author(s):  
Serhiy Orel ◽  
◽  
Vadim Durach ◽  
Bohdan Sjoma ◽  
◽  
...  

Military impact on the environment can be defined as two components: 1) impact on the environment in time of daily activities during the training of troops and 2) impact on the environment during the combat operation. In the Armed Forces of Ukraine, to some extent, environmental security measures are implemented only during daily operations in peacetime. As for taking into account the impact of fighting on the environment in time of planning combat operations, this issue is usually not even raised in their preparation. On the other hand, NATO member states understand that military operations can be inherently destructive to human health and the environment. Therefore, this study was conducted to determine the educational requirements for commanders, especially for officers who provide environmental protection in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, based on NATO regulations and the experience of Allies. The article considers how environmental issues are integrated into the military operation at each stage: planning, pre-deployment, deployment (execution and force rotation), redeployment, and post-deployment. The main tasks of environmental officers at each stage of the operation are defined. Based on the tasks solved by officers, the requirements for their education are formed, the subjects studied by US environmental officers are considered.


Author(s):  
Necati Polat

This chapter provides an outline of the change that took place in Turkey between 2007 and 2011, signalling a historic shift in the use of power in the country, long controlled by a staunch and virtually autonomous bureaucracy, both military and civilian, and known as ‘the state’, in the face of the chronically fragile democratic politics, forming ‘the government’. The time-honoured identity politics of the very bureaucracy, centred on ‘Westernisation’ as a policy incentive, was deftly appropriated by the ruling AKP via newly tightened links with the European Union to transform the settled centre-periphery relations often considered to be pivotal to Turkish politics, and reconfigure access to power. The chapter details the gradual fall of the bureaucracy—that is, the military, the higher education, and the system of high courts—and recounts the basic developments in foreign policy and on the domestic scene during and immediately after the change.


Turkey ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Finkel

What sort of political system does Turkey have? In order to even begin membership negotiations with the European Union, Turkey, like other candidates, had to demonstrate that its economy was capable of integrating with the free markets of the member states and that its...


Author(s):  
Fabrizio Coticchia

Public attitudes are greatly shaped by the cohesiveness of the strategic narratives crafted by policy-makers in framing the national involvement in war. The literature has recently devoted growing attention toward the features that define successful strategic narratives, such as a consistent set of objectives, convincing cause–effect chains, as well as credible promises of success. This paper provides an original framework for ‘effective strategic narratives’ for the case of Italy. The military operations undertaken by Italian armed forces in Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya represent the cases through which the framework is assessed. Drawing on content and discourse analysis of political debates and data provided by public opinion surveys, this paper explores the nature of the strategic narratives and their effectiveness.


In this issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, we focus on the relations between the European Union and NATO in the field of security. On 1 June 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels to discuss the details of the NATO Summit to be held on 14 June 2021 in Brussels, Belgium; the period, which coincides with the publication of this thematic issue. Twenty foreign ministers represented NATO member states, which are also EU members, making an event such as the NATO summit all the more important for the future of European security. Many topics were mentioned at the ministerial, such as Afghanistan, Belarus, Russia and China. In general, however, the emphasis was put on the fact that NATO should adapt to new challenges, security settings in a highly competitive environment. As mentioned by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, we are presented with a number of challenges to our security that we need to tackle together, because no country and no continent can deal with them alone. This includes strengthening the existing partnerships and building new ones, including in the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. The participants also discussed the stepping up of training and capability building for partners, as well as work to address the security impact of climate change. In the conclusion, the ministers broadly agreed that it was important to start work on NATO's next Strategic Concept, because our strategic environment has significantly changed since 2010. Secretary General underlined that NATO’s future adaptation would require Allies to continue investing in defence, and to invest more together, as a force multiplier and a strong message of unity and resolve. During Donald Trump’s mandate as President of the United States, the fact that the European Union or its Member States pay too little attention and thus resources for their own defence has often been a hot topic of political debate. In 2016, a year before the US President Trump took office, the European Union adopted a Global Strategy which envisaged several options to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy, which we will discuss in further detail in the next issue of the Contemporary Security Challenges. The Global Strategy provided that the European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and other existing and new mechanisms would operate in such a way that activities, resources and capabilities would not duplicate with NATO’s, but would complement each other. True enough that, within the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union has already foreseen many activities at its meetings and in the adopted documents in terms of strengthening this policy, but later implemented little. Has anything changed in this area in the past four years, or will perhaps something change at the time of the conference on the European future? Just as the Alliance is planning a new strategic concept, the European Union is announcing a Strategic Compass, which will set new directions for future cooperation, also in the field of security. In this issue, the authors present how the cooperation between the European Union and NATO is taking place in 2021 in some areas of security. The article titled EU-NATO cooperation and the Slovenian presidency of the Council of the European Union by Marko Mahnič presents an interesting thesis on whether obstacles to the coherent functioning of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the field of common security and defence are of a purely technical nature, or are there maybe differences in the policies, bilateral relations and national ambitions of certain countries. Damjan Štrucl writes about the EU-NATO partnership and ensuring information security and cybersecurity: theory and practice. According to him, the development of information and communication technology and new challenges of the modern security environment have led to the signing of the Joint Declaration on deepening the strategic partnership between both organizations in 2016. The author provides an analysis of the EU-NATO strategic partnership in ensuring security and defence in the modern security environment. Defence initiatives to strengthen the security of the European Union motivated Gregor Garb to write an article presenting what the 2016 European Union Global Strategy contributed to the EU’s strategic defence autonomy. Initially, in a theoretical sense, and after five years in a practical sense. All of course, given the fact that the European Union will continue to maintain strong relations and cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. David Humar and Nina Raduha present the process of creating the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in the Slovenian Armed Forces. Changes in the international environment have initiated security-related strategic considerations of NATO and the European Union. Slovenia as a member of both organizations also needs a strategic consideration in both military and security fields. Their article provides more details about the The process of devising the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia. Tackling irregular migration in Europe is a topic addressed by Miklós Böröcz. Ever since 2015, the then mass illegal migration has posed a major problem for Europe and the European Union. The mass refugee crisis has gradually transformed into illegal migrations of individuals and small groups, who have maintained and strengthened contact with everybody along the way, who take part in this and ensure that the migration flow with of illegal character does not subside. The author provides some solutions to this problem.


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