scholarly journals What Optimistic Responses to Deep Disagreement get Right (and Wrong)

Co-herencia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (32) ◽  
pp. 225-238
Author(s):  
Scott F. Aikin
Keyword(s):  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions to the problem of deep disagreement.

scholarly journals What Optimistic Responses to Deep Disagreement get Right (and Wrong)

Co-herencia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (32) ◽  
pp. 225-238
Author(s):  
Scott Aikin
Keyword(s):  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions to the problem of deep disagreement.

Educación y valores

2014 ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Sabino de Juan López
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

RESUMEN En el artículo se ofrece una reflexión en torno a la educación y valores. Tras una referencia a los diferentes sentidos en que se puede plantear el problema en función de la forma como se puede entender la relación entre los dos sustantivos “educación” y “valores”, la reflexión se centra en algunos problemas relacionados con los valores en cuanto contenidos de la educación. Primeramente se refiere al problema del criterio en función del cual determinar los valores de la educación, concluyendo en que el criterio no podía ser ni de carácter a priori, ni empírico, sino “sintético”. A continuación, se afronta el problema del principio, de la fuente de los valores, o la concreción del criterio de los valores de la educación, entendiendo que éstos deberían ser determinados a partir del sujeto de la educación. Se concluye con la referencia a una exigencia de los valores de la educación, la configuración de una totalidad unitaria e interactiva. Palabras clave: educación, valores, fuente de valores, integración, cultura EDUCATION AND VALUES ABSTRACT The article offers a reflection on education and values. After a reference to the different senses in which one can pose the problem in terms of how you can understand the relationship between the two nouns “education” and “values”, reflection focuses on some problems related to the values in the contents of education. First, it concerns the problem of the criterion against which to determine the values of education, concluding that the criterion could be neither a priori in nature, not empirical, but “synthetic”. Herein, the problem of principle is faced, the source of values, or the realization of the criterion of the values of education, understanding that these should be determined from the subject of education. It concludes with the reference of a requirement of the values in education, setting up a unitary and interactive whole. Key Words: education, values , power values , integration, culture

Core Criteria I

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Epistemic Criteria ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

Chapter 3 deals with the first issue one faces in the task of articulating the explicit epistemic criteria for belief: the problem of the criterion. It is tempting to suppose that a belief can be normatively proper from the epistemic point of view only if the believer can certify for herself the reliability of every belief-forming process on which she relied. But insisting on this quickly leads to the threat of an infinite regress. This chapter defends a foundationalist response to this problem, according to which we enjoy a default (albeit defeasible) permission to rely on certain cognitive processes in belief-formation. These are processes that satisfy what the author calls the Reliabilist Rationale. Importantly, our permissions here are social: any one of us is permitted to rely on any token process that satisfies this rationale, whether the token process resides in one’s own mind/brain or that of another epistemic subject.

scholarly journals Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Melchior
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Different Types ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
Agrippa’S Trilemma

AbstractThis paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.

scholarly journals On the Significance of Assumptions about Divine Goodness and Divine Ontology for ‘Logical’ Arguments from Evil

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
John Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agent ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Classical Theism ◽  
Radical Nature ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Goodness

Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) draws attention to the importance of ethical assumptions in ‘logical’ arguments from evil (LAfEs) to the effect that the existence of (certain types) of evil is incompatible with the existence of a God who is all-powerful and morally perfect. I argue, first, that such arguments are likely to succeed only when ‘normatively relativized’—that is, when based on assumptions about divine goodness that may be subject to deep disagreement. I then argue that these arguments for atheism are also, and more fundamentally, conditioned by assumptions about the ontology of the divine. I criticise Sterba’s consideration of the implications for his own novel LAfE of the possibility that God is not a moral agent, arguing that Sterba fails to recognize the radical nature of this claim. I argue that, if we accept the ‘classical theist’ account that Brian Davies provides (interpreting Aquinas), then God does not count as ‘an’ agent at all, and the usual contemporary formulation of ‘the problem of evil’ falls away. I conclude by noting that the question of the logical compatibility of evil’s existence with divine goodness is settled in the affirmative by classical theism by appeal to its doctrine that evil is always the privation in something that exists of the good that ought to be.

On Staying in Character: Virtue and the Possibility of Deep Disagreement

Topoi ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 719-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Campolo
Keyword(s):  
Deep Disagreement

Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Williams
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Reflective Knowledge ◽  
Animal Knowledge ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Skeptical Problem ◽  
Vicious Circularity ◽  
Direct Answer

AbstractIn his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circularity. Central to Sosa's anti-skeptical strategy is the claim that there are two kinds of knowledge. His thought is that animal knowledge, which can be understood in purely reliabilist terms, can ground justified trust in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties, thus elevating us (without vicious circularity) to the level of reflective knowledge. I offer a sketch of an alternative approach, linking knowledge and justification with epistemic accountability and responsible belief-management, which casts doubt on the idea that "animal" knowledge is knowledge properly so-called. However, it turns out that this approach is (perhaps surprisingly) close in spirit to Sosa's. I suggest that the differences between us may rest on a disagreement over the possibility of providing a direct answer to the Pyrrhonian challenge.

scholarly journals Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4975-5007
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli
Keyword(s):  
World Views ◽  
Epistemic Relation ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Rational Evaluation

Abstract This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.

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