scholarly journals What determines the ambitiousness of climate policy in different сountries

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 57-79
Author(s):  
Ilia Stepanov ◽  
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Natella Agikyan ◽  
Evgeniya Muzychenko ◽  
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...  

Climate change is considered one of the most challenging problems of the 21st century and requires coordinated action by governments across the globe. The Paris Agreement, ratified by most countries of the world, sets the goal of keeping the average temperature rise within 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. As part of the Agreement, countries set nationally determined contributions (NDCs)—targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions—which are determined voluntarily. Because these targets are nationally determined, they depend on domestic constraints and the additional opportunities that individual countries’ emission reduction strategies present. As a result, climate policies vary widely among countries, both in terms of the emission reduction targets and the policy instruments used. The purpose of this study is to systematize the factors influencing climate policy using factor and cluster analysis methods. Factor analysis is used to aggregate a set of investigated statistical indicators, reflecting a country’s development level, exposure to climate risks, energy endowment, and foreign trade specialization, into a series of principal components. Based on the selected principal components, the countries are clustered into homogeneous groups, and the indicators of climate policy ambition are compared among the clusters. The results of the study demonstrate that climate change vulnerability is not a determinant of climate policy. As a rule, the poorest and most vulnerable countries set the least ambitious emission reduction targets. At the same time, rich and energy-abundant countries are more likely to implement active climate policies and set more ambitious emissions reduction targets compared to energy-intensive countries and countries that specialize in exporting carbon-intensive products. Advanced climate policy instruments, such as a carbon tax or emissions trading system, are used with greater frequency in more advanced and energy-deficient countries.

Climate ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Bohdanowicz

There are numerous studies assessing the influence of individual sociological, political, and demographic factors on attitudes towards climate change. However, there is still a need for a deeper understanding of the reasons behind these attitudes and for research based on results from more than one country. This study empirically examines a range of psychosocial and demographic determinants of support for climate policy (renewable energy, energy efficiency and carbon tax) in Germany and Poland (n = 1969). The results show that the societies of both countries, despite significant differences in income, culture and political stance on climate change, similarly support implementation of climate policies. For both countries valid predictors of support are: awareness, emotional response to climate crisis, sense of control, and belief in effectiveness of solutions; the study also shows predictors relevant in only one country. Factor analysis identified similar dimensions of attitudes toward climate change in both countries. The main findings show that support for climate policy is high in both countries and that the public is ready to accept more ambitious climate goals. Despite the differences between the countries, a coherent climate policy seems justified. The study also shows differences between the countries and provides recommendations for policymakers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-210
Author(s):  
Simone Borghesi

AbstractThe present article describes the main insights deriving from the papers collected in this special issue which jointly provide a ‘room with a view’ on some of the most relevant issues in climate policy such as: the role of uncertainty, the distributional implications of climate change, the drivers and applications of decarbonizing innovation, the role of emissions trading and its interactions with companion policies. While looking at different issues and from different angles, all papers share a similar attention to policy aspects and implications, especially in developing countries. This is particularly important to evaluate whether and to what extent the climate policies adopted thus far in developed countries can be replicated in emerging economies.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominic Lenzi

Abstract Proponents of deliberative democracy believe deliberation provides the best chance of finding effective and legitimate climate policies. However, in many societies there is substantial evidence of biased cognition and polarisation about climate change. Further, many appear unable to distinguish reliable scientific information from false claims or misinformation. While deliberation significantly reduces polarisation about climate change, and can even increase the provision of reliable beliefs, these benefits are difficult to scale up, and are slow to affect whole societies. In response, I propose a combined strategy of ‘thinking and nudging’. While deliberative theorists tend to view nudging askance, combining deliberation with nudges promises to be a timelier and more effective response to climate change than deliberation alone. I outline several proposals to improve societal deliberative capacity while reducing climate risks, including media reform, strategic communication and framing of debates, incentivising pro-climate behaviour change, and better education about science.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hassler ◽  
Per Krusell ◽  
Conny Olovsson

We construct an integrated assessment model with multiple energy sources—two fossil fuels and green energy—and use it to evaluate ranges of plausible estimates for the climate sensitivity, as well as for the sensitivity of the economy to climate change. Rather than focusing explicitly on uncertainty, we look at extreme scenarios defined by the upper and lower limits given in available studies in the literature. We compare optimal policy with laissez faire, and we point out the possible policy errors that could arise. By far the largest policy error arises when the climate policy is overly passive; overly zealous climate policy (i.e., a high carbon tax applied when climate change and its negative impacts on the economy are very limited) does not hurt the economy much as there is considerable substitutability between fossil and nonfossil energy sources.


2010 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 209-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAMUEL FANKHAUSER ◽  
CAMERON HEPBURN ◽  
JISUNG PARK

Putting a price on carbon is critical for climate change policy. Increasingly, policymakers combine multiple policy tools to achieve this, for example by complementing cap-and-trade schemes with a carbon tax, or with a feed-in tariff. Often, the motivation for doing so is to limit undesirable fluctuations in the carbon price, either from rising too high or falling too low. This paper reviews the implications for the carbon price of combining cap-and-trade with other policy instruments. We find that price intervention may not always have the desired effect. Simply adding a carbon tax to an existing cap-and-trade system reduces the carbon price in the market to such an extent that the overall price signal (tax plus carbon price) may remain unchanged. Generous feed-in tariffs or renewable energy obligations within a capped area have the same effect: they undermine the carbon price in the rest of the trading regime, likely increasing costs without reducing emissions. Policymakers wishing to support carbon prices should turn to hybrid instruments — that is, trading schemes with price-like features, such as an auction reserve price — to make sure their objectives are met.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-78
Author(s):  
Yuri Yurievich Kovalev ◽  
Olga Sergeevna Porshneva

The article presents an analysis of the BRICS countries climate policies at the global and national levels. The authors consider the positions of these states within the framework of both international climate conferences (Conference of the Parties) held under the auspices of the UN since 1992, and the summits of BRICS member states in the years 2011-2020. The paper covers strategies and results of national climate policies implemented in these countries. Using structural, comparative, and content analysis methods, the authors emphasize that BRICS countries play a key role in stabilizing the climate of our planet today. It is impossible to achieve the main aim of the Paris Agreement without a comprehensive transformation of environmental practices in these societies. BRICS adheres to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in its position towards international climate policy; the BRICS countries stand for sustainable economic growth through the introduction of new environmental technologies, and against restrictive measures that impede their economic development. At the same time, the Russian economys dependence on the extraction and export of fuel resources complicates environmental transformation. Russia is dominated by a negative narrative of climate change, where the urgent ecological modernization of the economy is seen as a threat to key sectors (oil and gas) of the economy. The implementation of international agreements to reduce the carbon intensity of the Russian economy, the creation of conditions for the transition to climate-neutral technologies, would contribute not only to the fight against global climate change, but would become a powerful incentive for the modernization of the economy, accelerating innovation and increasing its competitiveness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Markus Lederer

The idea of a green deal transforming industrialized societies’ climate policies in a sustainable manner has become highly popular in various countries. The study takes up this notion focusing on climate policy initiatives in Canada and the EU, raising three interrelated issues: (i) on a descriptive level, the study asks where we stand and what has so far been achieved regarding climate policy; (ii) analytically, the study provides a theoretical explanation of why progress has been slow in the EU and hardly visible in Canada, making use of the concept of carbon democracy; (iii) on a prescriptive level, the study explores what will be needed to make a green deal successful, arguing that one has to accept that a green deal is a deeply political project that will create winners and losers and that not all losers can be compensated under the label of a “just transition”. The argument advanced is that the EU and Canada represent a form of carbon democracy in which the extensive use of carbon laid the foundation for establishing democratic institutions and strongly shaped them. The paper shows that the extensive influence of carbon-related activities not only empowers specific non-state agents but is rather deeply enmeshed in the societal and political genome of both regions’ polities. The claim that follows is that climate politics in Canada and the EU will have to be deeply transformative and therefore disruptive in order to be successful.  


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdurakhim Rakhimov ◽  
Erik Thulin

Promoting individual behavior change has been criticized as a strategy for addressing climate change due to its potential to diminish climate policy support. In a pre-registered study, we find that messages recommending the adoption of individual climate behaviors and highlighting their large impact do not affect support for a carbon tax. Programs that encourage personal behavior change with substantial mitigation potential offer complementary opportunities to policy without undermining its effectiveness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Ulijona Kaklauskaitė ◽  
Jekaterina Navickė

This article analyzes the relationship between the social and climate policies of the European Union member states and examines the concept of the eco–social state. In the climate crisis era, the need for a close link between social and climate policies is particularly acute. The European Green Deal and other EU strategies reflect a political agenda with a specific interest in social and ecological goals. We aim to answer whether more significant state efforts in the social field are related to a similarly more substantial commitment in climate policy or whether a greater focus on one means less attention on another.  On a theoretical level, we discuss the challenges of climate change for social policy and present the concept of climate justice. The similarities and differences between the ecological and the welfare state are also examined. We argue that the concept of climate justice highlights the phenomenon of a double and even triple injustice on a global level, which requires joint efforts in spheres of social and climate policy. Eco-social state combines social and environmental institutions intending to ensure welfare and sustainability and thus complements the traditional concept of the welfare state. The Koch-Fritz (2014) classification, which distinguishes between the established, deadlocked, emerging, and failing eco-social states, is presented in the paper and used for the empirical analysis.  The empirical part of the paper employs non-parametrical correlation and hierarchical cluster analysis. The former allows for exploring the links between the ecological and social indicators. The latter enables countries to be grouped according to social and climate indicators and compared to the traditional classification of welfare states and Koch-Fritz models of eco-social states. The analysis is based on social and climate indicators of the Europe 2020 strategy. The study found that countries that provide relatively more significant funding for traditional social problems also perform better in climate change adaptation and mitigation policies by reducing greenhouse gas emissions in an effort–sharing sectors and final energy consumption. We show that clusters of the EU member states in terms of social and climate indicators (eco–social state models) are very similar to their membership in the traditional welfare states’ classification. Moreover, social democratic welfare states are better prepared to address climate change than countries representing other types of welfare states. Thus the analysis confirms the social democratic welfare states as established eco–social states, while the conservative-corporate and liberal welfare states can indeed be called deadlocked eco–social states with average results. We show, however, that Lithuania, together with other Eastern European and Southern European countries, fluctuates on both the best and the worst social and climate change mitigation outcomes. Hence those should be attributed to a group with the mixed results and can be named as failed-emerging eco-social states.


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