scholarly journals BRICS Countries in International Climate Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-78
Author(s):  
Yuri Yurievich Kovalev ◽  
Olga Sergeevna Porshneva
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Ecological Modernization ◽  
Carbon Intensity ◽  
Brics Countries ◽  
Climate Policies ◽  
International Climate Policy ◽  
International Climate

The article presents an analysis of the BRICS countries climate policies at the global and national levels. The authors consider the positions of these states within the framework of both international climate conferences (Conference of the Parties) held under the auspices of the UN since 1992, and the summits of BRICS member states in the years 2011-2020. The paper covers strategies and results of national climate policies implemented in these countries. Using structural, comparative, and content analysis methods, the authors emphasize that BRICS countries play a key role in stabilizing the climate of our planet today. It is impossible to achieve the main aim of the Paris Agreement without a comprehensive transformation of environmental practices in these societies. BRICS adheres to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in its position towards international climate policy; the BRICS countries stand for sustainable economic growth through the introduction of new environmental technologies, and against restrictive measures that impede their economic development. At the same time, the Russian economys dependence on the extraction and export of fuel resources complicates environmental transformation. Russia is dominated by a negative narrative of climate change, where the urgent ecological modernization of the economy is seen as a threat to key sectors (oil and gas) of the economy. The implementation of international agreements to reduce the carbon intensity of the Russian economy, the creation of conditions for the transition to climate-neutral technologies, would contribute not only to the fight against global climate change, but would become a powerful incentive for the modernization of the economy, accelerating innovation and increasing its competitiveness.

Comments: Carbon Tariffs - Fair Incentives for Change?

2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Carbon Price ◽  
Carbon Leakage ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Trading Systems ◽  
Climate Policies ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Carbon Tariff

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.

Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: Blockade or Impe- tus for the International Climate Regime?

elni Review ◽  
2007 ◽  
pp. 23-27
Author(s):  
Christoph Holtwisch
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Climate Regime ◽  
International Climate Policy ◽  
The Usa ◽  
International Climate

The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate [APP or AP6] is a very new phenomenon in international climate policy. It has important effects on the traditional climate regime formed by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [FCCC] and its Kyoto Protocol [KP]. From its own point of view, the APP is a grouping of key nations to address serious and long-term challenges, including anthropogenic climate change. The APP partners - Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the USA - represent roughly half the world economy and population, energy consumption and global greenhouse gas emissions. For this reason, this “coalition of the emitting” is – and will be – a central factor in international climate policy.

scholarly journals Energy and Climate Policy—An Evaluation of Global Climate Change Expenditure 2011–2018

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 4839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Coilín ÓhAiseadha ◽  
Gerré Quinn ◽  
Ronan Connolly ◽  
Michael Connolly ◽  
Willie Soon
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Energy Consumption ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Global Climate Change ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Energy Sources ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
World Energy

Concern for climate change is one of the drivers of new, transitional energy policies oriented towards economic growth and energy security, along with reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and preservation of biodiversity. Since 2010, the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) has been publishing annual Global Landscape of Climate Finance reports. According to these reports, US$3660 billion has been spent on global climate change projects over the period 2011–2018. Fifty-five percent of this expenditure has gone to wind and solar energy. According to world energy reports, the contribution of wind and solar to world energy consumption has increased from 0.5% to 3% over this period. Meanwhile, coal, oil, and gas continue to supply 85% of the world’s energy consumption, with hydroelectricity and nuclear providing most of the remainder. With this in mind, we consider the potential engineering challenges and environmental and socioeconomic impacts of the main energy sources (old and new). We find that the literature raises many concerns about the engineering feasibility as well as environmental impacts of wind and solar. However, none of the current or proposed energy sources is a “panacea”. Rather, each technology has pros and cons, and policy-makers should be aware of the cons as well as the pros when making energy policy decisions. We urge policy-makers to identify which priorities are most important to them, and which priorities they are prepared to compromise on.

scholarly journals Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1333-1355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Bechtel ◽  
Federica Genovese ◽  
Kenneth F. Scheve
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Global Public Good ◽  
Behavioral Measures ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
International Climate Policy ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Mass Attitudes ◽  
Specific Interests

Mitigating climate change requires countries to provide a global public good. This means that the domestic cleavages underlying mass attitudes toward international climate policy are a central determinant of its provision. We argue that the industry-specific costs of emission abatement and internalized social norms help explain support for climate policy. To evaluate our predictions we develop novel measures of industry-specific interests by cross-referencing individuals’ sectors of employment and objective industry-level pollution data and employing quasi-behavioral measures of social norms in combination with both correlational and conjoint-experimental data. We find that individuals working in pollutive industries are 7 percentage points less likely to support climate co-operation than individuals employed in cleaner sectors. Our results also suggest that reciprocal and altruistic individuals are about 10 percentage points more supportive of global climate policy. These findings indicate that both interests and norms function as complementary explanations that improve our understanding of individual policy preferences.

scholarly journals Using the Market to Address Climate Change: Insights from Theory & Experience

Daedalus ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 141 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph E. Aldy ◽  
Robert N. Stavins
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Carbon Dioxide Emissions ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Shadow Price ◽  
Cost Effective ◽  
Clean Energy ◽  
Carbon Intensity ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Carbon Taxes

Emissions of greenhouse gases linked with global climate change are affected by diverse aspects of economic activity, including individual consumption, business investment, and government spending. An effective climate policy will have to modify the decision calculus for these activities in the direction of more efficient generation and use of energy, lower carbon-intensity of energy, and a more carbon-lean economy. The only technically feasible and cost-effective approach to achieving this goal on a meaningful scale is carbon pricing: that is, market-based climate policies that place a shadow-price on carbon dioxide emissions. We examine alternative designs of three such instruments: carbon taxes, cap and trade, and clean energy standards. We note that the U.S. political response to possible market-based approaches to climate policy has been, and will continue to be, largely a function of issues and structural factors that transcend the scope of environmental and climate policy.

scholarly journals Wald in der globalen Klimapolitik: Stand heute und Perspektiven

2019 ◽  
Vol 170 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-9
Author(s):  
Jürgen Blaser ◽  
Oliver Gardi
Keyword(s):  
Climate Policy ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Climate Change Policy ◽  
Adaptation Strategy ◽  
Mitigation Measures ◽  
Adaptation Measures ◽  
Mitigation And Adaptation ◽  
International Climate Policy ◽  
International Climate

Forest in global climate change policy: state of today and perspectives Forests play an essential role in both strategies of global climate policy: mitigation and adaptation. Forest is the only CO2 reservoir that can be directly influenced by humans: if new forest area is created or the productivity of forest is promoted, it stores additional CO2 and thus becomes a sink. In contrast, when forest is degraded or transformed, significant amounts of CO2 are released into the atmosphere, and the forest becomes a carbon source. So adaptation measures in the forest always contribute to the mitigation strategy, and mitigation measures – properly planned and executed – contribute to the adaptation strategy. The article describes the evolution of international climate policy since its inception and the role of forests and trees in this political process. The article focuses on current instruments of international climate policy for the promotion of forest programmes in industrialised and developing countries (REDD+). It concludes that forests are so significant in terms of their metabolism, carbon content and extent that it is almost impossible to correct the trend of increasing CO2 levels in the atmosphere without fully considering forests and their sustainable management.

scholarly journals Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (4) ◽  
pp. 1339-1370 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Nordhaus
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Empirical Modeling ◽  
International Climate Policy ◽  
Great Progress ◽  
Stable Coalition ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Economic Understanding

Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement. (JEL Q54, Q58, K32, K33)

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