scholarly journals Early Warning Mechanism as Control Tool Compliance with the Principle of Subsidiarity in Legislative Process of the European Union (Regional Dimension)

2021 ◽  
pp. 208-230
Author(s):  
Igor Irkhin
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Early Warning Mechanism ◽  
Control Tool

scholarly journals The Early Warning Mechanism as a Tool for Monitoring Compliance with the Principle of Subsidiarity in the European Union Legislative Procedure

Lex Russica ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 79-105
Author(s):  
I. V. Irkhin
Keyword(s):  
Early Warning ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Early Warning Mechanism ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Common Understanding

The paper substantiates the definition of the concept of an “early warning mechanism”, proposes narrow and broad approaches to its interpretation, analyzes the inherent legal, political and administrative parameters. The paper demonstrates the correlation between the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and competence within the framework of the early warning mechanism, their inseparable interrelationship and consequent practical problematics. The author investigates the main forms and methods of regulating the procedure for implementation of the early warning mechanism in EU member states. It is stated that the main differences can be traced in the context of the fixed circle of subjects of the right to conduct verification, as well as the degree of detailed elaboration (specification) of the field of regulated legal relations. Based on an analysis of the content of some reasoned opinions of national parliaments, it is concluded that the lack of a common understanding of the principle of subsidiarity at the European and national levels, as well as the criteria for its compliance, have a direct impact on the early warning mechanism, which is reflected in the reduced effectiveness of its implementation. Attention is paid to the legal nature and specifics of the “yellow card” and “orange card” regimes as a variety of forms of implementation of the early warning mechanism. It is concluded that at the current stage the “card” regimes represent an insufficient and ineffective instrument for the national parliaments to influence the EU legislative process. The author highlights the problems of organizing inter-parliamentary cooperation within the framework of the early warning mechanism. It is emphasized that, in fact, national parliaments act blindly when conducting checks on the conformity of draft legislation with the principle of subsidiarity. The paper concludes that the early warning mechanism in actual modification cannot be fully qualified as a tool for providing additional legitimation of solutions made by supranational authorities. The author makes proposals for improving the institutional configuration of the early warning mechanism.

Moving Beyond Procedure

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 784-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMIE KREPPEL
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Decision Procedures ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Legislative Influence

This article examines the influence of the European Parliament (EP) within the legislative process of the European Union. Although debate over the impact of the cooperation and co-decision I procedures continues, this article argues that, in part, the current theoretical debate is a false one that has caused many of the other important variables that affect EP legislative influence to be ignored. This article briefly revisits the current debate, then proceeds to an analysis of the success of more than 1,000 EP amendments under the cooperation and co-decision procedures. This evidence suggests that numerous other variables, such as internal EP unity and type of amendment made, have a significant impact on EP success, even controlling for procedure. In addition, this comparison points out some empirical differences between the two procedures that have been largely ignored in the theoretical debate but that nonetheless have a significant impact of EP success and merit further study.

scholarly journals Interim European surveillance case definition for anthrax

2001 ◽  
Vol 5 (44) ◽  
Author(s):  
A Nicoll
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
European Union ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
Single Case ◽  
Case Definition ◽  
National Surveillance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Health Centres ◽  
The Subject

The heads of national surveillance and public health centres, at a meeting in Luxembourg on 30 October 2001, agreed an interim surveillance case definition for anthrax for Europe (box). While anthrax is not formally notifiable internationally at the present time (click here), it was agreed that ascertainment of a single case of confirmed or probable human anthrax should be the subject of an “early warning” within the European Union under the provision of Decision no. 2119/98/EC of 24 September 1998 (Network Decision).

Legislating and Adjudicating

2020 ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Eleanor Sharpston
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Union Legislation ◽  
Final Text ◽  
The Eu

The chapter examines the role played by the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU) in ruling authoritatively on the meaning of European Union legislation. The EU legislative process differs from the parliamentary process in the United Kingdom for good reason. Within the European Union, there are many different traditions of how such drafting should be done; whilst, at EU level, multinationalism and multilingualism have a significant impact on what emerges as the final text. The chapter explains the difficulties encountered and gives illustrations from the Court’s case-law of instances where the Court has either decided not to take steps that might be construed as ‘legislating’ or, conversely, has gone to the limits of ‘constructive re-interpretation’. The chapter concludes by asking how far the Court should ‘bend’ a legislative text.

National Parliaments and the European Union

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrin Auel
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Direct Role ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

The role and position of national parliaments in European Union (EU) affairs have undergone a long, slow, and sometimes rocky, but overall rather remarkable, development. Long regarded as the victims of the integration process, they have continuously strengthened their institutional prerogatives and have become more actively involved in EU affairs. Since the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments even have a formal and direct role in the European legislative process, namely, as guardians of the EU’s subsidiarity principle via the so-called early warning system. To what extent institutional provisions at the national or the European level provide national parliaments with effective means of influencing EU politics is still a largely open question. On the one hand, national parliaments still differ with regard to their institutional prerogatives and actual engagement in EU politics. On the other hand, the complex decision-making system of the EU, with its multitude of actors involved, makes it difficult to trace outcomes back to the influence of specific actors. Yet it is precisely this opacity of the EU policymaking process that has led to an emphasis on the parliamentary communication function and the way national parliaments can contribute to the democratic legitimacy of the EU by making EU political decisions and processes more accessible and transparent for the citizens. This deliberative aspect is also often emphasized in approaches to the role of national parliaments in the EU that challenge the territorially defined, standard account of parliamentary representation. Taking the multilevel character of the EU as well as the high degree of political and economic interdependence between the member states into account, parliamentary representation is conceptualized as extending beyond the nation-state and as shared across the EU, with a strong emphasis on the links between parliaments through inter-parliamentary cooperation and communication as well as on the representation of other member states’ citizens interests and concerns in parliamentary debates. Empirical research is still scarce, but existing studies provide evidence for the development of an increasingly dense web of formal and informal interactions between parliaments and for changes in the way national parliamentarians represent citizens in EU affairs.

scholarly journals The Early Warning System and policymaking in the European Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe van Gruisen ◽  
Martijn Huysmans
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
Early Warning System ◽  
Warning System ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Relevant Aspect ◽  
Yellow Card ◽  
National Parliaments

Does the Early Warning System alert the European Commission about the prospects of passing new policy? We present a model of European Union policymaking in which the Early Warning System plays an important signalling role. In our model, the Commission uses signals from the Early Warning System to update its belief about governments’ voting strategies in the Council. The Commission may then anticipate difficult negotiations by withdrawing its proposal early. We find empirical evidence for our theory: (1) reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments strongly predict opposition from their governments and (2) the Commission is more likely to withdraw proposals that receive reasoned opinions, even in the absence of a yellow card. Our results run counter to the dominant view in the literature that the Early Warning System is not a very relevant aspect of EU decision-making. Instead, reasoned opinions constitute a clear signal that negotiations are more likely to fail.

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