scholarly journals Methodological Aspects of Social Preferences Research in the Context of Solving Social Dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (13) ◽  
pp. 33-37
Author(s):  
Alla Kovalenko ◽  
◽  
Albina Holovina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Trust And Reciprocity

The article presents an analysis of the main methodological principles and schemes of social preferences experimental research, which are determined as a fundamental concept to understanding the behavior of decision-makers in the process of resolving social dilemmas. The models presented in the article include an analysis of the factors that determine social preferences. Among them are the factors of trust, reliability, reciprocity, rejection of inequality, unconditional altruism and competitive advantage. The article provides a description of the strengths and weaknesses of the classic methods for studying social preferences, which usually take the form of ultimatum game, dictator game, trust game and public goods game. The study reveals the importance of the Nash equilibrium as a way to interpret human behavior in resource allocation during the game. Analysis of numerous literary sources shows that the ultimatum game is a classic scheme for studying the altruistic behavior of people. The submission of a proposal and its acceptance is an example of Nash's ideal equilibrium. Deviation from this balance can be interpreted as altruism. In turn, the trust game is a classic scheme for studying the reciprocity and prosocial orientation. If the behavior of players deviates from Nash's equilibrium, it is interpreted as being caused by trust and reciprocity. The dictator game is a classic scheme for studying the rejection of inequality. The subject's behavior can be interpreted as a rejection of inequality or altruism, but not as a rejection of risk, as the offer of Player 1 is mandatory for Player 2. Public goods game is a classic scheme for studying the competitive orientation. Nash's ideal balance in this form of play is to do nothing for public consumption, but deviating from this rule is interpreted as altruistic behavior that is the opposite of competitive orientation. As a result, the design of psychological research is presented, which most accurately typologies the social preferences of the subjects and can contribute to the creation of a representative model of decision-making process.

scholarly journals Hierarchy, power, and strategies to promote cooperation in social dilemmas [pre-print]

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. Then how is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

Sharing Money With Humans Versus Computers: On the Role of Honesty-Humility and (Non-)Social Preferences

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110556
Author(s):  
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Stefan Pfattheicher
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Game Studies ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Game ◽  
The Social ◽  
As If

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

scholarly journals Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Junhui Wu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Fundamental Feature ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.

scholarly journals Sharing money with humans versus computers: On Honesty-Humility and (non-)social preferences

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Stefan Pfattheicher
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Game Studies ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Game ◽  
The Social ◽  
As If

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (1) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (2) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (3) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game

2021 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 101613
Author(s):  
François Cochard ◽  
Julie Le Gallo ◽  
Nikolaos Georgantzis ◽  
Jean-Christian Tisserand
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Different Populations ◽  
Meta Analyses

Generosity, fairness, trust and time: the performance of therapeutic community residents in economics experiments

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Jessica V. Linley ◽  
Brian Roe ◽  
Keith L. Warren
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Behavior ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Comparison Group ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Preference Elicitation ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Games

Purpose Therapeutic communities (TCs) assume that residents are capable of working together to overcome substance abuse and criminal behavior. Economic games allow us to study the potential of cooperative behavior in TC residents. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze results from a sample of 85 corrections-based TC residents and a comparison group of 45 individuals drawn from the general population who participated in five well-known economic experiments – the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, risk attitude elicitation and time preference elicitation. Findings TC residents keep less money in the dictator game and return more in the trust game, and prefer short-term rewards in the time preference elicitation. In the ultimatum game, nearly half of all residents refuse offers that are either too low or too high. Research limitations/implications While the study involves a sample from one TC and a comparison group, the results suggest that residents are at least comparable to the general public in generosity and appear willing on average to repay trust. A substantial minority may have difficulty accepting help. Practical implications Rapid peer feedback is of value. Residents will be willing to offer help to peers. The TC environment may explain residents’ tendency to return money in the trust game. Residents who refuse to accept offers that are either too low or too high in the ultimatum game may also have difficulty in accepting help from peers. Social implications Economic games may help to clarify guidelines for TC clinical practice. Originality/value This is the first use of economic games with TC residents.

scholarly journals Active Learning on Trust and Reciprocity for Undergraduates

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalia Rodrigo-González ◽  
María Caballer-Tarazona ◽  
Aurora García-Gallego
Keyword(s):  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Earnings Information ◽  
Trust And Reciprocity ◽  
Reading Experiment ◽  
The University

We propose a teaching activity aimed at promoting social values, such as trust and reciprocity, among undergraduate students in economics and related degrees. We present our pilot experience of what we call RED–‘Reading–Experiment–Discussion’, a three-step activity as part of a class of a specific module at the University of Valencia. During the Reading step, we encourage students to reflect, learn, and critically think about social values. In the second step, Experiment, students make decisions in a trust game experiment, a game created to measure trust and reciprocity in economic environments. Students then give opinions through a post-experiment questionnaire. Our research hypotheses are tested by using non-parametric methods. We also investigate the association between students’ decisions and their attitudinal and sociodemographic characteristics by linear regression analysis. Experimental data show that decisions on trust and reciprocity are dependent on earnings information and that, on average, females trust more than males. Finally, in the Discussion step, the learning is reinforced by sharing the readings about morals and the experimental decisions. In short, RED may be of great help in transmitting to students the role of social preferences in individual decision making.

Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-369
Author(s):  
Caleb A. Cox ◽  
Brock Stoddard
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Information And Communication

We experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the return and send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthfulness, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that communication is largely truthful and increases efficiency. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication. (JEL C72, D82, D83, H41)

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