scholarly journals Existem bases tributárias dotadas de valor intrínseco? Uma reflexão político-filosófica sobre os fundamentos morais da tributação a partir dos escritos de Liam Murphy e Thomas Nagel

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evanilda Nascimento de Godoi Bustamante
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Thomas Nagel

Neste artigo, examinamos as principais teses de Murphy e Nagel sobre o fundamento político-moral do direito tributário. Sustentamos, com os autores, que a distribuição de rendas realizada pelo mercado não pode ser tida como intrinsecamente justa, como supunham os teóricos da tradição liberal. Contrariamente aos autores, porém, entendemos que há bases de cálculo intrinsecamente justas, e que é possível analisar a justiça do direito tributário por meio do princípio metodológico da “prioridade local”, oferecido por Ronald Dworkin. Aplicando-se esse princípio, é possível analisar a justiça de certas bases tributárias independentemente da análise das despesas realizadas pelo Estado para o fornecimento de bens sociais.

scholarly journals Liberalismo igualitário e ação afirmativa: da teoria moral à política pública

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (48) ◽  
pp. 85-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Feres Júnior ◽  
Luiz Augusto Campos
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Politica Publica

O presente artigo examina a hipótese de que a teoria política e moral do liberalismo igualitário serve de justificação para políticas de ação afirmativa de recorte étnico-racial, hipótese essa que tem sido assumida como verdadeira por acadêmicos e importantes operadores do direito em nosso país. Buscamos estabelecer como autores fundamentais do liberalismo igualitário, como John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel e Robert Taylor, trataram a questão das políticas de discriminação positiva. O método usado é a interpretação textual, tomando cuidado de trabalhar o mais próximo possível da linguagem e dos conceitos nos próprios textos dos autores e cobrindo a evolução do tema na obra de cada um, particularmente na de Rawls. Pretendemos mostrar que há uma gradação de opiniões em relação à questão, que vai da defesa à rejeição de tais políticas, passando por posições intermediárias que justificam algumas modalidades de ação afirmativa, mas não outras. Portanto, não há uma relação unívoca entre a teoria política e moral do liberalismo igualitário e a justificação de políticas de ação afirmativa de recorte étnico-racial, a despeito do senso comum e do fato de teóricos do liberalismo igualitário e defensores da ação afirmativa partilharem o mesmo lugar no espectro político das democracias liberais.

THE DWORKINIAN RELIGION OF VALUE

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 526-534
Author(s):  
Rafael Domingo
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
New York University ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Eightieth Birthday ◽  
Advanced Study ◽  
Law And Justice ◽  
University Of Bern ◽  
The University

As Ronald Dworkin was writing his Einstein lectures “Religion without God,” at New York University (NYU) in the fall of 2011, I was also working in Washington Square, as a fellow of the NYU Straus Institute for the Advanced Study of Law and Justice. On December 8, just a few days before Dworkin delivered the lectures at the University of Bern, I had the opportunity to attend the last session of his famous Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy at Furman Hall. In that session, co-led by his colleague and friend Thomas Nagel, Dworkin presented the manuscript of his Swiss lectures. After the seminar, we had an anticipatory celebration of Dworkin's eightieth birthday, which would take place three days later. And that was the last time I would see Ronald Dworkin—which might explain why I remember in such detail that seminar, in which he talked about religion without God with more spontaneity and improvisation, I imagine, than he would in the Einstein lectures days later.

Losing Moral Knowledge

2019 ◽  
pp. 151-191
Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Difference

Some philosophers—including Gilbert Ryle, Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel—have held that there are important respects in which our cognitive relationship to morality is more secure than our cognitive relationship to ordinary empirical knowledge. I defend the claim that moral knowledge is susceptible to being lost in the same ways in which non-moral knowledge is, including by being forgotten and by being debunked. I offer a novel solution to Ryle’s puzzle about “forgetting the difference between right and wrong.” The chapter raises, and suggests answers to, a number of underexplored questions, including questions about the extent to which some cases of moral corruption are best understood as cognitive processes (i.e. processes involving a loss of knowledge), as well as questions about the kinds of considerations that could in principle make it reasonable for us to lose confidence even in moral claims that strike us as obviously correct.

The Solidarity Solution

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristi A. Olson
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Gender Wage Gap ◽  
Measurement Problem ◽  
Wage Gap ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Easy Task ◽  
Political Philosopher ◽  
Equal Income ◽  
Ideal Part

What is a fair income distribution? The empirical literature seems to assume that equal income would be fair, but the equal income answer faces two objections. First, equal income is likely to be inefficient. This book sets aside efficiency concerns as a downstream consideration; it seeks to identify a fair distribution. The second objection—pointed out by both leftist political philosopher G. A. Cohen and conservative economist Milton Friedman—is that equal income is unfair to the hardworking. Measuring labor burdens in order to adjust income shares, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers and economists attempt to sidestep the measurement problem by invoking the envy test. Yet a distribution in which no one prefers someone else’s circumstances to her own, as the envy test requires, is unlikely to exist—and, even if it does exist, the normative connection between the envy test and fairness has not been established. The Solidarity Solution provides a novel answer: when someone claims that her situation should be improved at someone else’s expense, she must be able to give a reason that cannot be rejected by a free and equal individual who regards everyone else as the same. Part I develops the solidarity solution and shows that rigorous distributive implications can be derived from a relational ideal. Part II uses the solidarity solution to critique the competing theories of Ronald Dworkin, Philippe Van Parijs, and Marc Fleurbaey. Finally, part III identifies insights for the gender wage gap and taxation.

Excursus

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Schlieter
Keyword(s):  
Life Review ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Niklas Luhmann ◽  
Search For Meaning ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation

This chapter, an excursus, embarks on a more philosophical interpretation of consciousness and experience. Building on Thomas Nagel and Niklas Luhmann, it is argued that human consciousness, defined as a process of self-reproduction of never-ending new possibilities, is perplexed by the task of imagining its own nonexistence. Given that consciousness is not equipped for this task, that is to imagine death (its own nonexistence), it will react with a search for meaning, a context for the existential threat. The excursus argues that this leads to the highly accelerated activity of consciousness. It may result in a phenomenon reported by a certain number of near-death experiencers, namely, the life review. In short, then, the life review is a highly accelerated search for meaning. These deliberations are further substantiated by a comparison with “wake-up dreams,” in which a similar structure becomes visible.

Taking Children’s Human Rights Seriously

2020 ◽  
pp. 48-69
Author(s):  
Michael Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Children's Rights ◽  
Popular Media ◽  
Children’S Rights ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Persuasive Argument ◽  
The Law ◽  
Deficit View

Despite the development of the children’s rights movement, human rights scholarship continues to overlook the rights of children. Even those like Ronald Dworkin, who proclaim the need to take rights seriously, are curiously silent, even ambivalent, when it comes to children. This inattention often forces advocates of children’s rights to the margins of human rights scholarship. In the few places where serious philosophical discussion of children’s rights does take place, the analysis intends to diminish the value of rights for children. These critics are not malevolent, and typically want what is best for children, but they do not think it can be accomplished through a children’s rights agenda. This chapter lays out a persuasive argument for a children’s rights agenda, or, for taking children’s rights seriously. Drawing from philosophy, history, literature, popular media, and of course the law, this chapter argues against the conventional deficit view underlying most arguments against the recognition of children’s rights and makes a case for the importance of children’s rights where rights are the currency in use.

How Nowhere Can You Get (and do Ethics)?The View from Nowhere. Thomas Nagel

Ethics ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen L. Darwall
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Nagel

scholarly journals Judicial authority, legitimacy and the (international) rule of law as essentially contested and interpretive concepts: Introduction to the special issue

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
KNUT TRAISBACH
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Final Point ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
International Rule

AbstractBeyond setting the stage, the Introduction makes three claims about the conceptual triangle of the rule of law, judicial authority and legitimacy. The first is that all three are essentially contested and interpretive concepts in the sense of Walter B. Gallie and Ronald Dworkin. In their expositions, the contested and interpretative nature of such concepts is nothing to be ‘solved’, rather the formulation of different conceptions and contestation about them are central functions of such concepts. The interpretive and essentially contested nature points us to the relevant ‘actors’ and to conflicts and trade-offs between contested competencies. Thus the second point is that arguments about the rule of law and judicial legitimacy are often a means of questioning or securing the authority of a particular actor or institution in relation to other actors and institutions. The final point is that transposing concepts from the domestic to the supranational is a constructive endeavour because it entails creating new conceptions and substituting old ones as well as legitimising new authorities and delegitimising old ones. Thus, this special issue also cautions against discourses that ultimately are more about legitimation than about legitimacy and more about new ways of ruling than the rule of law.

Das Recht auf Asyl bei Emer de Vattel 1758: unvollkommenes Recht, vollkommenes Recht, Menschenrecht

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-254
Author(s):  
Rainer Keil
Keyword(s):  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Moral Legitimacy ◽  
Self Help ◽  
Perfect Duties ◽  
Xxist Century ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
Specific Country

When, within the framework of a highly controversial debate of the early 1990s in Germany on the right to asylum, Winfrid Brugger argued, a human right to asylum could not be based on sound reason, he referred to the supposed impossibility of an imputation of the plight of refugees to certain foreign states. In more recent debates, similar arguments have been brought forward and formulated as a problem of imperfect or perfect duties and rights. Much earlier, in 1758, Emer de Vattel already had discussed the right to asylum as a right that has aspects of both an imperfect right and a perfect right. This has mostly been ignored in the recent debate. In this article, I try to show how de Vattel reasoned. His argumentation limited the otherwise strong sovereignty of states by referring to the reasons of the moral legitimacy of their powers. This led him to the result that the per se perfect right to asylum, imperfect in relation to specific states, can, if states collectively fail to admit a refugee in urgent danger, become a claim against a specific country in the shape of a perfect right to self-help. I will briefly try to reconstruct some of de Vattel‘s ideas with concepts of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. The difference between Dworkin’s rule and Alexy’s Regel becomes relevant for understanding de Vattel’s perfect and human right to asylum. In the end, I will briefly investigate how much of de Vattel’s thought depends on assumptions a XXIst century thinker would probably not be ready to suppose any more. It will become clear that de Vattel’s thought on asylum is mostly independent from rather controversial assumptions of his work; it fits rather well to some recent approaches limiting sovereignty by human rights and concepts of territorial justice.

A REPLY TO RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF MORAL SKEPTICISM

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 23-45
Author(s):  
Mateus Matos Tormin
Keyword(s):  
General Structure ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Moral Domain

This paper focuses on “indeterminacy”, “objectivity” and “truth” in the work of Ronald Dworkin. The text is divided into four parts: first, I will expose the general structure of Dworkin’s conception of objectivity in the moral domain (Section 1). Next, I will present the main critiques Dworkin addresses to two of his most important philosophical enemies, namely the “external skeptic” (Section 2.1) and the “internal skeptic” (Section 2.2). I then intend to address Dworkin’s critiques by presenting counterarguments in defense of moral skepticism (Section 3). In order to clarify the debate and its points, I try to illustrate the arguments with examples whenever possible. In the concluding Section (4), I recapitulate the main points of the text.

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