2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe De Donder ◽  
John E. Roemer

We study how rich shareholders use their political influence to deregulate firms that they own, thus skewing the income distribution towards themselves. Individuals differ in productivity and choose how much labor to supply. High productivity individuals also own shares in the productive sector and thus earn capital income. All individuals vote over a linear tax rate on (labor and capital) income whose proceeds are redistributed lump sum. Shareholders also lobby in order to ease the price cap imposed on the private firm. We first solve analytically for the Kantian equilibrium of this lobbying game together with the majority voting equilibrium over the tax rate. We then proceed to a comparative statics analysis of the model with the help of numerical simulations. We obtain that, as the capital income distribution becomes more concentrated among the top productivity individuals, increased lobbying effort generates efficiency as well as equity costs, with lower labor supply and lower average utility levels in society.


2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 807-835 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi E. Feldman ◽  
Peter Katuš čÁk ◽  
Laura Kawano

We develop an empirical test for whether households understand or misperceive their marginal tax rate. Our identifying variation comes from the loss of the Child Tax Credit when a child turns 17. Using this age discontinuity, we find that despite this tax liability increase being lump-sum and predictable, households reduce their reported wage income upon discovering they have lost the credit. This finding suggests that households misinterpret at least part of this tax liability change as an increase in their marginal tax rate. This evidence supports the hypothesis that tax complexity can cause confusion and leads to unintended behavioral responses. (JEL D12, D14, H24, H31)


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (8) ◽  
pp. 2007-2031 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noemi Schmitt ◽  
Frank Westerhoff

The seminal cobweb model by Brock and Hommes reveals that fixed-point dynamics may turn into increasingly complex dynamics, as firms switch more quickly between competing expectation rules. While policy makers may be able to manage such rational routes to randomness by imposing a proportional profit tax, the stability-ensuring tax rate may cause a very high tax burden for firms. Using a mix of analytical and numerical tools, we show that a rather small profit-dependent lump-sum tax may even be sufficient to take away the competitive edge of cheap destabilizing expectation rules, thereby contributing to market stability.


Author(s):  
Robert P. Culp

The primary purpose of this study was to utilize the mathematical approach to demand estimation developed in Culp (2004) to compare two common emissions based taxes. The model assumes Cournot-Nash behavior and divides the automobile market into five homogenous segments. A global optimization program is utilized to mathematically determine the range of values the coefficients of demand must take in each segment to satisfy market equilibrium. Simulations were performed to examine the comparative impact on social welfare of both the per mile emission tax (PMET) and the lump sum emission tax (LSET) in the automotive and travel markets. In the simulations, a global optimization program allows market conditions to change while holding constant the level of pollution reduction, satisfying the other constraints of the model, and satisfying each firm’s first order profit-maximizing conditions. The simulation found that in five of the thirty-two quarters examined, and regardless of market conditions, that the LSET produced more gains from trade. In simulations of the remaining quarters, the outcomes varied depending upon the cross price elasticity of vehicle demand and upon the sensitivity of consumers to vehicle operating cost. The simulations also show that an approximately 20 percent reduction in emissions from new vehicles is achieved by the LSET with a median tax rate of $155.74 per gram of average CO emissions per mile. Consequently, a vehicle that emits an average of two grams of CO per mile would pay a one-time fee of $311.48. The median tax rate required by the PMET is $0.00666 per gram per mile. Accordingly, a vehicle that emits two grams of CO per mile on average would pay $0.0103 per mile or $1332.46 for every 100,000 miles traveled. The difference between the two tax rates, required to achieve the same pollution reduction goal, is likely the result of consumer’s insensitivity to the rise in vehicle operating costs caused by the PMET. This result is consistent with the view that consumers highly discount future payments.


1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (5) ◽  
pp. 1156-1181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Krusell ◽  
José-Víctor Ríos-Rull

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median-voter model of the size of government. Taxes are proportional to total income, and they are redistributed as equal lump-sum transfers. Voting takes place periodically over time, and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility. We calibrate the model to U.S. data. Key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices. The total size of transfers predicted by our political-economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data. (JEL E60, H11, P16)


BDJ ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 147 (8) ◽  
pp. 224-225
Author(s):  
J Greenway
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
pp. 120-136
Author(s):  
R. Saakyan ◽  
I. Trunin

Main directions of tax legislation development are considered in the article from the point of view of relevancy of zero tax rate implementation and tax refund. Special emphasis is placed on the problem of tax refund delay that undermines the competitiveness of the export sector of economy. Comparative analysis of VAT refund mechanisms in different countries and Russia with respect to effectiveness of tax administration has allowed to formulate some hypotheses concerning relevant parameters of refund and test them with the help of various methods and models.


2020 ◽  
pp. 28-43
Author(s):  
A. S. Kaukin ◽  
E. М. Miller

The paper analyzes the consequences of the abolition of the export duty on oil and oil products as a necessary step to stimulate energy efficiency of Russia’s economy and eliminate underdevelopment provoked by a long-term subsidizing of inefficient oil refining sector in Russia. The calculation results have shown that even taking into account several deviations from the planned scenarios of changing the parameters of tax regulation of the oil industry in 2014— 2019, the tax maneuver brought over 3.5 trillion rubles (in 2019 — 148 billion rubles) to the state budget in 2014—2017, mainly due to an increase in the base mineral extraction tax rate, and contributed to an increase in the depth of oil refining from 72% to 85%. In addition, the article analyzes possible risks associated with the current plan for reforming the taxation of the industry until 2024 and proposes an alternative that could level some of them. A comparative analysis of the effects of the tax maneuver under the current reform plan and the alternative variant suggests that the latter will allow to achieve a greater total budgetary effect in four years, reduce the cost of subsidizing domestic oil refining, increase the efficiency of Russian vertically integrated oil companies, and reduce the growth rate of oil products prices in the retail market.


Author(s):  
Bich Le Thi Ngoc

The aim of this study is to analyze empirically the impact of taxation and corruption on the growth of manufacturing firms in Vietnam. The study employed pooled OLS estimation and then instrument variables with fixed effect for the panel data of 1377 firms in Vietnam from 2005 to 2011. These data were obtained from the survey of the Central Institute for Economic Management and the Danish International Development Agency. The results show that both taxation and corruption are negatively associated with firm growth measured by firm sales adjusted according to the GDP deflator. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is linked with a reduction of 16,883 percentage points in firm revenue, over four and a half times bigger than the effect of a one-percentage point increase in the tax rate. From the findings of this research, the author recommends the Vietnam government to lessen taxation on firms and that there should be an urgent revolution in anti-corruption policies as well as bureaucratic improvement in Vietnam.


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