Paul Ricœur: traços do religioso numa filosofia sem absoluto

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 1027-1056
Author(s):  
Gonçalo Marcelo

This paper assesses the ways in which Transcendence and the question of God appear in the philosophy of Paul Ricœur. Taking stock of the debate on the theological turn of French phenomenology, the paper aims to show the unique position held by Ricœur among French phenomenology and hermeneutics, in that in spite of his Christian faith, Ricœur strove to put forward a philosophy of limits ‘without absolute’ while, at the same time, developing inquiries in phenomenology and hermeneutics of religion. The paper follows the development of Ricœur’s thought on this matter, from his early phenomenological works, through the hermeneutical turn and until the essay of fundamental anthropology of Oneself as Another, unpacking the Kantian and Hegelian influences, the approach on religion ‘within the limits of reason alone’ and also the way in which the Kantian undertones of hermeneutics as philosophy of finitude at the same time open the space to hope and imagination. Ricœur’s philosophy therefore appears as a rigorous descriptive and interpretive effort that strives not to mix the genres of discourse, while, at the same time, we can still find some ethical and supra-ethical traits in his practical philosophy that do stem from his Christian faith – but whose status is inspirational and therefore does not dent the overall theoretical framework of his philosophy of limits.

Author(s):  
Adrián Bertorello

RESUMENEl trabajo examina críticamente la afirmación central de la hermenéutica de Paul Ricoeur, a saber, que el soporte material de la escritura es el rasgo determinante para que una secuencia discursiva sea considerada como un texto. La escritura cancela las condiciones fácticas de la enunciación y crea, de este modo, un ámbito de sentido estable en el que se puede validar una concepción de la subjetividad que está implicada en las dos estrategias de lecturas (el análisis estructural y la apropiación), esto es, un sujeto pasivo que se constituye por la idealidad del significado. Asimismo, el trabajo intentará precisar una serie de ambigüedades en el uso que Ricoeur hace del «ser en el mundo» para sostener la referencialidad del discurso.PALABRAS CLAVETEXTO, ESCRITURA, REFERENCIA, SUBJETIVIDAD, MUNDOABSTRACTThis paper critically examines the main assertion of Paul Ricoeur´s hermeneutics, i.e., that the material base of writing is the determining feature to consider a discursive sequence as a text. Writing cancels the factual conditions of enunciation and creates, in this way, a background of stable meaning where it is possible to validate a conception of subjectivity implicated in the two reading strategies (the structural analysis and the appropriation), i.e., a passive subject constituted by the ideality of meaning. Likewise, this paper aims to clarify some ambiguities in the way Ricoeur uses the «beings in the world» to support the discourse referentiality.KEY WORDSTEXT, WRITING, REFERENCE, SUBJECTIVITY, WORLD


Author(s):  
Jesse Matz

Orlando and other texts express Woolf’s interest in subjective ‘time in the mind’, an interest she shared with other modernists who challenged chronological norms, but Woolf explored other forms of time as well. Some align her work with the theories of Henri Bergson, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Mary Sturt, and this variety—the way Woolf developed forms of time across her career as a writer—tracks with the phenomenological hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. His Time and Narrative explains the dialectical pattern according to which Woolf perpetually found new ways for time and narrative to shape each other, culminating in novels that thematize this reciprocal relationship between the art of narrative and possibilities for temporal engagement. Woolf’s early fiction breaks with linear chronology, starting a series of virtuoso performances of temporal poiesis.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esteban Lythgoe

AbstractIn this paper we intend to show that in Memory, History, Forgetting, Paul Ricœur articulates memory and history through imagination. This philosopher distinguishes two main functions of imagination: a poetical one, associated with interpretation and discourse, and a practical and projective one that clarifies and guides our actions. In Memory, History, Forgetting, both functions of imagination are present, but are associated with different aspects of memory. The first one is present especially in the phenomenology of the cognitive dimension of memory; the second one is developed in the analysis of the abuses of artificial memory, while their convergence is described in the section on the abuses of natural memory. Besides the similarities in the way these functions of imagination operate in Oneself as Another and in Memory, History, Forgetting, we will show some important differences between these two works and we will propose reasons for these differences.Keywords: Poetical Imagination, Practical Imagination, Abused Memory, Ideology, Utopy.RésuméDans cet article nous souhaiterions montrer que, dans La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, l’imagination productrice est ce qui permet d’articuler la mémoire et l´histoire. Ricœur distingue deux principales fonctions de l’imagination: l’une, poétique, associée à l’interprétation et au discours ; l’autre pratique et projective, qui éclaire et oriente nos actions. Dans La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, ces deux fonctions de l’imagination sont présentes mais elles sont associées à des aspects différents de la mémoire. La première est surtout présente dans la phénoménologie de la dimension cognitive de la mémoire, la seconde apparaît dans l’analyse des abus de la mémoire artificielle, et l’articulation entre ces deux fonctions se trouve enfin décrite dans la section concernant l’abus de la mémoire naturelle. Outre les similitudes dans la façon dont ces fonctions de l’imagination opèrent dans Soi-même comme un autre et dans La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, nous essaierons de montrer qu’il existe cependant certaines différences importantes entre ces deux œuvres en tentant d’en expliciter les raisons.Mots-clés: Imagination poétique, imagination pratique, mémoire abusée, idéologie, utopie.


2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 378
Author(s):  
Yulia Nasrul Latifi

Danarto’s Rembulan di Dasar Kolam (The Moon Beneath the Pond) tells about a wife’s sacrifice in an unfortunate situation. The wife, is an unfortunate woman whose husband cheats and treats her disrespectfully. Yet, her spirituality endures her in such situation. Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics theory proposes the hypothesis that the analysis of symbol is a guide to the analysis of text, and the other way around. Both must be submitted to a process of metamorphosis or dialectical phenomena. The result of this analysis is the emergence of symbolical meaning in various terms. Rabi’ah becomes a symbol of a wife’s strength. Her wisdom and personality give the way out to her household problems. Her social status as well as gender role is the symbol that religiosity belongs to anyone despite one’s social status. From this character, it can be seen that the knowledge of spiritualism is aimed not only vertically (to God) but also horizontally (to humanity). The title Rembulan or the Moon symbolizes the wife, because, despite her condition- symbolized as the pond-she endures and still gives her shine, like the moon.


2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Valenkamp ◽  
Johannes L. Van der Walt

Conditions for faith education to remain meaningful in the 21st century cultural context Although significant numbers of their members are leaving the mainstream churches, this does not mean that these people have relinquished their Christian faith as such. There are signs that people leave mainstream denominations because of new approaches to life and personal experience in the cultural context of the 21st century. The authors try to discover explanations for this phenomenon that also seems to affect the faith education of the younger generation. It is concluded that the faith education of young people can only remain meaningful if people adopted what Paul Ricoeur called a “second naivity”, and if educators complied with certain conditions. By following certain guidelines, educators will help resist a threatening sense of loss of transcendance, relevance and reference among their learners.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger W. H. Savage

In this article, I relate the demand that Paul Ricoeur suggests mimesis places on the way we think about truth to the idea that the work of art is a model for thinking about testimony. By attributing a work’s epoché of reality to the work of imagination, I resolve the impasse that arises from attributing music, literature, and art’s distance from the real to their social emancipation. Examining the conjunction, in aesthetic experience, of the communicability and the exemplarity of a work reveals how Ricoeur’s definition of mimesis as refiguration relates to the “rule” that the work summons. This “rule” constitutes the solution to a problem or question for which the work is the answer. In conclusion, as a model for thinking about testimony, the claims that works make have a counterpart in the injunctions that issue from exemplary moral and political acts. 


1970 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-126
Author(s):  
Andrzej Wiercinski

Thinking with Paul Ricœur is a great pleasure and an even greater challenge. The more we seem to understand his life project, the more perplexed we are when facing the inescapability of the incompleteness, incomprehensibility, and impenetrability of what calls for thinking. Ricœur remains a faithful companion on the way to understanding oneself and reaching the inaccessible, despite the unprecedented progress of psychology, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and religion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-139
Author(s):  
Pierre-Olivier Monteil

This study undertakes a reading of Etienne de La Boétie’s Discours de la servitude volontaire, endeavoring to bring to light the way it convergences with and diverges from the political thought of Paul Ricœur, around the central concept of the will. On the basis of the twin notions of “denaturation” and of “pathology,” a course unfolds which aims at helping establish the people, in comparison with the institution of the State, through a political process revitalised by friendship. But the two thinkers differ when it comes to the resources of the will. This is reflected in the notion of freedom, conceived as absolute in La Boetie, while Ricœur emphasizes its contingency, which leads him to thematize it in terms of capabilities.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Joél Z. Schmidt

Paul Ricoeur clearly sought to differentiate between and keep separate his philosophical and theological intellectual endeavors. This essay brings into relief a deep, implicit, recapitulative pattern in Ricoeur’s thinking that cuts across this explicit “conceptual asceticism.” Specifically, it highlights this recapitulative pattern in Ricoeur’s treatment of prophecy in the Hebrew Bible; his understanding of utopia and ideology; the functioning of symbols in The Symbolism of Evil and of sublimation in Freud and Philosophy. On these topics Ricoeur extended his typical generosity toward all that might appear to be outdated, primitive, and even regressive in our collective and personal humanity. The frequently recapitulative nature of Ricoeur’s insights indicates the importance not just of the content of his thought but also the way in which he did his thinking, a pattern which above all was generous, even to a fault. 


2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-434
Author(s):  
Robert Piercey

AbstractIt is now widely accepted that philosophers should be historically self-conscious. But what does this mean in practice? How does historical consciousness change the way we philosophize? To answer this question, I examine two philosophers who put historical consciousness at the heart of their projects: Richard Rorty and Paul Ricoeur. Rorty and Ricoeur both argue that historical consciousness leads us to see philosophy as fragmented. It leads us to view our thinking from multiple perspectives at once, perspectives that are often in considerable tension. But Rorty and Ricoeur reach radically different conclusions about how we should respond to this fragmentation. Their disagreement, I argue, is closely connected to their views of identity. Rorty and Ricoeur have different understandings of what it means for something to be unified, and thus different ideas about what it would take for our perspectives on ourselves to be brought together. My argument for this claim has four parts. First, I try to identify the problems that historical consciousness raises for philosophy, and explain why the most common response to them is unsatisfactory. Second, I discuss Rorty’s claim that historical consciousness ought to make us ironists about our philosophical views, and to abandon truth as a goal of inquiry. Third, I contrast Rorty’s position with Ricoeur’s. Ricoeur argues that we can be historically self-aware and still see philosophy as a rational enterprise that aims at truth. I argue that Ricoeur’s optimism on this point is rooted in his view of identity, and specifically in his distinction between idem- and ipse-identity. Finally, I ask what all of this shows about the options available to historically minded philosophers today.


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