RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RULING ELITE AND THE MASSES: THE ESSENCE OF THE BASIC APPROACHES AND CONCEPTS

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (1(24)) ◽  
pp. 64-70
Author(s):  
О. В. Прядко
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Abdulhamid Ozohu-Suleiman ◽  
Shehu Mustapha Liberty

Following the commencement of the third wave democratization in Africa, scholarly preoccupation shifted, or at least began to shift away from the over flogged discourse on colonial antecedents and authoritarian rule among others, as explanations for governance failure in the continent. Thus, the prevailing liberal political conditions now offer a new perspective to articulate the development problematic in emergent democracies of Africa. This paper seeks to examine how the negative outcomes generated by this governance system have made development the casualty of the democratization process in Nigeria. It advances the thesis of elite collusion to provide insights into the causes of governance failure in Nigeria. The paper argues that the hegemonic interest of the ruling elite remains the predominant factor that narrowly defines public policy. By means of interpretative approach the paper reviewed secondary data from extant literature and development reports that are Germaine to the subject matter of the study. It established that much of the development deficit is the predictable consequence of the disconnect between the common good and state policy/institutional action. This disconnect is exacerbated by a political environment that is overwhelmed by self-seeking and unpatriotic ruling elite. The paper concludes that; democracy, though, a necessary condition for good governance and sustainable development, requires an ideologically driven party politics to reconstruct the prevalent governance system. A number of recommendations are made among which are; an urgent need to build strong governance institutions that are rule bound (re-bureaucratization) in order to neutralize elite collusion, and a realignment of the democratization process to embrace the variant of social democracy – an option that prioritizes the participation of the masses in the development process.


TECHNOLOGOS ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 65-77
Author(s):  
Selyaninova Gulsina

The article focuses on the revolutionary ethics of the Russian intelligentsia based on the idea of the service to the people, sacrifice and the possibility of using violence in the struggle for a future happy society. The revolutionary ethics based on violence was expressed in the fact that the very idea of revolution became absolute. Inherent in the revolutionary movement was a fanatical readiness to sacrifice themselves and others to the abstract idea of revolutionary victory for the sake of abstract human happiness. Revolutionary ethics subverted the religious values that preserved the moral health of society. To be sure, the idea of revolutionary violence was primarily shaped by the subversive activities of the revolutionary Russian intelligentsia. But this process was also shaped by other events of world history. Researchers have noted the great influence of the First World War, in which Russia was drawn by the ruling elite. Maintaining the stability of society on the basis of empathy and respect for human life was also one of the tendencies of the era which the revolutionary intelligentsia ignored. This tendency was expressed in Tolstoy's doctrine of non-violence (non-resistance to evil with violence) and also in collections of articles “Problems of Idealism” (1902), “Milestones” (1909), and “From Depth” (1918), which expressed religious and ethical values. The practices of embodying revolutionary ethics from February to October 1917 in the Urals on the basis of archival historical sources have also been considered in the article. The February Revolution of 1917 intensified the politicization of public consciousness which was largely tragic (including intelligentsia) in conditions of the general low level of culture of the masses. The author concludes that the democratization of the political life of the Russian society in February - October 1917 was accompanied by the implementation of the ideas of revolutionary overthrow of the existing foundations, developed by the revolutionary intelligentsia. This process was complemented by the destructive instincts of the masses, and the Bolsheviks’ coming to power in October 1917 was a visible embodiment of the violent seizure of power.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-278
Author(s):  
Talip Kucukcan

The Islamic Society of the London School of Economics (LondonUniversity) recently orgamed a one-day conference on “Islam, Democracy andFreedom in North Africa.” In attendance were scholars from several universitiesas well as religious leaders and former statesmen. The audience was composedmainly of university students.The first session featured S. Salaam of the Sorbonne (Paris), who discussedthe recent situation in Algeria after touching on late nineteenth- and earlytwentiethcentury social, political, and religious developments. He talked aboutthe ulama’s role as a source of mobilization against French colonial rule as wellas their attempts to motivate the masses, through their dynamic Islamic teachings,to struggle for the emancipation of Algeria. According to him, the moral andspiritual support of the learned segment of Algerian society enabled the nationalistleaders to unite the people behind a national cause, one which is also conceivedof as the religious obligation of jihad. On a more recent note, Salaam noted thatthe media has attributed the Islamic Salvation Party’s (FIS) success in the lastelections to Algeria’s economic backwardness. While there may be some truthto this argument, the success of Islamic ideology lies in its emphasis on socialjustice and equality, the strengthening of morality, and the uplifting of Qur’anicteachings. This is in stark contrast to the widespread corruption prevalent amongthe ruling elite. Salaam argued that the FIS has provided people with an authenticsense of identity which can be used to fill the gaps caused by modernization.The second paper was presented by Julian C. Hollick, a radio joumalist withAmerica’s National Public Radio organization. Addressing the topic of Islamand the media, Hollick laid out the Western media’s misconceptions anddistortions of Islam, which he attributed to either poor journalism or ignoranceof (or prejudice towards) Islam. He noted that journalists are not as objectiveas is commonly believed, for they are products of a given society and share inits stereotypical images and prejudices. These factors can prevent a journalistfrom penetrating beneath the surface of a foreign culture and society. Hollickproposed that ignorance of different interpretations of events and a superficialstudy of the phenomenon being investigated results in both poor journalism anda distorted coverage of events. He stated that many Western journalists tend tocover the ”pathologic aspects of development“ in the Muslim world (i.e., militantIslam and women’s rights) since such stories have a greater chance of being ...


Author(s):  
G. N. KANINSKAYA

The phenomenon of a right populism in modern France is analyzed.  In such context, the theoretical approaches of leading French  historians, sociologists and political scientists to the definition of  populism are considered. The main differences in the definition of  populism by different specialists are shown. Different manifestations of populism such as the left-, rightwing, and  emanating from the masses and the ruling elite are characterized.  The features of a modern right-wing populism are reviewed on the  example of the National Front Party (NF), headed by Marin Le Pen.  The political, cultural, electoral and institutional factors that led to  the growing popularity of the NF are studied. The specifics of the  success of the “fronts” in various elections, beginning in 2012, are  presented in a “long-term”, “medium-term” and “short-term”  perspective. Weaknesses in governing the country of systemic ruling left and right parties, and the growth of distrust towards them  by civil society are shown. The evolution of the National Front  since the founding of the party by Jean-Marie Le Pen and internal  party crises are considered. The author comes to the conclusion  that, despite the fact that in the doctrinal plan the “marinists” have  not moved away from the “national populism” that followed the NF  congress on March 10-11, 2018, tactical actions and a change in the  name of the party suggest that that the party is trying to become  the second system right-wing party in France. Besides, the strong  assertion of populism in global political culture has become a  challenge to liberal democracy in the 21st century, so it could be  expected to manifest itself in other far-right associations.


Author(s):  
Craige B. Champion

This book takes a new approach to the study of Roman elites' religious practices and beliefs, using current theories in psychology, sociology, and anthropology, as well as cultural and literary studies. The book focuses on what the elites of the Middle Republic (ca. 250–ca. 100 BCE) actually did in the religious sphere, rather than what they merely said or wrote about it, in order to provide a more nuanced and satisfying historical reconstruction of what their religion may have meant to those who commanded the Roman world and its imperial subjects. The book examines the nature and structure of the major priesthoods in Rome itself, Roman military commanders' religious behaviors in dangerous field conditions, and the state religion's acceptance or rejection of new cults and rituals in response to external events that benefited or threatened the Republic. According to a once-dominant but now-outmoded interpretation of Roman religion that goes back to the ancient Greek historian Polybius, the elites didn't believe in their gods but merely used religion to control the masses. Using that interpretation as a counterfactual lens, the book argues instead that Roman elites sincerely tried to maintain Rome's good fortune through a pax deorum or “peace of the gods.” The result offers rich new insights into the role of religion in the lives of the Roman ruling elite.


Author(s):  
Nikolay S. Savkin

Introduction. In the 21st century the phenomenon of imitation associated with the formal reproduction of operations and procedures is gaining popularity in many countries, including Russia, and requires a socio-philosophical analysis and interpretation. Imitation manifests itself in politics, economics, science, education, replacing the real activities of individuals, social groups, political structures with a fake form of activity, thereby representing a social danger to development. Research Methods. In the process of the study, dialectical-materialistic, synergetic methods were used, which made it possible to draw objective, scientifically-based conclusions about the possibility and necessity of overcoming the negative consequences of imitative influences in education, healthcare and science. A systematic approach and a comprehensive assessment of the processes under study makes it possible to reveal the contradictory nature of simulation manipulations. The Results. The finding of the study indicate that the imitation of public administration leads to the loss of high prestige of the state as a leading social institution for regulating socio-economic processes in society, and a decline in the authority of the ruling elite. In the minds of the masses of people there are doubts about the ability of the “top” to systematically manage the development of society. Discussion and Conclusion. The expected effect of a critical analysis of the manifestations of imitation in public administration, healthcare, science, and education is the desire of state structures, party organizations to overcome the negative consequences of imitation manifestations. In the field of science, there is an urgent need to regulate the transparency of financial flows, all decision-making procedures, upgrade equipment and instruments, radically increase salaries in order to attract young people to scientific research, to raise the prestige of science.


2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Hopf

AbstractThe IR literature on hegemony rarely combines attention to material power and ideas. Cox's neo-Gramscian work is a rare exception, but it too narrowly construes Gramsci's conceptualization of common sense, reducing it to elite views on political economy. But Gramsci argued that hegemony had to reckon with mass quotidian common sense. If political elites do not take into account the taken-for-granted world of the masses, elite ideological projects would likely founder against daily practices of resistance. In this article, I show how mass common sense can be an obstacle to an elite hegemonic project aimed at moving a great power into the core of the world capitalist economy. In contemporary Russia, a ruling elite with a neoliberal project is being thwarted daily by a mass common sense that has little affinity with democratic market capitalism. Scholarly work on future Chinese, Brazilian, or Indian participation in constructing a new hegemonic order would do well to pay attention to the mass common senses prevailing in those societies


2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 103-106
Author(s):  
Jay Willoughby

Imagine that a struggling revolutionary movement is promising paradiseafter your defenseless country is unwillingly sucked into the maelstrom oftotal war; that the revolutionary leaders are highly respected men andwomen, many of whom were educated in the former colonial master’shomeland; and that the ruler, who is credited with single-handedly achievingyour nation’s independence and enjoys near-divine status among the masses, joins the revolutionaries after being overthrown and calls upon youto do likewise. And then, full of post-victory idealism, imagine that you livefor three years, eight months, and twenty days in the horror that introduceda new word into the English language: auto-genocide. Welcome to DemocraticKampuchea, whose ruling elite, the Khmer Rouge, targeted theauthor’s people, the Cham Muslims, for extermination: “The enemies ofAngkar [the “Organization”] come in many categories, but the biggest enemiesare the Cham. The plan is to destroy them all before 1980” (p. 6).This book is divided into five parts: “Introduction,” “S-21 PrisonerCases,” “Analysis,” “References,” and “Appendix.” The “Introduction” dealswith the controversial questions of how many Cham died under the KhmerRouge (from 77,000 to 400,000-500,000) and how many lived in Cambodiabefore the Khmer Rouge took over (from about 250,000 to 700,000, the latternumber being accepted by the Cham). Osman then moves on to how theKhmer Rouge sought to destroy community solidarity: turning Cham againstCham and children against parents, forbidding Islamic and Cham customs intoto, destroying the Qur’an and the keitab (a book explaining the Qur’an),making local leaders “disappear,” splitting up families during forced evacuations,and resettling the Cham among ethnic Khmer and Chinese. He alsoexplains why he chose the thirteen case studies that make up the next part:“…there is sufficient documentation for study and research” (p. 8) ...


2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles C. Fonchingong

Nurturing Cameroon’s fledgling democracy is proving a herculean task against the backdrop of disintegrative forces: flawed electoral process, ethnicity, identity consciousness, clientelism, endemic corruption, regionalism and neopatrimonialism inherent in the state apparatus. The undercurrents on the interface of statehood in Cameroon’s democratization process from the ’90s are explored. There is an enormous gulf between the state and the masses with the elite playing a prominent role in political sloganeering and regionalism, leading to a heightened sense of exclusion. The bureaucratic ethos still remains largely centralised despite the discourses on decentralisation. The simmering Anglophone problem is still brushed aside. The paper illuminates on the disruption and fragmentation of national politics which has led to the emergence of identity and ethnic constructions in the search for belonging to the polity. The question of legitimacy and civic participation is largely distorted due to the disinterestedness of the populace in the state machinery. This is rendered more fluid by the manipulative tendencies of the regime, ruling elite and a fractured opposition. The fundamental question is whether Cameroon was adequately prepared for multiparty politics. Rekindling Cameroon’s botched democratic process hinges on the institutionalisation of consensus building, democratic accountability and participative governance.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vivienne Muller

The Hunger Games trilogy by Suzanne Collins deals with a dystopian future society in which a punitive ruling elite provide ‘entertainment’ for the masses in the form of mediatised ‘games’ featuring young people who must fight to kill one another until there is only one winner. The purpose of these games is to remind the populace of the power of the government and its ability to dispose of any who dare to defy it. In acknowledging violent ‘games’ as virtual entertainments which can be used to political effect, Collins suggests that they possess a disturbing capacity to undermine ethical perspective on the human, the humane and the real. Drawing on Baudrillard's ideas about simulation and simulacra as well as Elaine Scarry's and Susan Sontag's concerns for media representations of the body in pain, this paper discusses the ways in which the texts highlight the dangers of virtual modes while also risking perpetuating their entertainment value.


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