The Commission’s initiative on the passerelle clauses – Exploring the unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-508
Author(s):  
Robert Böttner
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
European Council ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Commission President ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced general and special passerelle or bridging clauses into primary law. They can be used to alter voting arrangements from unanimity to qualified majority in the Council or from a special to the ordinary legislative procedure. This is to enable a shift to more supranational decision-making without the need for a full-fledged treaty revision. The European Parliament called on the European Council and the Council to make use of the passerelle clauses, also to involve Parliament as a co-legislator under the ordinary legislative procedure. The former Commission had started a discussion on the use of the passerelle clauses in four policy areas and it appears that the incumbent Commission President has endorsed this ambitious project. This article aims to explore the potential and the shortcomings of the bridging clauses as part of the unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty and discusses the enhanced cooperation procedure as a possible alternative.

scholarly journals The abandonment of the Spitzenkandidaten System: (Un)sustainable democracy in the EU?

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-80
Author(s):  
Carlos Espaliú Berdud
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Commission President ◽  
The Eu

In the process of the parliamentarisation of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon took a further step forward by introducing into the founding treaties - Article 17.7 TEU- the need to take into account the elections to the European Parliament for the appointment of the President of the Commission. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has been trying to impose its interpretation of Article 17.7 TEU, which has been coined into the Spitzenkandidaten doctrine, according to which the head of the party winning the elections should be elected as Commission President. The Parliament succeeded in imposing its vision with the occasion of the appointment of Juncker in 2014. Nevertheless, by not proposing Manfred Weber, the leader of the most voted party in the 2019 elections, as President, the European Council has prevented the consolidation of the 2014 precedent. Article 17.7 of the TEU also expresses the desire to bring the European elections closer to the citizens, so that their opinion is taken into account when the President of the Commission is elected. And it seems that both the results of participation in 2019 and the perception of the voters show that the Spitzenkandidaten system has been useful for that purpose. In any event, I consider that the fact that citizens voted in the 2019 elections in the belief that their votes would be decisive in appointing the President of the Commission and, in the end, it was not elected an Spitzenkandidaten as head of the Commission, is a very serious lack of consideration for citizens. Received:  03 February 2021Accepted: 25 March 2021

scholarly journals (Un)settling the precedent: Contrasting institutionalisation dynamics in the spitzenkandidaten procedure of 2014 and 2019

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316802092597
Author(s):  
Eva G. Heidbreder ◽  
Daniel Schade
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Use Of Resources ◽  
Building Process ◽  
Commission President ◽  
To Come ◽  
Key Resources

The article analyses the application of the spitzenkandidaten procedure as instances of a larger institution building process in which the European Parliament and the European Council try to enact competing rules. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new clause on how to appoint the Commission President. While in 2014 the European Parliament successfully realised its interpretation according to which the winning spitzenkandidat became Commission President, in 2019 the Council succeeded in deciding not only who would take the Commission presidency but also other key positions. We consider both appointments as cases of decision-making in a natural arena that lack stable institutions about how to appoint the Commission president. Accordingly, the single decisions pended on the case-specific strategic use of resources. While the analysis of the two single cases does not allow us to predict what the institutional rules for future appointments will be, we can identify key resources and strategies that will determine how the institutional rules will be shaped in the elections to come and thus further the understanding of the institutionalisation in the making.

scholarly journals Efficiency and Effectiveness of the European Parliament under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 70
Author(s):  
Matei ◽  
Ciora ◽  
Dumitru ◽  
Ceche
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Efficiency And Effectiveness ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure

In the aftermath of the 2019 European elections, the article tries to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the European Parliament within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). After defining and formulating the main indicators, the paper analyses the micro- and macro-performance of the European Parliament within the decision-making process from a quantitative-qualitative and a qualitative-quantitative perspective; highlighting the relativizing factors and the responsiveness of the European decision-making process to the Europeans’ needs.

scholarly journals Efficiency and Effectiveness of the European Parliament under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ani Matei ◽  
Cristina Ciora ◽  
Reli Ceche ◽  
Adrian Stelian Dumitru
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
European Institutions ◽  
Efficiency And Effectiveness ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure

On the eve of the Brexit process, in the context of a rising Euroscepticism that fuels the modest confidence of European citizens in their national and European institutions, the article assesses the efficiency and effectiveness of the European Parliament within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). After defining and formulating the main indicators, the paper analyses the micro- and macro-performance of the European Parliament within the decision-making process from a quantitative-qualitative and a qualitative-quantitative perspective, highlighting the relativizing factors and the responsiveness of the European decision-making process to the Europeans’ needs.

scholarly journals 15. European parties: A powerful caucus in the European Parliament and beyond

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tapio Raunio
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
European Parties ◽  
Commission President ◽  
State Of Research ◽  
Political Groups

This chapter examines the party system of the European Parliament (EP). In the early 1950s, members of the EP decided to form party-political groups instead of national blocs to counterbalance the dominance of national interests in the European Council. Since then, the party groups have gradually, but consistently, consolidated their positions in the EP. The chapter first considers the shape of the EP party system, the structure of the party groups, and the role of national parties within them. It then looks at the Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidates) initiative, whereby the Europarties put forward their own candidates for the Commission President in the 2014 elections. It also discusses coalition politics and parliamentary committees as well as electoral accountability in the EP and concludes with an overview of the state of research on the EP party system, emphasizing the need to understand how coalitions are formed in the committees and the plenary.

scholarly journals BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PASSERELLE CLAUSES

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-15
Author(s):  
Mihaela Pătrăuș ◽  
Darius-Dennis Pătrăuș
Keyword(s):  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Judicial Cooperation ◽  
Legislative Procedures ◽  
The Family ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
European Policies ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
The Eu

The Lisbon Treaty in order to strengthen the EU's capacity to decide, to act and to ensure the legitimacy of decisions taken at the same time, reformed the decision-making process of the EU, particularly by changing the legislative procedures in force.Among the novelties of the Lisbon Treaty, we must mention the passerelle clauses, which according to the ordinary legislative procedure will be generalized, under certain conditions, in areas which were initially outside its scope.The treaty nominates two types of passerelle clauses: the general passerelle clause which applies to all European policies and the enabling of this clause will be authorized by a decision of the European Council, acting unanimously; the passerelle clauses specific to certain European policies (MFF, Common Security and Defence Policy, judicial cooperation regarding the family rights- this specific clause is the only one explaining which national parliaments keep their right to oppose; cooperation is strengthened in the areas governed by unanimity or by a special legislative procedure, social affairs, environmental ).The flexibility introduced through a significant number of passerelle clauses in the Lisbon Treaty allows adjustment of the EU quickly and efficiently, depending on punctual developments, without neglecting the guarantees on the sovereignty of member states.

Time is of the essence: Explaining the duration of European Union lawmaking under the co-decision procedure

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110364
Author(s):  
Adam Kirpsza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
European Parliament Elections

The article explores factors affecting the duration of the co-decision procedure (currently the ordinary legislative procedure), the main procedure for adopting legislation in the European Union. Drawing from rational choice institutionalism, it expects the speed of co-decision to be determined by three attributes: the impatience of legislators, issue linkage and the characteristics of Council and European Parliament negotiators ( relais actors). The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis on a dataset of 599 controversial legislative acts submitted and enacted under co-decision between 1999 and 2009. The results show that co-decision proposals are decided faster when they are urgent, negotiated prior to the European Parliament elections and concluded through single proposal logrolls. By contrast, multi-proposal packages and the ideological distance between relais actors prolong decision-making. Overall, the article contributes to the literature by showing that the impatience of legislators, package deals and the properties of negotiators are relevant drivers of co-decision duration.

Article 178 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Regional Development ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Development Fund ◽  
European Regional Development Fund ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure ◽  
Committee Of The Regions ◽  
European Regional

Article 162 EC Implementing regulations relating to the European Regional Development Fund shall be taken by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

Article 59 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Tomkin
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Specific Service ◽  
Article 59 ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure

Article 52 EC In order to achieve the liberalisation of a specific service, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall issue directives.

Article 133 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Single Currency ◽  
European Central ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure

Without prejudice to the powers of the European Central Bank, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down the measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the European Central Bank.

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