The European Parliament and executive politics in the EU: voting behaviour and the Commission President investiture procedure

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-80
Author(s):  
Carlos Espaliú Berdud

In the process of the parliamentarisation of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon took a further step forward by introducing into the founding treaties - Article 17.7 TEU- the need to take into account the elections to the European Parliament for the appointment of the President of the Commission. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has been trying to impose its interpretation of Article 17.7 TEU, which has been coined into the Spitzenkandidaten doctrine, according to which the head of the party winning the elections should be elected as Commission President. The Parliament succeeded in imposing its vision with the occasion of the appointment of Juncker in 2014. Nevertheless, by not proposing Manfred Weber, the leader of the most voted party in the 2019 elections, as President, the European Council has prevented the consolidation of the 2014 precedent. Article 17.7 of the TEU also expresses the desire to bring the European elections closer to the citizens, so that their opinion is taken into account when the President of the Commission is elected. And it seems that both the results of participation in 2019 and the perception of the voters show that the Spitzenkandidaten system has been useful for that purpose. In any event, I consider that the fact that citizens voted in the 2019 elections in the belief that their votes would be decisive in appointing the President of the Commission and, in the end, it was not elected an Spitzenkandidaten as head of the Commission, is a very serious lack of consideration for citizens. Received:  03 February 2021Accepted: 25 March 2021


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 870-879
Author(s):  
Frank Decker

After the 2019 European election, national political actors and party officials in both the European Parliament as well as in the Council once again clashed over the selection of the Commission’s President, a controversy that also received widespread public attention . Disagreements centered on the so-called Spitzenkandidaten - top candidate - system that - contrary to its premiere in 2014 - failed to be implemented . The manner in which this system functions is frequently misunderstood by both political actors and observers . One example is that the appointment process is interpreted through the lens of parliamentary democracy, another is that the overrepresentation of smaller member states within the European Parliament is depicted as a serious violation of democratic principles . Potential starting points for a thorough democratization of the EU, such as the direct election of the Commission President, a common electoral system with joint European parties, and a greater say by voters and the President of the Commission regarding the appointment of commissioners are also discussed . [ZParl, vol . 50 (2019), no . 4, pp . 870 - 879]


Author(s):  
Uwe Puetter

The chapter focuses on the implications of Brexit on the EU inter-institutional balance, and inter-state relations, and argues that not much change is to be expected here. According to Puetter, the UK already dramatically reduced its engagement inside the EU institutions. It isolated itself within the European Council and it was the only Member State together with Hungary to vote against the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President in 2014. The UK lost influence in the European Parliament as a result of David Cameron’s decision to take the Conservative party out of the European Peoples’ Party. Brexit may make room for greater roles for countries like Italy and Spain, yet, the German–French axis will probably remain dominant. Puetter suggests that the inter-institutional equilibrium within the EU will not change. Brexit is unlikely to shift the balance from the European Council back towards the European Commission.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4 (1)) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Marek Danikowski

The right of EU citizens residing in another Member State, to vote and stand in elections to the European Parliament is a major achievement of the European democracy. In the light of EU citizens’ still insufficient knowledge concerning the opportunities and benefits brought in by this right, it is worth making this institution more familiar to themin a straightforward way, at the same time balancing criticism towards the idea of the EU.


Author(s):  
Panagiotis Delimatsis

Secrecy and informality rather than transparency traditionally reign trade negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. Yet, transparency ranks among the most basic desiderata in the grammar of global governance and has been regarded as positively related to legitimacy. In the EU’s case, transparent trade diplomacy is quintessential for constitutional—but also for broader political—reasons. First, even if trade matters fall within the EU’s exclusive competence, the EU executive is bound by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to inform the European Parliament, the EU co-legislator, in regular intervals. Second, transparency at an early stage is important to address public reluctance, suspicion, or even opposition regarding a particular trade deal. This chapter chronicles the quest for and turning moments relating to transparency during the EU trade negotiations with Canada (CETA); the US (TTIP), and various WTO members on services (TiSA).


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes

In November 2016, the European Commission presented the Clean-Energy-for-all-Europeans Package. It consists of eight legislative proposals which should define targets and policy and regulatory frameworks for the EU's climate and energy policies up to 2030 and beyond. Recasts of the existing Renewable Energies Directive and the Energy Efficiency Directive, as well as proposals for a new energy market design, which should be fit for renewables, are among the key elements of the package, which aims at replacing the existing 2020-framework. The package includes 2030-targets for Greenhouse Gas Reduction (at least 40%), Energy Efficiency (at least 27/30%), and the share of Renewables in Gross Final Energy Consumption (at least 27%). In contrast to the 2020-framework, the EU-wide renewables-target would no longer be underpinned by binding national targets but should be reached in a joint effort with a new governance system. Since the proposal was submitted to the European Parliament and the European Council for the legislative procedures which must end in an agreement before the next elections for the European Parliament in 2019, controversial debates are taking place. The intention is to finalise the legal procedures before the end of 2018. Parliament and Council had planned to decide about their respective opinions about the various pieces by February 2018. Afterwards, probably not finished before the end of 2018, compromise negations will take place, before the whole package will eventually be accepted by both bodies. Among the most controversially discussed topics is the ambition level of the proposals and whether or not it is in line with the commitments signed by the EU and all its Member States in the context of the Paris Agreement. Industry stakeholders not only from the renewable energy sector and environmental NGOs have proposed significantly higher targets in order to stay “well below 2 °C” of global warming before the end of the century. They also suggested continuing binding national targets or − as a compromise − enacting a very strict governance system. I shall present and evaluate the state of play of the 2030-framework decision process. And I shall end with some policy recommendation still to be considered in the ongoing debate.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-649
Author(s):  
Bas Schotel

AbstractFor the first time in its history, the EU is in the process of acquiring significant and genuine permanent operational powers. A new Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard provides Frontex with a permanent corps of 10,000 border guards—3,000 of which will be EU agents—its own equipment, and its own competences to intervene along the EU borders and beyond. The operational powers will allow the EU to directly and physically intervene in tangible reality.This Article argues that the conferral of operational powers on the EU poses a risk to individual legal protection. This is because once authorities have acquired operational powers of a certain extent and quality, they can afford to act against or without the law by simply overpowering or eluding the legal mechanisms that normally constrain the exercise of public power. So far, Members of the European Parliament and academics critical of Frontex and the new Regulation have overlooked this issue and concentrated exclusively on how to legally constrain the exercise of operational powers. This Article addresses this blind spot by examining whether and how public law should place legal constraints not only on the exercise but also on the build-up of operational powers.


Management ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 473-487
Author(s):  
Andrzej Czyżewski ◽  
Sebastian Stępień

Summary The objective of the paper is to present the results of negotiations on the EU budget for 2014-2020, with particular emphasis on the Common Agricultural Policy. Authors indicate the steps for establishing the budget, from the proposal of the European Commission presented in 2011, ending with the draft of UE budget agreed at the meeting of the European Council on February 2013 and the meeting of the AGRIFISH on March 2013 and then approved by the political agreement of the European Commission, European Parliament and European Council on June 2013. In this context, there will be an assessment of the new budget from the point of view of Polish economy and agriculture.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document