scholarly journals 15. European parties: A powerful caucus in the European Parliament and beyond

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tapio Raunio
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
European Parties ◽  
Commission President ◽  
State Of Research ◽  
Political Groups

This chapter examines the party system of the European Parliament (EP). In the early 1950s, members of the EP decided to form party-political groups instead of national blocs to counterbalance the dominance of national interests in the European Council. Since then, the party groups have gradually, but consistently, consolidated their positions in the EP. The chapter first considers the shape of the EP party system, the structure of the party groups, and the role of national parties within them. It then looks at the Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidates) initiative, whereby the Europarties put forward their own candidates for the Commission President in the 2014 elections. It also discusses coalition politics and parliamentary committees as well as electoral accountability in the EP and concludes with an overview of the state of research on the EP party system, emphasizing the need to understand how coalitions are formed in the committees and the plenary.

15. European parties:

2021 ◽  
pp. 348-368
Author(s):  
Tapio Raunio
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Party System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
European Level ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Social Democrats ◽  
European Parties ◽  
Commission President ◽  
The One ◽  
Political Groups

The party system of the European Parliament (EP) has been dominated by the two main European party families: centre-right conservatives and Christian democrats, on the one hand, and centre-left social democrats on the other, which controlled the majority of the seats until the 2019 elections. In the early 1950s, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) decided to form party-political groups, instead of national blocs, to counterbalance the dominance of national interests in the Council. Over the decades, the shape of the EP party system has become more stable, and traditional levels of group cohesion and coalition formation have not really been affected by the rise of populism and the increasing politicization of European integration. National parties remain influential within party groups, not least through their control of candidate selection. Outside of the Parliament, Europarties—parties operating at the European level—influence both the broader development of integration and the choice of the Commission president.

scholarly journals The Role of the European Socialists in the EU Political System

2021 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 83-93
Author(s):  
Boris Guseletov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
European Parties ◽  
The One ◽  
The Eu

The article explores the formation of a single European socio-political space and the evolution of the institution of pan-European political parties (Europarties). It is shown that the growth of practical and scientific interest to the European parties was associated with the gradual strengthening of the role and influence of this relatively new institution in the political system of the EU. The authors identified new trends in the development of the institute of European parties. On the one hand, the confrontation between the supporters of European integration (Eurooptimists) and their opponents (Eurosceptics) has intensified. On the other hand, the format of relations between individual European parties (in particular, the Party of European Socialists, which traditionally supports the expansion of ties between governments and society) with European civil society and key political institutions of the EU (the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament) is gradually changing. Based on the analysis of materials related to the activities of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in the last two years, it is shown that this party has managed to create specific tools and mechanisms to strengthen its ties with civil activists (the so-called PES networks on various issues), national member parties, to involve representatives of this party in its work in the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament.

The Commission’s initiative on the passerelle clauses – Exploring the unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-508
Author(s):  
Robert Böttner
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
European Council ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Legislative Procedure ◽  
Commission President ◽  
Ordinary Legislative Procedure

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced general and special passerelle or bridging clauses into primary law. They can be used to alter voting arrangements from unanimity to qualified majority in the Council or from a special to the ordinary legislative procedure. This is to enable a shift to more supranational decision-making without the need for a full-fledged treaty revision. The European Parliament called on the European Council and the Council to make use of the passerelle clauses, also to involve Parliament as a co-legislator under the ordinary legislative procedure. The former Commission had started a discussion on the use of the passerelle clauses in four policy areas and it appears that the incumbent Commission President has endorsed this ambitious project. This article aims to explore the potential and the shortcomings of the bridging clauses as part of the unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty and discusses the enhanced cooperation procedure as a possible alternative.

scholarly journals The abandonment of the Spitzenkandidaten System: (Un)sustainable democracy in the EU?

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-80
Author(s):  
Carlos Espaliú Berdud
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Commission President ◽  
The Eu

In the process of the parliamentarisation of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon took a further step forward by introducing into the founding treaties - Article 17.7 TEU- the need to take into account the elections to the European Parliament for the appointment of the President of the Commission. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has been trying to impose its interpretation of Article 17.7 TEU, which has been coined into the Spitzenkandidaten doctrine, according to which the head of the party winning the elections should be elected as Commission President. The Parliament succeeded in imposing its vision with the occasion of the appointment of Juncker in 2014. Nevertheless, by not proposing Manfred Weber, the leader of the most voted party in the 2019 elections, as President, the European Council has prevented the consolidation of the 2014 precedent. Article 17.7 of the TEU also expresses the desire to bring the European elections closer to the citizens, so that their opinion is taken into account when the President of the Commission is elected. And it seems that both the results of participation in 2019 and the perception of the voters show that the Spitzenkandidaten system has been useful for that purpose. In any event, I consider that the fact that citizens voted in the 2019 elections in the belief that their votes would be decisive in appointing the President of the Commission and, in the end, it was not elected an Spitzenkandidaten as head of the Commission, is a very serious lack of consideration for citizens. Received:  03 February 2021Accepted: 25 March 2021

scholarly journals Das Scheitern des Spitzenkandidatensystems und andere populäre Irrtümer über die Demokratisierung der Europäischen Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 870-879
Author(s):  
Frank Decker
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Public Attention ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
European Parties ◽  
Commission President ◽  
European Election ◽  
Democratic Principles ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
The Eu

After the 2019 European election, national political actors and party officials in both the European Parliament as well as in the Council once again clashed over the selection of the Commission’s President, a controversy that also received widespread public attention . Disagreements centered on the so-called Spitzenkandidaten - top candidate - system that - contrary to its premiere in 2014 - failed to be implemented . The manner in which this system functions is frequently misunderstood by both political actors and observers . One example is that the appointment process is interpreted through the lens of parliamentary democracy, another is that the overrepresentation of smaller member states within the European Parliament is depicted as a serious violation of democratic principles . Potential starting points for a thorough democratization of the EU, such as the direct election of the Commission President, a common electoral system with joint European parties, and a greater say by voters and the President of the Commission regarding the appointment of commissioners are also discussed . [ZParl, vol . 50 (2019), no . 4, pp . 870 - 879]

scholarly journals European Affiliations or National Interests? Analyses of Voting Patterns on Trade Policy in European Parliament

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-48
Author(s):  
Yoo-Duk Kang
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Probit Model ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Political Affiliation ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Members Of European Parliament ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
Country Specific

Abstract This article examines the determinants of voting patterns within the European Parliament for EU trade legislations including EU trade agreements. Given that trade is a very sensitive issue for particular Member States, our question is to verify whether members of European Parliament (MEP) tend to vote in line with their political affiliation or national identity prevails in voting for trade-related issues. Our results from EU trade agreements with Korea and Columbia/Peru show that MEPs tend to vote with others in their political groups in trade legislations and their voting pattern is not very different from the overall voting pattern observed in other policy areas. This trend is confirmed by both the comparison of intra-voting cohesion index and the empirical test based on the probit model. Country-specific variables do not explain well the voting behavior of MEPs in trade issues. However, it is noteworthy that some MEPs voted in line with their national interests in case of EU-Korea FTA.

scholarly journals Punching Below Its Weight: The Role of the European Parliament in Politicised Consultation Procedures

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Chiara Vinciguerra
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Unintended Effect ◽  
Bargaining Position ◽  
Policy Making Process ◽  
Level I ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Do So

With Lisbon, the European Parliament formally acquired an equal standing to that of the Council of the EU in the making of policies in the AFSJ (area of freedom, security and justice). However, the growing political salience of policy issues at stake and bottom-up politicisation in the AFSJ has had the unintended effect of undermining the European Parliament’s internal unity even under consultation procedures. To show how this played out in practice during Europe’s migration and refugee crisis, this article analyses the European Parliament’s role, preferences, and bargaining position in the making of two Refugee Relocation Decisions (Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601) under consultation procedure. To do so, this article exploits Putnam’s two-level framework (level I and II politics throughout the policy-making process) to explore early agenda-setting attempts and groups’ positions on issues of refugee relocation and burden-sharing, as they were formally stated in their position papers and expressed at the LIBE Committee and at plenary. This article shows that the high domestic salience and politicization of the issues at stake left MEPs torn between competing principals at home and within their European Parliament political groups and had the effect of weakening overall unity on the issue of refugee relocation.

3. The EU’s political institutions

2020 ◽  
pp. 40-74
Author(s):  
Steve Peers
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
National Systems ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the possible tension between democracy and effectiveness in the context of the EU’s political institutions: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, and the Commission. To this end, it examines in turn the composition, powers, and functioning of each of these institutions, comparing them to national systems and assessing their democratic accountability and the effectiveness of their functioning. It shows that the role of various EU institutions has evolved over time - in particular to strengthen the legislative role of the European Parliament, and that body’s control over the Commission.

scholarly journals Representation of Lithuanian Citizens in the European Parliament: Between European and National Interests

Politologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-106
Author(s):  
Sima Rakutienė ◽  
Ingrida Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Opinion Poll ◽  
Public Opinion Poll ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Conflict Of Interests ◽  
Semistructured Interviews ◽  
Representation Of Interests ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
Ruling Party

The article analyzes the problem of conflict of European and national interests in the activities of a Member of the European Parliament (MEP). The study seeks answers to the following questions: what factors impact the decision and voting of EP members, elected in Lithuania, in the plenary sessions in the cases of collision of interests, and to what extent the interests of the electorate, national parties, or European political groups are important to MEPs elected in Lithuania. To achieve the goal, first, a review of the scientific literature on the representation of interests in the European Parliament, the issues of conflict of interests is carried out. Next, the theoretical model of the “two-level game,” which is applied in the analysis of an MEP’s activities, is discussed. In the second part of the article, a Lithuanian case study is carried out, analyzing the data of semistructured interviews with MEPs, results of public opinion poll of the Lithuanian population, and other quantitative data. The results show that MEPs elected in Lithuania, like the MEPs elected in other countries, face the problem of a conflict of interests. The inquiry also revealed that an MEP’s decision on how to vote in an EP plenary session depends not only on whether they are a member of the opposition or the ruling party, but also on their personal preferences.

3. The EU’s political institutions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Peers
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
European Council ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
National Systems ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the possible tension between democracy and effectiveness in the context of the EU’s political institutions: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, and the Commission. To this end, it examines in turn the composition, powers, and functioning of each of these institutions, comparing them to national systems and assessing their democratic accountability and the effectiveness of their functioning. It shows that the role of various EU institutions has evolved over time - in particular to strengthen the legislative role of the European Parliament, and that body’s control over the Commission.

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