scholarly journals PATRON CLIENT: KONTRAK SEMI MUDHARABAH DALAM TEORI KEAGENAN DI PERIKANAN LAUT

El Dinar ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Vika Annisa Qurrata
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Blue Water ◽  
Marine Fisheries ◽  
Operational Costs ◽  
Depth Interviews

This study aims to find out how the skipper (as principal) interact with pandega fishermen (as agents) in creating mudaraba-style contracts in marine fisheries (patron-client). With in-depth interviews, there are two important findings: in general juragandi Blue Water Waters especially in the payang fishermen and the lifeboats impose exploitation fees or operational costs to the pandega fishermen in a shared way. Then there is a bit of aberration in the profit-sharing system, but this institution seems to exist and be a deal that never openly conflicts. Based on the findings and some literature, mudaraba contracts can be a purely alternative financing if it is more just and beneficial to both parties ie the master / shahibul maal as principal and pandega / mudharib as agent. To minimize the possibility of moral hazard and adverse selection on the mudaraba contract, it is advisable to monitor each return of the vessel for the sale of fish and the skipper can place one of the trustees other than the pandega fisherman.

scholarly journals Analysis of Low Realization For Mudharabah Financing at Muamalat Indonesia Bank, Banda Aceh

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 215-223
Author(s):  
Arinal Rahmati ◽  
Deni Mulyadi ◽  
Januddin Januddin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Income Statement ◽  
Financing Model ◽  
Depth Interviews ◽  
Problem Data ◽  
Banda Aceh

This study aims to determine the causes of low realization of mudharabah financing at Muamalat Indonesia Bank, Banda Aceh Branch. This research is expected to be a framework or model for other Islamic banks that have the same problem. Data for this study are collected through in-depth interviews and documentation studies. This research uses descriptive analysis method and the results of the data obtained are analyzed qualitatively. The results of the study show that the minimum factor of realization of mudharabah financing is caused by the bank's difficulty in obtaining the income statement accurately, transparently and routinely. In addition, mudharabah products are very vulnerable to the occurrence of moral hazard from business actors (mudharib) who tend to maximize profits resulting in reduced returns to the bank as shahibul mall. Then other factors are also influenced by the ineffectiveness of the profit-sharing financing model relating to entrepreneurs and the lack of interest in the scheme of profit sharing in business activities.

Mechanism Design for R&D Outsourcing with Double-Sided Moral Hazard and Double-Sided Adverse Selection

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1569-1574
Author(s):  
Xu Ding ◽  
Wei Dong Meng ◽  
Bo Huang ◽  
Feng Ming Tao
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Transfer Payment

It is studied that how to use profit sharing arrangement as an incentive mechanism to stimulate both parties of R&D outsourcing to reveal their private information and commit enough R&D resources or efforts. First, it is proved that the double-sided moral hazard in R&D outsourcing can not be totally prevented under traditional profit-sharing arrangement, namely, fixed, proportional or mixed profit-sharing arrangement. And a new mixed profit sharing arrangement is proposed, which is composed of a fixed transfer payment and allocation proportion, and proved to be able to prevent the double-sided moral hazard, and motivate both parties to reveal their private information and commit enough efforts.

scholarly journals The Importance of Good Customer Ethics in Improving The Financing Portion of Mudharabah

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 015
Author(s):  
Khotibul Umam
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Bank Financing

Mudharabah is a partnership contract (reputation agreement) in which one party (shahibul maal) will give his property to another party (mudharib) as productive business capital  with profit sharing between the owner of the funds/capital based on the agreed ratio in advance. In practice, the application of financing mudharabah is not easy to be implemented in Islamic banking because financing mudharabah will make the asymmetric information between the customer and Islamic banking. Mudharabah client have more information than Islamic banking about all of that business.  Asymmetric information sometimes can make the costumer do the moral hazard and adverse selection acts with the result that Islamic banking didn't take that risk and make the distribution of mudharabah financing portion becomes very small when compared to the total number of Islamic bank financing. Mudharabah Customers must have a good business ethics and always have advanced principle of honesty, trustworthy and transparent in managing shahibul maal funds in orther to they can minimize the risk of financing mudharabah and make Islamic banking be confident to grant the decision of financing mudharabah.

scholarly journals Aplikasi Pembiayaan di Bank Syari’ah

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-233
Author(s):  
Ahmad Dahlan
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
Information Problem ◽  
Sociological Aspect

The aplication of Syari’ah bank financial which is based on profit and loss sharing, known as margin profit sharing, seems facing many challenges. From the financing side, the obstacles are asymmetric information problem, side streaming, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The indirect obstacles are the sociological aspect, such as a domination of capitalist system in banking and the non optimum human resources.

Using Mudarabah for Micro-Enterprises of Refugees

2020 ◽  
pp. 593-621
Author(s):  
Omar Kachkar
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Financial Inclusion ◽  
Support Program ◽  
Support Programs ◽  
Micro Enterprises

This chapter examines the prospects and challenges of using the Mudharabah (profit-sharing partnership) instrument to extend microfinancing to refugees in microenterprise support programs. According to the literature, many Muslim refugees voluntarily exclude themselves from microfinance programs due to the element of interest that is strictly prohibited in Islam. Mudarabah as a Shari'ah-compliant mode of finance represents one potential instrument that complies with the religious teachings of Muslim refugees and could assist in the financial inclusion of many of them. Despite the inherent risks of Mudarabah such as moral hazard and adverse selection, some successful stories are remarkably encouraging. This chapter is proposing a model for a microenterprise support program based on Mudarabah. The chapter concludes that Mudarabah is a viable mode of finance provided that best practices in implementing Mudarabah as well as microfinance programmes are well adopted and observed.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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