Biology and Genetics in DSM-5

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin A. Ross

DSM-5 includes a number of statements concerning the biology and genetics of mental disorders, and these represent a significant landmark in the history of psychiatry. According to DSM-5, there are no laboratory tests, x-rays, or other biological markers for any mental disorder; there is no physiological specificity to any mental disorder; there is no genetic specificity to any mental disorder; and there is no symptom specificity to DSM-5 disorders. DSM-5 disorders, according to the manual, have porous boundaries with each other, have high rates of comorbidity, and fluctuate a great deal over time. The risk genes for mental disorders number in the hundreds, each contributes perhaps 1%–2% to the overall risk, and the same genes confer risk for multiple DSM-5 categories of disorder. The idea that DSM disorders are separate diseases with distinct pathophysiologies has been disconfirmed by the DSM-5, and therefore by the American Psychiatric Association, as it has by the National Institutes of Mental Health.

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (6) ◽  
pp. 530-541 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa J Green ◽  
Stacy Tzoumakis ◽  
Kristin R Laurens ◽  
Kimberlie Dean ◽  
Maina Kariuki ◽  
...  

Objective: Detecting the early emergence of childhood risk for adult mental disorders may lead to interventions for reducing subsequent burden of these disorders. We set out to determine classes of children who may be at risk for later mental disorder on the basis of early patterns of development in a population cohort, and associated exposures gleaned from linked administrative records obtained within the New South Wales Child Development Study. Methods: Intergenerational records from government departments of health, education, justice and child protection were linked with the Australian Early Development Census for a state population cohort of 67,353 children approximately 5 years of age. We used binary data from 16 subdomains of the Australian Early Development Census to determine classes of children with shared patterns of Australian Early Development Census–defined vulnerability using latent class analysis. Covariates, which included demographic features (sex, socioeconomic status) and exposure to child maltreatment, parental mental illness, parental criminal offending and perinatal adversities (i.e. birth complications, smoking during pregnancy, low birth weight), were examined hierarchically within latent class analysis models. Results: Four classes were identified, reflecting putative risk states for mental disorders: (1) disrespectful and aggressive/hyperactive behaviour, labelled ‘misconduct risk’ ( N = 4368; 6.5%); (2) ‘pervasive risk’ ( N = 2668; 4.0%); (3) ‘mild generalised risk’ ( N = 7822; 11.6%); and (4) ‘no risk’ ( N = 52,495; 77.9%). The odds of membership in putative risk groups (relative to the no risk group) were greater among children from backgrounds of child maltreatment, parental history of mental illness, parental history of criminal offending, socioeconomic disadvantage and perinatal adversities, with distinguishable patterns of association for some covariates. Conclusion: Patterns of early childhood developmental vulnerabilities may provide useful indicators for particular mental disorder outcomes in later life, although their predictive utility in this respect remains to be established in longitudinal follow-up of the cohort.


1923 ◽  
Vol 69 (287) ◽  
pp. 434-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry A. Cotton

It is extremely befitting that this Association should be interested in the relation of chronic sepsis to mental disorders, principally for the reason that this idea had its origin in England. As early as 1875, Savage, the English alienist, reported the recovery of cases of mental disorder following the extraction of infected teeth. The full significance of this report, of course, was not realised at the time, for if it had been recognised, an entirely different history of the care and treatment of mental disorders during the last century would have been written.


Author(s):  
Sally-Ann Cooper

Mental disorders are common in people with intellectual disability, with a reported point prevalence of 36% in children and young people (including challenging behaviours), and 40.9% in adults (or 28.3% excluding challenging behaviours). People with intellectual disability experience all types of mental disorders, some more commonly than the general population, e.g. autism, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, and dementia. Challenging behaviours are also common, and have no clear general population equivalent. Multi-morbidity of mental and physical disorders is typical. Mental disorder assessments are complex due to multi-morbidity and polypharmacy, in addition to impairments in communication, understanding, vision, and hearing, and the need to work with family and paid carers as well as the person with intellectual disability. Mental disorder classificatory systems have been developed for people with intellectual disability, in view of under-reporting when using general population manuals: DC-LD was designed to complement ICD-10, and DM-ID 2 to interpret DSM-5.


Author(s):  
Alfonso Troisi

Medicalization of human behavioral diversity is a recurring theme in the history of psychiatry, and the problem of defining what is a genuine mental disorder remains an unresolved question since the origins of clinical psychopathology. This chapter presents an evolutionary view of mental health, placing functional capacities and biological adaptation at the core of attempts to define mental disorder instead of other criteria of morbidity that are commonly used . This theoretical shift depends on the fact that the evolutionary concept of mental disorder is consequence oriented: what makes a condition pathological are its consequences, not its causes or correlates. The chapter then provides, an evolutionary analysis, which reveals that the degree of efficiency of functional capacities is dependent on features of the environment. Optimal functional capacities are sets of coevolved traits that are best suited to increasing adaptation in specific environments. The same trait can be highly adaptive in one environment and minimally adaptive in another.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (8) ◽  
pp. 932-948 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa Roy ◽  
Marie-Pier Rivest ◽  
Dahlia Namian ◽  
Nicolas Moreau

Since its initial publication, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has been the object of criticism which has led to regular revisions by the American Psychiatric Association. This article analyses the debates that surrounded the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.). Building on the concepts of public arenas and reception theory, it explores the meaning encoded in the manual by audiences. Our results, which draw from a thematic analysis of traditional and digital media sources, identify eight audiences that react to the American Psychiatric Association’s narrative of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.): conformist, reformist, humanist, culturalist, naturalist, conflictual, constructivist and utilitarian. While some of their claims present argumentative polarities, others overlap, thus challenging the idea, often presented in academic publications, of a fixed debate. In order to further discuss on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, we draw attention to claims that ‘travel’ across different communities of audiences.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ester Holte Kofod

Grief is sometimes poetically described as the price of love: An inescapable existential condition of human life. However, throughout the 20th century, grief has increasingly come to be understood as a pathological condition that requires psychological and/or medical intervention. With the release ofDiagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders(5th ed.,DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), grief came close to being included as a separate mental disorder. However, the diagnostic revisions concerning bereavement have been met with criticism of medicalizing grief and of exceeding the territory of psychiatry beyond its legitimate borders. On this basis, I argue that grief is currently a border diagnosis, that is, a condition whose meanings are informed in heterogeneous ways by medical, psychiatric, and psychological understandings yet constantly challenged by alternative, nonmedicalizing discourses. Drawing on empirical findings from an ongoing interview study with bereaved parents after infant loss, I analyze and discuss 4 different accounts concerning the question of diagnosing grief: (a) diagnosis as a legitimating and normalizing practice, (b) diagnosis as a demarcation practice, (c) diagnosis as pathologization, and (d) diagnosis as a normative ideal. Through the examples, I attempt to demonstrate how bereaved individuals do not merely passively adopt but reflectively use these kinds of understandings to deal with their grief.


2019 ◽  
pp. 189-220
Author(s):  
Allan V. Horwitz

Psychiatry faced a major predicament as it entered the 1970s: it lacked the disease conditions that would provide the field with medical legitimacy. The publication of the DSM-III by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 marked a thoroughgoing change in thinking about mental illness. In one stroke, psychiatry discarded one intellectual paradigm that had little concern with diagnosis and adopted an entirely new system of classification that imported a model from medicine where diagnosis is “the keystone of medical practice and clinical research.” The promulgators of the DSM-III overthrew the broad, vague, and often etiologically oriented concepts that were embodied in the DSM-I and DSM-II, reclaiming the diagnostic tradition that dominated 19th-century psychiatry. The fundamental principle of the new manual was to define distinct mental disorders through using observable clusters of symptoms without reference to their causes. The DSM-III created a powerful standardized system of diagnoses that reigned virtually unchallenged for the following three decades. It allowed psychiatry to reorganize itself from a discipline where diagnosis played a marginal role to one where it was the basis of the specialty. The DSM-III revolutionized conceptions of mental disorder through transforming conditions that had been thought to be distinctively psychosocial into ones that were disease-like states.


Author(s):  
Terence M. Keane ◽  
Mark W. Miller

This chapter reviews the status of modifications to the definition of PTSD and proposed changes for DSM-5. We include a brief history of the diagnosis and trace its evolution in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). We discuss some of the current controversies related to the definition of PTSD including its location among the anxiety disorders, the utility of Criterion A and its subcomponents, and the factor structure of the symptoms. We review the rationale for the addition of new symptoms and modifications to existing criteria now and conclude with comments on future directions for research on PTSD.


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