scholarly journals Are Insider Sales Always Bad News? Evidence On Large Sales By Key Insiders

2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynda S. Livingston

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 40.3pt 0pt 0.5in; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-family: &quot;CG Times&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt;">Investors often scrutinize stock trades by corporate insiders, hoping to infer the nature of any privileged information which may have motivated the trades. Conventional wisdom suggests that sales of stock by insiders reveal negative information; this interpretation is supported by empirical work such as the series of papers by Seyhun. However, this common interpretation fails to distinguish between sales by atomistic insiders and sales by controlling blockholders.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>In this paper, I present evidence which suggests that sales by controlling insiders should not be considered bad news. Using both a series of logit regressions and traditional event-study tests, I examine the relationship between a firm's performance and the willingness of its controlling shareholder to sell a significant proportion of his shares. I find that firm value is just as likely to rise on the news of large insider sales as it is to fall, so that large sales need not imply negative private information.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>One possible explanation for a positive response to a controlling blockholder's large sale is that such a sale makes the insider vulnerable to meaningful oversight by outside shareholders. Thus, a large sale may be a signal of the insider's willingness to expose himself to shareholder monitoring and discipline. However, regardless of the interpretation, the empirical evidence presented in the paper forces the conclusion that it is inappropriate to interpret all insider sales as bad news: insider sales occur in a variety of contexts, and creating buy/sell rules which ignore those contexts is simplistic and erroneous.</span></p>

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (12) ◽  
pp. 3766-3797 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Edmans ◽  
Itay Goldstein ◽  
Wei Jiang

We analyze strategic speculators’ incentives to trade on information in a model where firm value is endogenous to trading, due to feedback from the financial market to corporate decisions. Trading reveals private information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental value. This feedback effect has an asymmetric effect on trading behavior: it increases (reduces) the profitability of buying (selling) on good (bad) news. This gives rise to an endogenous limit to arbitrage, whereby investors may refrain from trading on negative information. Thus, bad news is incorporated more slowly into prices than good news, potentially leading to overinvestment. (JEL D83, G12, G14)


Author(s):  
Sondes Draief

This research investigates the effect of the determinants of accounting discretion (beating last year’s earnings, overinvestment problems, growth options, debt, and financial risk) on the relationship between earnings management and stock returns. We use discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management.Based on a sample of 486 American firms for the period 2002-2010, our results show that discretionary accruals are positively priced by the market. This relation is even stronger when firms beat last year’s earnings, have higher growth options and increase their debt ratio. Indeed, firms’ accounting manipulations are used, in these circumstances, to convey private information about future prospects and signal good financial situation to external investors. However, discretionary accruals are negatively priced by investors in distressed firms and when overinvestment problems are intense. These firms have greater motivation to use opportunistic earnings management to camouflage the fall of firm value.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Chen ◽  
Zeqiong Huang ◽  
Xu Jiang ◽  
Gaoqing Zhang ◽  
Yun Zhang

We examine the effects of asymmetric timeliness in reporting good versus bad news on price informativeness when prices provide useful information to assist firms’ investment decisions. We find that a reporting system featuring more timely disclosure of bad news than of good news encourages speculators to trade on their private information. Consequently, it generates a higher expected investment level and firm value. Our analysis generates predictions consistent with empirical findings and provides a justification for the more timely reporting of bad news in the absence of managerial incentive problems. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.


2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Wertag ◽  
Denis Bratko

Abstract. Prosocial behavior is intended to benefit others rather than oneself and is positively linked to personality traits such as Agreeableness and Honesty-Humility, and usually negatively to the Dark Triad traits (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy). However, a significant proportion of the research in this area is conducted solely on self-report measures of prosocial behavior. Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between prosociality and the basic (i.e., HEXACO) and dark personality traits, comparing their contribution in predicting both self-reported prosociality and prosocial behavior. Results of the hierarchical regression analyses showed that the Dark Triad traits explain prosociality and prosocial behavior above and beyond the HEXACO traits, emphasizing the importance of the Dark Triad in the personality space.


2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dichu Bao ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
G. Mujtaba Mian ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su

ABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe the negative private information that managers possess. We tackle this challenge by constructing a proxy for managers' private bad news (residual short interest) and then perform a series of tests to validate this proxy. Using management earnings guidance and 8-K filings as measures of voluntary disclosure, we find a negative relation between bad-news disclosure and residual short interest, suggesting that managers withhold bad news in general. This tendency is tempered when firms are exposed to higher litigation risk, and it is strengthened when managers have greater incentives to support the stock price. Based on a novel approach to identifying the presence of bad news, our study adds to the debate on whether managers tend to withhold or release bad news. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.


2011 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsiao-Fen Hsiao ◽  
Chuan-Ying Hsu ◽  
Chun-An Li ◽  
Ai-Chi Hsu

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