scholarly journals Stosowanie przepisów o formie czynności prawnych, jako instrument kontroli obrotu prawnego w perspektywie orzecznictwa SN w latach 1964–1989

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 61-80
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Górska
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Economic Transformation ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Control ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Basic Functions ◽  
Political Conditions ◽  
Market Relations

The regulation of civil law transactions during the Polish People’s Republic took place on many different levels. Among other things, the scope of state control over the performance of legal transactions also involved the obligation to document them. At the normative level, the code institution of the form of legal transactions reflected classical civilist concepts, typical for free-market relations. The aim of the study is to determine to what extent the principle of freedom of form expressed in the Civil Code was respected in practice, and to what extent the application of the rules on form made them another tool at the disposal of the totalitarian state to control transactions. Judicial jurisprudence seems to be the most appropriate area to analyze this problem. The article presents selected theses of the Supreme Court relating to the application of regulations on the form of legal transactions, formulated in the years 1964–1989, that is, from the enactment of the Civil Code to the beginning of the political and economic transformation towards democracy and free-market economy. The main considerations are preceded by a presentation of the code regulation of the form of legal actions with an indication of the basic functions, which — in the intention of the authors of the Civil Code — were ascribed to the form of legal actions. The part of the study devoted to the discussion of the jurisprudence explains, first of all, how the principle of the freedom of form was understood and how the provisions on the special form and the consequences of failing to observe it were applied. The conclusions that emerge from the analysis do not allow us to formulate a thesis about an ideological interpretation by the Supreme Court. In particular, it cannot be confirmed that the use of provisions on form testified to their instrumentalization. This leads us to reflect that the political conditions of the communist period did not preclude the Supreme Court from interpreting the law in a fully autonomous manner. For this reason, much of the case law from that period is still relevant.

The tenure of English judges

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Object ◽  
William Iii ◽  
Science Association

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.

Scientific Commentary on the Review of Judicial Practice on Some Issues of the Application of Legislation on Business Entities

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 27-32
Author(s):  
V. K. Andreev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
Law Making

The article discusses the forms of clarification on matters of judicial practice by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as in the Review of judicial practice on some issues of the application of legislation on business companies dated December 25, 2019. Clarifications of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on issues of judicial practice are characterized as the positions of the courts identified in the course of studying and summarizing the judicial practice of the corresponding category of cases, which are acts of individual regulation of public relations. Focusing on Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and Section 6, Art. 12 of the APC RF shows the validity of dividing wrong into two types of wrong: the «moderate» type of «judicial law-making and the position of the court» and the «radical» type of «judicial law-making», when the court develops the rule of law, which contradicts the constitutional principle of separation of powers. When resolving corporate disputes, it is necessary to investigate whether the charter of a non-public company does not contain the rights and obligations of its participants, which they themselves created by making a unanimous decision and including them in the charter of the company (paragraph 3 of Art. 66.3 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, paragraph 3 of Art. 14 of the Law about LLC).

The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Independent Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Harsh Criticism

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.

scholarly journals Czy przebaczenie niweczy skutki uprzedniego wydziedziczenia?

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 143-153
Author(s):  
Anna Moskal
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Inheritance Law ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Made In

Does forgiveness nullify the effects of previous disinheritance? The legal nature of forgiveness is the subject of passionate debates among the representatives of civil law doctrine. According to the dominant position in the literature, forgiveness is an act of affection or its manifested expression of forgiveness of the perpetrator of experienced injustice and related to this grudge. This institution has been applied three times in the Civil Code — once with the donation agreement, twice in regulations of inheritance law. Article 1010 § 1 provides that a testator cannot disinherit eligible for legal portion if he forgave him. The wording of the above article indicates that accomplishment of disinheritance in case if testator eligible for legal portion has previously forgiven. The legislator did not, however, determine the effects of forgiveness in relation to previous disinheritance. In the act of 1971, the Supreme Court accepted that such forgiveness would automatically nullify the effects of disinheritance, and could be made in any form. In recent years, lower courts have begun to question the Supreme Court's position, and judges increasingly refer to the critical statements of numerous doctrines. As it was rightly stated, admitting the possibility of invoking the forgiveness made after disinheritance poses a serious threat to the realization of the testator’s will, who, by forgiving, does not necessarily want to revoke the effects of his previous disinheritance. The postulate of de lege ferenda is, according to the author of the article, giving of freedom of judging the effects of forgiveness to the courts and each examination of the forgiving testator’s will on the possible abatement of the consequences of previous disinheritance.]]>

Judicial Power in a Political World

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Crowe
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Rhetoric ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Relationship

This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects upon the lessons of the more than 200-year historical lineage of the institutional judiciary for our understanding of judicial power in America. More specifically, it considers the place of the federal judiciary in America's past and future in empirical and normative terms, respectively. It argues that both political rhetoric and academic exegesis about the Supreme Court embody a fundamentally incorrect presumption about the judiciary being external to politics, and that such presumption leads to a series of misconceptions about the relationship between judicial power and democratic politics. The chapter offers a conception that not only locates the judicial branch squarely within the political arena but also places substantially greater emphasis on its cooperation rather than conflict with other actors and institutions in that arena.

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