scholarly journals CSTO: at the Close of the Second Decade of Its History

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (7) ◽  
pp. 126-134
Author(s):  
A. Krivopalov

Following the events of 1991, Russia established either bilateral or multilateral relations with most of the independent states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In each individual case, these relations were characterized by a specific set of advantages and disadvantages. The article explores the evolution of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) through the lens of this fundamental duality. This overview in no way claims to be a complete or exhaustive study on the subject. However, its relevance is supported by the fact it moves beyond the purely descriptive approach which still dominates the study of the CSTO and the crisis that has gripped the organization. There is a demand for a clearer structural and theoretical framework explaining the difficulties Russia has faced in promoting its integration efforts in the post-Soviet space. The undeniable advantage of the bilateral approach is its institutional simplicity. In a multilateral system or a block of states, it is far more difficult to coordinate the interests of every individual nation, especially if they maintain membership in a number of integration groups at the global or regional level. One of the strengths of the multilateral format, which involves a stricter adherence to collective obligations, is that it serves as a structural framework for major integration projects that can have a significant positive effect on the international standing of those who initiate them. The author concludes that in 2002–2008, during the early period of CSTO’s existence, cooperation was predominantly multilateral in nature, with the participating countries – those representing the Central Asian core of the organization – rallying around Moscow, unified by the commonly perceived threats generated by the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. However, even at this early stage, there were signs within the CSTO foreshadowing a shift from multilateral military-political cooperation to a more basic format – that of a collection of bilateral ties between Russia and its allies. The past 20 years of Russia’s relations with its neighbors have demonstrated that the historical momentum for convergence is, in fact, not strong enough to offset the centrifugal forces pulling nations away from one another.

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-338 ◽  

The Political Consultative Committee established under the Warsaw collective security treaty held its first meeting in Prague on January 27 and 28, 1956. In addition to representatives of the eight signatory powers (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union), an observer from the People's Republic of China attended the meeting. According to press reports, a declaration was issued at the close of the two-day meeting in which an immediate big-power agreement to exclude nuclear weapons from the equipment of any armies stationed in Germany was proposed. The declaration said that the Warsaw powers noted a basic change in the international situation and the existence of possibilities for its further improvement; while in Europe the continued armament of the western powers and the remilitarization of Germany made it essential for the signatories to ensure their own safety, at the same time they intended to work constantly for a system of collective security and general disarmament. Specifically, the declaration renewed an earlier Soviet proposal for a European collective security system and the establishment of a zone to include all Germany, where arms and troops would be limited and controlled. In the meantime, it recommended that nonaggression pacts should be made between states, and in general a start should be made to improve relations between states, irrespective of their existing or eventual membership in one or another military bloc. A communique issued with the declaration announced that the newly created army of the German Democratic Republic had been formally accepted into the command of Marshal Ivan S. Konev, supreme commander of the Warsaw treaty military structure.


2021 ◽  
pp. 20-32
Author(s):  
Eldar Kh. Seidametov ◽  
◽  

The article examines the situation of the Tatars and other Muslim minorities in Bulgaria during the communist period. The policy of the state in relation to Muslim minorities after the proclamation of the People`s Republic of Bulgaria and the establishment of socialism in the state according to the Soviet model, when the political, economic and social models of the USSR were imported and introduced without taking into account the national characteristics of Bulgaria, are analyzed. As in the Soviet Union (especially in the early stage of its formation, religion was banned and this applied to all confessions without exception. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) made every effort eradicate religious identity and, in particular, Islamic identity. It was planned to replace the religious ideological fragment with a socialist one, and then, on its platform, form and stimulate the development of the national, modernist and Soviet identity of Muslims. Moreover, the emphasis was also placed on improving the way of life and the material situation of the Muslim population, which, according to the Marxist theory of culture, should have contributed to a more effective formation of socialist consciousness. The ruling party saw in the Muslim religious consciousness and rudiments of the Ottoman past, an obstacle on the way of socialist progress and formation of socialist consciousness. Emasculating elements of the religious worldview from the mind of people, the BCP set itself the task of creating a modern, secular, socialist personality. To this end, in 1946–1989 the government implemented a number of economic, educational and cultural establishments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-191
Author(s):  
Lucien Bianco

China underwent its most murderous famine between 1958 and 1962. Although a demographic transition from the countryside to the cities was in its early stage and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was among the lowest in the world, objective conditions were far less decisive than Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies in bringing about the famine. A development strategy copied on the Soviet model favoured quick industrialization at the expense of rural dwellers. Such novelties as people’s communes, communal canteens, and backyard furnaces further aggravated the famine. Though ethnic minorities represented only 6 percent of China’s population, compared to forty-seven percent in the Soviet Union, Soviet nationality policies heavily influenced those of China. Initially mild, especially for Tibetans, Chinese nationality policies became more authoritarian with the advent of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. Qinghai Tibetans resisted the closure of many monasteries; then the same policies, and famine itself, caused a more important rebellion in 1959 in Xizang (Tibet). Repression and the flight of the Dalai Lama to northern India coincided with the end of Tibet’s special status in China. Internal colonialism did not, however, aggravate the impact of famine on national minorities in China. Their rate of population growth between the first two censuses (1953 and 1982) exceeded that of Han Chinese. Among the provinces most severely affected by famine, only Qinghai was largely inhabited by ethnic minorities. Within Qinghai the same pattern prevailed as in Han populated provinces: the highest toll in famine deaths was concentrated in easily accessible grain surplus areas. The overwhelming majority of victims of the Chinese famine were Han peasants. At most, 5 percent were members of ethnic minorities, compared to eighty percent of victims in the Soviet Union in the period between 1930 and 1933.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 350-387
Author(s):  
Olle Sundström

In his exhaustive study of ‘shamanism’ among the Altaic peoples in Southern Siberia, the renowned Soviet ethnographer Leonid P. Potapov contends that ‘under the present conditions there are no remnants or survivals of Shamanism as such left in Altai’. What remains are legends and reminiscences, but these can no longer be told by people with personal experiences of Altaic ‘shamans’ and their rituals. According to Potapov, modern socialist culture has changed the minds of the Altaic peoples to the degree that they are now a materialistically thinking people, and ‘shamanism’ has completely disappeared. In addition, he contends that there are no prospects of its return after the deathblow dealt by Soviet anti-religious repression in the 1930s ‘shamanic’ rituals were forbidden and ritual paraphernalia such as drums and costumes were expropriated by the authorities. Considering that Potapov in his study follows Altaic ‘shamanism’ through 1500 years, depicting it as a ‘religion’ and ‘theology’ which stayed more or less intact over the centuries, his statement seems more like a pious hope based on the Soviet vision of a society liberated from superstition, religion, and spiritual exploitation. Potapov himself delineates Altaic ‘shamanism’s’ development from a ‘state religion’to a ‘folk religion’. From this perspective it might seem remarkable that ‘shamanism’ should not have survived 70 years of atheist repression, missionary work and the Soviet transformation of society. Already by the time Potapov’s book was published, during the very last months of the existence of the Soviet Union, there had, in fact, appeared a number of persons claiming to be ‘shamans’, with an ancestry dating from the time of ‘shamans’ of the first half of the twentieth century. These individuals were also part of organisations and movements promoting the revival of ‘shamanism’ in the autonomous Altai Republic. In other parts of the former Soviet Union similar processes took place. Today, in post-Soviet Altai, as well as in many other parts of Siberia, shamanism exists in the same sense that there is Buddhism, Christianity and Islam in the region.


Author(s):  
Paul Hyer

Chinggis Khan is the single most important icon or historical figure of Mongolia but the next most important icon, for many generations was the Jebtsundamba khutukhtu (hubilgan, incarnation or “Living Bud­dha”) of Urga.1 The 8th Jebtsundamba, as a symbol of both religious and secular power or unity in Mongolia, weathered the storm of China’s 1911 Revolution, and Russia’s 1917 Revolution. Then during the early period of the Communist Revolution in Mongolia (1921), northern Mongolia became the first satellite of the Soviet Union and because the Jebtsundamba wielded enormous traditional influ­ence among the people he was retained by communist leaders during a transition in the revolution in Mongolia. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v0i17.82 Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, No.17 2012: 64-74


2021 ◽  
pp. 72-79
Author(s):  
Maryna Okladna ◽  
Margarita Fedorovska ◽  
Darya Yukhymenko

Problem setting. Secret diplomacy, in various forms, has remained a key method of international relations and the development of relations between states. For example, the fate of the Caribbean Crisis was decided by secret diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, despite the extremely large influence of secret diplomacy on the development of international relations, it is necessary to note a rather small level of study of secret diplomacy as a phenomenon. Analysis of recent researches and publications. In the scientific literature, the theoretical aspects of secret diplomacy have been the subject of scientific research by such scholars as Cornelia Biolu, Anthony Venis-V. John, Pika SM, Kostyuk DA, Pron TM, but a significant number of extremely important documents for understanding the problem remains in closed access. That is why the lack of scientific literature, which would describe secret diplomacy in the theoretical aspect, significantly complicates the study and study of secret diplomacy in general. Target of research. The aim of the paper is to carry out a critical review of the definition of secret diplomacy, to analyze the types of secret diplomacy and to consider features of their functioning in international relations, as well as to identify the disadvantages and advantages of secret diplomacy. Article’s main body. The article provides a general analysis of the definition of the concept of "secret diplomacy" in international practice. The opinions of leading scientists are given. Examples from history are analyzed. The paper analyzes in detail the types of secret diplomacy, and also considers the features of their functioning in international relations. In addition, the main advantages and disadvantages of secret diplomacy were formulated, as well as the prospect of its further application in practice. Conclusions. Secret diplomacy is the activity of the government to implement the foreign, international policy of the state, which is conducted in secret from society, other states and third parties in order to facilitate negotiations, establish relations and obtain various benefits. The methods of secret diplomacy have been used since ancient times and continue to be key not only in relations between states, but also in resolving international conflicts, despite the fact that the phenomenon has a number of disadvantages in addition to its advantages. There are several types of secret diplomacy, each of which differs from the others not only in its purposes for which it is used, but also in its components.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-146
Author(s):  
Gayle Lonergan

This article illustrates the recruitment profile of the Civil War cohort of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1919 to 1921.It disputes the traditional historiography, which presents the party as undergoing a linear process of decay and corruption ending in the period of the careerists of the Brezhnev period. Instead it demonstrates that even in the early period of the revolutionary republic the party was an attractive prospect for those wishing to attain position and privilege. Once it had shown itself to be the victor in the conflict, the party enjoyed considerable popularity in unexpected regions, attracting ambitious young peasants from the peripheries of the former Empire.


Slavic Review ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Evans Clements

Traditionally in surveys of Soviet history, if Alexandra Kollontai is mentioned she is presented briefly as the advocate of the “glass of water theory of sex,” a woman who practiced free love as freely as she preached it. The lecturer then moves on to more serious concerns, having ignored the history of a tormented, perceptive woman intimately involved in the early Soviet experiment in female emancipation. Kollontai advocated far more than free love, and the role she played was far greater than that of mistress to Alexander Shliapnikov. From 1917 until her departure from the Soviet Union in 1923 she held positions of major importance in the young government and in the Bolshevik party. Kollontai worked first as an agitator in 1917, then took the post of commissar of state welfare from November 1917 to March 1918, when she resigned in protest against the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. In 1921 she joined the Workers' Opposition, adding to Shliapnikov's proposals for trade-union reform her own call for party and government democratization and giving articulate voice to those demands in an often-cited pamphlet, The Workers' Opposition. Throughout the revolutionary years she was recognized as a major authority on the problems of women and child care. Since Kollontai did play an important role in the early period of Soviet history, her personality and ideology warrant study. That study in turn reveals a woman who perceived the problems of womanhood with clarity and who wrote about and sought a liberation beyond the comprehension of many of her contemporaries.


1975 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-49
Author(s):  
Herbert J. Ellison

Our focus is upon problems of periodization in Belorussian and Ukrainian history. It is tempting, and perhaps even useful, at the outset of this commentary to speculate on what would be the problems addressed in a discussion of this subject had the 1917 revolution resulted in genuine national independence for the main nationalities of the Russian Empire, followed by nearly sixty years of relatively free scholarship within the context of democratic societies. Probably the early period would not have been too different from what actually occurred in the Soviet Union, with a considerable flourishing of the various national historiographies and with vigorous research into the unique elements of the particular national heritage. Indeed, we have the example of the inter-war Baltic states before us which seems to support such speculation.


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